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## **Fukuzawa Yukichi and Maruyama Masao: Two Visions of Japan<sup>1</sup>**

**Alan Macfarlane**

Fukuzawa Yukichi and Maruyama Masao are arguably the most interesting Japanese intellectuals of the last two hundred years. It is a great honour, but also somewhat humbling, to be talking about them, and to be doing this in the illustrious Centre for Japanese Studies at Berkeley. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to visit the west coast of America for the first time, and to share some ideas with you.

The task of briefly summarizing their visions of Japan is made both simpler and more complex by the fact that their theories are so intertwined. Increasingly through his life Maruyama went back to Fukuzawa's ideas and his *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, in particular, is filled with quotations from and allusions to Fukuzawa. As Carol Gluck wrote in the Maruyama seminar last year, 'You want to trace Maruyama, his own ideas, look at what he writes on Fukuzawa'.

A second difficulty is that there is a widespread image of Fukuzawa and Maruyama as the great modernizers. Certainly when I encountered each of them as a non-specialist I first learnt that their importance was that they saw more clearly than anyone else the values of western modernity. I was told that they were determined to introduce many aspects of the politics, social relations and, in Fukuzawa's case, the technology, which had made the west so open and powerful.

I received an image that each had faced a crisis, and for each of them the solution was rapid 'modernization', the replacing of a crumbling, brittle and unsatisfactory 'eastern' structure by a shining, efficient, open new model. Fukuzawa used modern forms as a way of smashing down the claustrophobic late Tokugawa world of his youth and laying the foundations for modern Japan. Maruyama advocated a return to western values as an antidote to the disastrous fascist tendencies which had led into the war experience of Japan in the 1930's and 40's.

It took me some time to realize that while there is a half-truth in this representation, it tends to miss much of what makes these two thinkers so great. Like Tocqueville, their power arises from a tension, from almost equal loyalties to two different orders. They do not advocate the destruction of an older Japan, to which they still feel a deep attachment, but rather a synthesis. They advocated preserving the best of the continuities with the past, while absorbing enough of the new lines of force which have been developed in the west. It is this balancing act which makes them so interesting.

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As you will know, Fukuzawa was born in 1835, into a late Tokugawa society which he described so brilliantly in his *Autobiography*. He found himself growing up in a world which, in comparison to his experiences in America and Europe, seemed

extraordinary. On the surface it was a highly advanced pre-industrial society, a complex civilization stretching back thousands of years, filled with money, markets, cities, internal trade, a high literature, superb crafts, ingenious technologies. It had taken the best of Chinese civilization and improved on it. In the material and external sense it seemed about as high level an equilibrium as could be achieved without industrial power, as Susan Hanley and others have argued.<sup>2</sup>

The central problem in Fukuzawa's life and thought came from the realization that however well Japan had done by pursuing the Chinese agrarian path, when faced with the American warships and the aggressive imperialisms of the industrial and scientific west, all this was doomed. Japan's meticulous, organic, skilled world would be brushed aside and trampled over by those who had already cracked open China in the Opium Wars, had gobbled up India, South America and much of the Pacific. Japan was next on the list.

To avoid the fate of becoming an imperial colony, something drastic had to be done. Many people, of course, were saying the same thing. Fukuzawa's genius was to see that the changes that were needed went far beyond a technical appropriation of bits of western technology.

It was not enough to introduce isolated bits of western technology, to follow China in buying weapons from the West, for instance. It was essential that Japan learnt the principles or spirit behind the technology and created the appropriate institutional structures. 'The idea seems to be that, if England has one thousand warships, and we too have one thousand warships, then we can stand against them.' This was not enough. It was 'the thinking of men who are ignorant of the proportions of things.' Much more was needed. 'If there are one thousand warships, there have to be at least ten thousand merchant ships, which in turn require at least one hundred thousand navigators; and to create navigators there must be naval science.' Even more than this was required. 'Only when there are many professors and many merchants, when laws are in order and trade prospers, when social conditions are ripe - when, that is, you have all the prerequisites for a thousand warships - only then can there be a thousand warships.'<sup>3</sup>

So what Fukuzawa set about doing was to undertake a comparative anthropology of civilizations along the lines which he had observed in the work of western philosophers. He felt that once he could understand the deeper nature of the whole of western and eastern civilizations, he could then work out what changes were needed.

