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Bakumatsu Foreign Employees

by H. J. JONES

SIGNIFICANT OF CHANGING currents in Japanese government and society in the years of waning Tokugawa power (the *bakumatsu* era) was that government's employment of foreigners. From the seventeenth century, in contradiction to policy excluding foreigners from the main islands, Westerners were found in semi-official or private employ from time to time,¹ but in the last fifteen years of the Tokugawa period at least two hundred foreign technological and language instructors were hired, most by the central government (*bakufu*) and some by regional domains (*han*). Of these, more than eighty were French, more than sixty were Dutch, about thirty were British, while Americans and Germans constituted the remainder. The *bakumatsu* experience in the hiring of foreigners, as in other aspects of policy, had pronounced effects on the new government which emerged with the Meiji Restoration in 1868.

Late Tokugawa Conditions

JAPANESE OFFICIALDOM, both *bakufu* and *han*, was aware of Western incursions in China and shocked by the first Anglo-Chinese War (1840). From the second quarter of the nineteenth century various coastal incidents involving Western ships brought the reality of alien intrusion from possibility to probability.² The

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¹ Jeurien Henslitzn has been called the first hired teacher (*oyatoi kyōshi* 御傭教師). He taught surgery and language as a means of repaying a Dutch debt to Japan. Other Dutch were also used. But in 1673, the *bakufu* commissioner (*bugyō* 奉行) in Nagasaki issued an order for several young men to study with Dutch teachers (*Shōkanchō Nisshi* 商館長日誌,

9th day, 11th month, 1673). This was the formal beginning of study with foreign teachers. Watanabe Minoru 渡邊實, 'Meiji Seifu no Ōka Seisaku to Gaijin Kyōshi' 明治政府の歐化政策と外人教師, in *Nihon Rekishi* 日本歴史 38:7, 1951, p. 17.

² Cf. G. A. Lensen, 'Early Russo-Japanese Relations', in *Far Eastern Quarterly* [FEQ], 10:1, 1950, pp. 2-37; W. G. Aston, 'H. M. S., Phaeton at Nagasaki', in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* [TASJ], 1st Ser., 8, Tokyo, 1879, pp. 323-6; E. W. Clement, 'British Seamen and Mito Samurai in 1824', in *TASJ*, 1st Ser., 38, 1905, pp. 86-131; *Ishinshi Shiryō Hensan Jimukyoku* 維新史資料編纂事務局, ed., *Ishinshi* 維新史, 1939, 1, pp. 393-454.

danger to Japan inherent in these clashes with foreign vessels was confirmed by knowledge of Western superior technology and exacerbated by Dutch warnings of British power and hostile intentions.³ Consequently, late Tempō period (1841–4) reforms were a marked departure from those prior to 1840 which had been largely economic in nature. Stimulated by external events, these later reforms aimed at greater military preparation, and fiscal and administrative aspects were means to achieve national defense goals. A policy emerged linking national defense aims to economic development (*kyōhei-fukoku*).⁴

Education of the upper classes had been encouraged by both *bakufu* and *han*, and channels for education of commoners (temple schools and various vocational schools) were never entirely closed. By the nineteenth century there were some four hundred schools for the samurai class and fifty or more dealt with Western studies.⁵ Emphasis was on Western military science, medicine, and language study. Students from these schools participated in the establishment of *bakumatsu* industries. As Thomas C. Smith has noted, the earliest industries were strategic and the absence of a capitalist class on the Western order precluded development being left in private hands.⁶ Capital accumulation was always a major problem. Some headway was made in shipbuilding after the ban on the construction of large ships was lifted in 1853, and in ore smelting, especially in Saga *han*. But in the 1850s and 1860s, while the purchase of foreign machinery and arms continued, three other methods were undertaken: the acquisition of foreign ships, warships or converted steamers, the employment of foreign instructors, and the dispatch of Japanese to observe and study abroad.

It was the encounter with Commodore Perry in 1853 which gave new urgency to reform programs already under way. External pressure and internal instability combined to provide the impetus for engaging foreign technicians and instructors. Even so, at the outset initiative was from a foreign power and the *bakufu* a reluctant cooperator. When in 1853 the *bakufu* began negotiations for a warship from Holland, it was not yet decided what form the national defense program would take; numerous opinions were under advisement. All of the proposals assumed that any undertaking would be purely Japanese, and one of the more famous

³ D.C. Greene, 'Correspondence between William II of Holland and the Shōgun of Japan AD 1844', in *TASJ* 34, 1907, pp. 99–132; C.R. Boxer, *Jan Compagnie in Japan 1600–1850*, The Hague, 1950, App. v, pp. 185–7.

⁴ 強兵富國. Sakata Yoshio 坂田吉雄, 'Meiji Ishinshi no Mondaiten' 明治維新史の問題点, in Sakata Yoshio, ed., *Meiji Ishinshi no Mondaiten*, 1962, pp. 12–3; Umetani Noboru 梅溪昇, 'Meiji Ishinshi ni okeru Chōshū Han no Seijiteki Dōkō' 明治維新史における長州藩の政治的動向, in *ibid.*, pp. 313–7; Umetani Noboru, *Meiji Zenki Seijishi no Kenkyū* 明治前期政治史の研究, 1963, pp. 21–3.

⁵ Nihon Kagakushi Gakkai 日本科學史學會, ed., *Nihon Kagaku Gijyutsushi Taikei*, 8: *Kyōiku* 1 日本科學技術史大系, 8: 教育1 [NKGTT], 1964, pp. 17–62, esp. 27–35 for *han* school curriculum; Watanabe, *Nihon Rekishi*, 38:7, 1951, pp. 16–21, & 39:8, 1951, pp. 22–5; Ogata Hiroyasu 尾形裕康, *Nihon Kyōiku Tsūshi* 日本教育通史, 1963, Pt. II, Ch. 3.

⁶ Thomas C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan*, Stanford U.P., 1955, p. 4 (1–12); Horie Yasuzō 堀江保藏, *Kinsei Nihon no Keizai Seisaku* 近世日本の經濟政策, 1942, pp. 344–9.

stressed that *bakufu* retainers should form the core of all preparations;⁷ certainly the idea of hiring foreigners was not entertained.

The request in 1853 to purchase a warship from Holland was but one response to the American mission to open Japan to trade. And with the threat of European events which led in the following year to war in the Crimea and fearing the objections of other powers, the Dutch initially refused. Through Commissioner J. H. Donker