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Fukuzawa based his ideas on the work of Guizot, Tocqueville and Mill. This led him to believe, like Montesquieu, that there must be a separation and balance of powers. If there was the Confucian fusion of kinship and politics, there would be hierarchical absolutism. If there was a fusion of politics and religion, there would be despotism. For instance, he commented that in the case of Buddhism, 'its teaching has been entirely absorbed by political authority. What shines throughout the world is not the radiance of Buddha's teachings but the glory of Buddhism's political authority. Hence it is not surprising that there is no independent religious structure within the Buddhist religion.'<sup>4</sup> Or again, if there was a fusion of society and economy there would be stagnation. If

there was a fusion of public life and private morality there would be absolutism. The parts needed to be separated and artificially held apart.

'To use a simile, if you take metals such as gold, silver, copper and iron, and melt them together, you would not end up with gold, or silver, or copper, or iron, but with a compound mixture that preserves a certain balance between the various elements, and in which each adds strength to the others. This is how Western civilization is.'<sup>5</sup> There must be a never-ending contest, which no part wins. 'The point of difference between Western and other civilizations is that Western society does not have a uniformity of opinions; various opinions exist side by side without fusing into one. For example, there are theories which advocate governmental authority; others argue for the primacy of religious authority. There are proponents of monarchy, theocracy, aristocracy, and democracy. Each goes its own way, each maintains its own position. Although they vie with one another, no single one of them ever completely wins out. Since the contest never is decided, all sides grudgingly are forced to live with the others.'<sup>6</sup>

The general openness of the society can only be guaranteed if freedom to dominate is held in check. 'Now in the first place, the freedom of civilization cannot be bought at the expense of some other freedom. It can only exist by not infringing upon other rights and privileges, other opinions and powers, all of which should exist in some balance. It is only possible for freedom to exist when freedom is restricted.'<sup>7</sup> Again we have the idea of the dynamic balance of powers and opinions.

The domination of one sphere, for instance the kinship or political system, is a 'disease'. 'All of this is the result of the imbalance of power, an evil that has arisen from not paying attention to the second step of things. If we do not take cognizance of this evil and get rid of the disease of imbalance, whether the country is at peace or in turmoil no real progress will be made in the level of civilization of the country.'<sup>8</sup>

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If this was how the west had become rich and powerful, what was to be done? Here Fukuzawa faced two problems. The first concerned how far Japan had to travel to meet this target, and how much it should sacrifice. For what Fukuzawa realized was that underneath the high-level craft, commercial, agrarian attainment of Japan there lay, largely invisible to outsiders, a type of civilization unknown elsewhere in the world. Japan had attained the highest levels of affluence and artistic skills, and one of the longest peaceful periods of a recorded civilization, on a rocky and unstable island. It had done so not merely by hard work and good organization. It has achieved the almost impossible because, in essence, it had retained an extraordinary, non-divided, world.

Fukuzawa nowhere gives a complete portrait of what this world was like, but he touches on it in its different aspects through his own experiences. He describes the relationality, hierarchy, embeddedness and conformity which were signs of the integration that it produced in a number of key passages. Let me just quote one of these.

Fukuzawa described what he perceived to be the rigid and hierarchical social system of Tokugawa Japan, where people were born unequal. He described how 'Back in those childhood days, I lived under the iron-bound feudal system. Everywhere people clung to the ancient custom by which the rank of every member of a clan was unalterably fixed by his birth. So from father to son and grandson the samurai of high rank would retain their rank. In the same way those of lower rank would forever remain in their low position. Neither intelligence nor ability could prevent the scorn of their superiors.'<sup>9</sup>

What was to be found in the family and clan was to be found everywhere. 'Wherever there are social relationships there you will find this imbalance of power. Even within the government itself the imbalance can be extremely great, depending on the position and grade of the officials. When we see a minor official brandishing his authority over one commoner we might think he is a very powerful person. But let this same official meet someone higher in the bureaucracy and he will be subjected to even worse oppression from his superior than he dealt out to the commoner.'<sup>10</sup>

It was a system of innate inequalities, which afflicted every relationship. 'You will find this imbalance in all relations between man and woman, between parents and children, between brothers, and between young and old. Turn from the family circle to society, and relations there will be no different. Teacher and student, lord and retainer, rich and poor, noble and base-born, newcomers and oldtimers, main family and branch families - between all of these there exists an imbalance of power.'<sup>11</sup> The whole social structure seemed fixed, almost caste-like, and was transmitted over the generations.

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Now such a world is basically as oil is to the water of western separations. Yet it was this very 'stickiness', relationality, which made the system work so effectively. Fukuzawa's problem was to see whether Japan could be adapted to retain the best of the integrated solutions, yet make it sufficiently flexible to underpin the new western technologies, sciences and the social and political arrangements which came with them. It was not just a vague matter of 'eastern spirit' and 'western science', but something much deeper that needed adjustment.

So Fukuzawa set about trying to prize open the Japanese system to let in some oxygen. He set up clubs, helped found Keio University, Maruzen bookshop, improve banking, develop the art of public speaking, improve the status of women and many other things. He was a single-man modernizing tornado and for a while western ideas and institutions were known as 'Fukuzawa things'.

Working in collaboration with many others, the changes he suggested seemed to work. Japan appeared to perform a miracle. Three generations before anywhere else in Asia it industrialized. It became a might economic and military power, defeating China and Russia. Later, after the massive damage of the Second World War, it rebuilt itself to become the most efficient economy in the world.

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Like Fukuzawa, Maruyama's genius was to see below the surface to the bed-rock of a deeper Japanese world. He was prompted to do this by as great an existentialist crisis as that faced by Fukuzawa, but of a different kind. The Japanese disgrace of the slide into fascism and the defeat in the Second World War, with the complicity of the

intellectuals, faced Maruyama with the problem of what had gone wrong with the supposed modernization of Japan. Had it been too extreme, not extreme enough, or a botched operation?

In order to solve this problem he made a serious study of the outside models which Japan was supposed to base herself on, not just the Enlightenment thinkers read by Fukuzawa, but also more recent philosophers, in particular German ones like Marx, Weber and Mannheim. He also looked to see how America was proceeding.

Fukuzawa had been optimistic, for he looked forward to trying an experiment in mixing systems – and for a while seemed hugely successful. He did not live to see the failures, either in Japan itself, or in the Cold War era. Maruyama was more pessimistic for he saw not only that the Japanese experiment was flawed, but also that the western trajectory had led to fascism and counter-fascism, communism and counter-communism, all deeply unsatisfactory.

The failure to overcome Japan's basically vertical and oppressive inequalities, fusing power and sentiment, was one of the main reasons, Maruyama believed, for the swing to fascism.

'The entire national order is constructed like a chain, with the Emperor as the absolute value entity; and at each link in the chain the intensity of vertical political control varies in proportion to the distance from the Emperor... from the apex of the hierarchy to the very bottom it was virtually impossible for a truly free, unregulated individual to exist. Society was so organized that each component group was constantly being regulated by a superior authority, while it was imposing its own authority on a group below.'<sup>12</sup>

His ideas on this are almost exactly like those of Fukuzawa two generations before, and he explicitly draws on the earlier insight.

'What takes the place of despotism in such a situation is a phenomenon that may be described as the maintenance of / equilibrium by the transfer of oppression. By exercising arbitrary power on those who are below, people manage to transfer in a downward direction the sense of oppression that comes from above, thus preserving the balance of the whole. This phenomenon is one of the most important heritages that modern Japan received from feudal society. It has been aptly interpreted by Fukuzawa Yukichi as the result of 'attaching too great importance to power', which, as he says, 'has been the rule in human intercourse in Japan ever since the beginning'. Fukuzawa continues as follows:

[The Japanese] made a clear distinction between the moral codes that apply to people above and to people below, and an equally clear distinction in the field of rights and duties. As a result every individual is in one capacity the victim of coercion, while in another capacity he metes out coercion to his fellow-men. He both suffers and perpetrates oppression; in one direction he yields, in another he boasts...' (in *Civilization*, vol.V) (pp.17-18))

The same phenomenon had been noted by Lafcadio Hearn. 'The individual of every class above the lowest must continue to be at once coercer and coerced'. The

average man is ‘under three kinds of pressure: pressure from above, exemplified in the will of his superiors; pressure about him, represented by the common will of his fellows and equals; pressure from below, represented by the general sentiment of his inferiors. And this last sort of coercion is not the least formidable.’<sup>13</sup>

Japan had never become egalitarian or modern or democratic, Maruyama argued. He wrote that ‘in Japan, although we have modern specialization, pre-modern social relations are still deeply ingrained.’<sup>14</sup> As Andrew Barshay writes, ‘for Maruyama, Japanese history appeared as a succession of thwarted break-throughs to universality. Japan could have, but did not, become a fully modern, democratic nation-state.’<sup>15</sup>

This was depressing enough, yet there was something equally worrying, which was that not only had Germany and Italy betrayed the ideals of the Enlightenment in the fascist era, but as Maruyama looked at America in the 1950’s, he felt that even the American solution was not working. Commenting on the McCarthy trials, he wrote that ‘...reading, too, of the astonishingly weak resistance shown by the general public, I am sure I cannot be alone in thinking “Alas, has America come to this?...”’<sup>16</sup>

He quoted Rauschnig’s book on Germany in 1939 “‘The temptation of our day is to accept the intolerable, for fear of still worse to come.’” Men who are in the clutches of fear quake before delusions of their own creation. History offers many examples of the illusion giving birth to the reality. Fascism is, par excellence, the child of fear – as well as the mother.’<sup>17</sup>

Later he commented that ‘It is ironical that with intensification of the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union have come more and more to resemble each other as they turn their internal organizations into “garrison-states”.’<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, he approvingly quotes Thomas Mann: ‘Due to unfortunate world circumstances, changes that strangle the heart and stir up anxiety have crept into the atmosphere of even that blessed country, that country which has raised itself to an enormous power. The enforcement of / conformism in the name of loyalty, spying one one’s conscience, education towards slander, the refusal to grant passports to undesirable scholars, thrusting down the unorthodox intellectuals mercilessly into economic ruin... all these things have regrettably come to be daily occurrences. In short, the defense of freedom is in trouble, and not a few people fear that it is at the brink of destruction.’<sup>19</sup>

Maruyama never resolved the problems he faced, for both Japan and the west had let him down. As Andrew Barshay writes, ‘In the end, Maruyama may best be seen as a utopian pessimist: utopian in spirit, but pessimistic about the capacity for self-transformation in the “deep things” of Japanese social structure.’<sup>20</sup>

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Yet it is even more complicated than this, for while wanting to open up Japan, Maruyama, like Fukuzawa, was also aware that the destruction of these “deep things” was not only impossible, but undesirable.

He believed that the best one could do was to separate the levels, to change the superficial but maintain the deep. He realized that the Japanese had not only been led into disaster by their past trajectory, but also had been protected by it. The deeper

structure had given them the resilience to survive the crushing defeat of 1945 and American occupation.

Yet, unaware of all this, they were adrift in the world, neglecting their special contribution and constitution. In his later years he set out to create a meta-theory of what had happened in Japanese history to explain to his countrymen who they really were and what the real pattern of their civilization had long been.

He stressed that Japan had followed a unique path; it was not just like a smaller China, or a copy of the west. ‘Nationalism in Japan has evolved along unique lines... To explain the singularity of its evolution we are obliged in the last analysis to focus on the unique pattern of Japan’s evolution as a modern state.’<sup>21</sup> Comparing Japanese nationalism to other parts of Asia, ‘Only one nation, the Empire of the Rising Sun, followed a completely different path.’<sup>22</sup>

So he put forward a fascinating metaphor for how we should look at the continuities of Japan. ‘Japan is characterized by a degree of homogeneity – homogeneity in terms of race, language, mode of agricultural production, etc. – unusual among the highly industrialized nations of the world... Often it is emphasized how much Japan has changed despite basic continuities; I, however, prefer to ask whether historical changes occurred not in spite of, but precisely because of, some basic continuous factors that underlie the Japanese experience.’

His famous metaphor was taken from a musical organ. ‘In music the *basso ostinato*... is a recurrent pattern of bass notes. It is an underlying motif that is independent from the treble part and, if the main theme appears in the treble part, it is bound to undergo some modifications by this *basso ostinato*. This metaphor may be applied to the historical development of Japanese thought. Most of the main themes have been imported from abroad since ancient times, beginning with Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and including modern ideologies such as liberalism, constitutionalism, anarchism, socialism, and so on.... If...we examine the circumstances in which those ideologies underwent modifications after they arrived in Japan from the Asian continent or from the West, certain patterns of thinking similar in each case emerge, each responsible for subtly changing the original. These recurrent patterns of thinking are those which I have termed the *basso ostinato* of Japanese intellectual history.’<sup>23</sup>

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Even more than Fukuzawa, Maruyama only gives parts of the picture, hints, guesses, a dab of paint here or there. It is very much an allusive, indirect, Japanese kind of painting where we have to fill in a great deal with our imagination.

I would like to end by adding my own impressions after visiting and reading about Japan over the last fifteen years. I believe that they are roughly in line with what Fukuzawa and Maruyama hinted at, but did not develop into a consistent picture. I am like an archaeologist, filling in the likely gaps between the surviving relics of two world views. This is how I guess it may be.<sup>24</sup>

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It seems to me that by filtering and modifying the pressures from outside, Japan has managed to avoid the separations of modernity. Starting off as holistic and integrated, it has more or less remained so. While appearing to be very modern, and perhaps, indeed, post-modern (in its fusion between spheres of life), it has reached this stage without actually going through the stage of modernity.

The anthropologist Ohnuki-Tierney offers us a choice. The Japanese case ‘challenges the assumption that modernization undermines the symbolic realm of the people; either the anthropological distinction between primitive and modern cultures is incorrect, or Japanese culture is “primitive”.’<sup>25</sup> I would argue that the distinction, as I had understood it, is indeed incorrect. If we do retain the opposition, then Japan is certainly “primitive” or tribal. Reischauer is right when he says that ‘the Japanese formed a sort of gigantic modern tribe’.<sup>26</sup>

This explains why schoolchildren I met could not answer the question of what religion they believed in because there was no such thing as ‘a religion’. Likewise it explains why all economic activity in Japan is embedded in social relations, and *vice versa* so that it enjoys ‘capitalist communism’. It explains the odd feeling of a porous kinship, both spreading out its emotional impact onto relations of power and production and belief, yet in itself weak and fragmented at the institutional level. It explains why all parts of life are fused together through aesthetics and style, which, by emphasising process and form, can unite people when there is nothing else to do so. It explains why all of ethics is multi-stranded, contextual and *ad hoc*.

The feeling I have, after living in a tribal society in Nepal for several years and after reading and teaching about many of the classic tribal societies in Africa, India, South America and the Pacific, is that Japan is curiously like a gigantic tribal society. It comprises not just a few thousands or tens of thousands of persons, but over 120 million. The surface of Japan, particularly the technology and material world, at first look familiar enough to westerners. Yet below it is a set of relations which is very different from what I have experienced elsewhere in other large civilizations.

Japan is a famously inter-twined society. Hardly any action or relationship is single-dimensional or stranded. Almost everything involves simultaneously what we would divide off as a separate political, economic, social and religious dimension. This is a huge burden for the Japanese since it means that each inter-personal relationship tends to be multi-level. It explains why many Japanese find it such a relief to live in the fragmented west.

Yet the multi-level and intertwined nature of the society is also a great source of strength since the famous *anomie* (rootlessness) and pointlessness, the draining of meaning when we separate out our institutions, is mitigated in Japan. Every gesture or action, for example working or painting or drinking tea, has a wealth of meanings beyond the thing itself.

In Japan, nothing is split apart. Mind and body are on one continuum, part of the same entity, not separate as in the modern west. The material world of the senses and the supernatural world of spirit are not opposed and different; they are interfused in the way that the poet Wordsworth tried to describe. Everything is simultaneously material, and infused with spirit. The sacred and the profane, the individual and the

group, the natural and the supernatural, the mind and the body, all the recent western oppositions are negated.

It has not gone through the dissociations of modernity, the move towards universalism, as Maruyama would put it. Japan has achieved an orderly, efficient, sophisticated and aesthetically beautiful civilization while maintaining this holistic cohesion. It is extraordinary.

Evidence for this interpretation comes if we ask the question, what is the determining institution in Japan? In tribal societies there is nothing that dominates, although kinship, which underpins what we term religion, politics and economics, often draws everything together. In many peasant civilization, it is the combination of religion and politics. In modern capitalist societies, it is the economy which is the infrastructure or determinant. But with Japan?

Kinship is not a candidate, for it is both very weak, constructed and fragmentary, though, as a sentiment and metaphor, it stretches out into all spheres as Maruyama lamented. Religion in Japan does not exist as an infrastructure, it is fragmented, it is simultaneously, like kinship, everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Political power is important traditionally and the strong feudal traditions make it come closer to a determining fact, but again it seems to mingle into the family and economy and not to be the generator of all worlds. And economic activities while very important, do not prescribe, but reflect other pressures.

This explains why it is unsatisfactory, when asked to say what permeates or holds Japan together, to suggest that it is the normal institutions we are familiar with in the west - law, politics, economy, religion, kinship or class. Instead, when talking of Japan we begin to speak of aesthetics, etiquette, feelings, shared experience, history.

It feels in Japan as if there is no infrastructure in the Marxist sense, no base or foundations on which Japan is built. Rather it is, like the traditional houses, held together not by the strong foundations but by the horizontal ties between different parts. It is glued by manners, purity, aesthetics, good behaviour, respect. It is the only large civilization I know of where 'custom' (or *habitus*, as it is now known to anthropologists) really is king.

That is to say that the unexamined, invisible, rules of behaviour are what mainly hold people together. You *are* Japanese, and you behave accordingly. Nothing can be or needs to be written down. There is no shell or outer carapace of institutional separation – except the physically bounded country which provides a tough casing for what, inside, is flexible, soft and constantly in movement.

Other contemporary industrial societies are structured by the institutional areas, so that individuals behave within each of them, performing institutional roles as workers, family members, voters, worshippers. In the absence of institutional spheres, everything is connected to everything else in Japan. Every one and every thing is a relation, not a thing in itself. In Japan we have *homo holisticus*, fully holistic or undivided humanity.

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If we put together these two great thinkers and their penetrating vision of Japan between 1840-1980, along with my own impressions from visits since 1990 and reading and discussions, we gain the following single picture.

Japan incorporated Chinese civilization into its basically non-separated, non-Axialized world, between 600-1850. It remained holistic and relational, with admixtures. The *basso ostinato* was not lost. This gave it the toughness to absorb the second great tsunami, the Meiji shock and then the after-shock of the Second World War and Americanization.

The nature of this absorption is well described by Fosco Maraini. 'Thirty years of loving acquaintance with Japan... have been a progressive discovery of unity and continuity underlying all superficial confusion and change... deep down one detects a monolithic something that functions like a structural frame holding all parts of the complicated machinery together. Shocks, blows, bumps are absorbed and eventually converted into stimulants to further progress.'<sup>27</sup> The 'monolithic something' has echoes of Maruyama's 'deep things'.

So we now have in Japan a nation which, on the surface, looks ultra-modern, as high a level as one can reach with industrial production, just as in 1840 it had reached the top of a high-level agrarian equilibrium. Yet behind the mirror, it is as almost as much of a different world from the institutionally separated west as it has ever been.

As Maruyama famously said, it is important for Japan to pretend to be democratic, that is to live up to the fictions of the west. Yet its outward shell of adherence to the western divisions is partly a shell, just as its Chinese surface was partly a protective covering. What goes on inside the octopus pot, to use another of Maruyama's famous metaphors, is another matter.

This is not, I hope, just another repetition of the *nihonjinron* theory of Japanese uniqueness and continuity. It is similar to *nihonjinron* in that it does accept that Japan is unique, and perhaps more uniquely unique, if that is possible, than any other large civilization. It also accepts the basic continuities. It differs from the theory in suggesting that the reasons for this has nothing to do with Japanese genes or innate character, but are the result of pure historical chance and the peculiar island position of Japan. And it stresses, with Fukuzawa and Maruyama, the costs as well as the benefits of this peculiar trajectory, the stickiness, the conformity, the authoritarianism, the anti-subjectivity.

Yet I do believe that Fukuzawa and Maruyama are right, and the object of our study, Japan, is very different in its core to all other civilizations. This has many implications. One of these is in relation to the whole philosophy and methodology of the social sciences and the efforts at comparative understanding, not just of Japan, but of all civilizations. This will be the theme of my seminar tomorrow.

(5200, including notes)

- <sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Professors Kenichi and Toshiko Nakamura and Dr. Jun Sato, as well as my wife Sarah Harrison, for all their valuable comments and support in writing this lecture.
- <sup>2</sup> Susan B.Hanley, *Everyday Things in Pre-modern Japan* (Berkeley, 1997)
- <sup>3</sup> Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, tr. David A. Dilworth and G.Cameron Hurst (Tokyo, 1973),192
- <sup>4</sup> □ Fukuzawa, *Civilization*, 147
- <sup>5</sup> □ Fukuzawa, *Civilization*, 135
- <sup>6</sup> □ Fukuzawa, *Civilization*, 125
- <sup>7</sup> □ Fukuzawa, *Civilization*, 135
- <sup>8</sup> □ Fukuzawa, *Civilization*, 160
- <sup>9</sup> □ Fukuzawa Yukichi, *The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa*, tr. Eiichi Kiyooka, (New York, 1972), 179
- <sup>10</sup> Fukuzawa, *Civilization*, 136
- <sup>11</sup> Fukuzawa, *Civilization*,, 136
- <sup>12</sup> Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (Oxford, 1969),16
- <sup>13</sup> Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan – An Interpretation* (Macmillan, New York, 1904), 427
- <sup>14</sup> Maruyama, *Politics*, 264
- <sup>15</sup> Andrew Barshay, ‘Imagining Democracy in Postwar Japan: Reflections on Maruyama Masao and Modernism’, *Jnl. Of Japanese Studies*, 19, 1992, 383
- <sup>16</sup> Maruyama Masao, *Politics*, 159
- <sup>17</sup> Maruyama, *Politics*, 165
- <sup>18</sup> Maruyama, *Politics*, 179
- <sup>19</sup> Maruyama, *Politics*, 338-9, quoting Thomas Mann, *Comprendre*, 1953),
- <sup>20</sup> Barshay, ‘Imagining Democracy’, 406
- <sup>21</sup> Maruyama, *Politics*, 135
- <sup>22</sup> Maruyama, *Politics*, p.142)
- <sup>23</sup> Maruyama Masao, ‘The structure of Maturigoto: the basso ostinato of Japanese political life’ in *Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History*, eds. Sue Henny and Jean-Pierre Lehmann (London, Athlone Press, 1988) 27-8
- <sup>24</sup> The full account of what my guess consists of will be published in ‘Japan Through the Looking Glass’, by Profile Books, London, in 2007.
- <sup>25</sup> Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, *Illness and Culture in Contemporary Japan, an anthropological view* (Cambridge, 1984), 50
- <sup>26</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese* (Harvard, 1977),396
- <sup>27</sup> Fosco Maraini, *Japan; Patterns of Continuity* (Kodansha, 1971),22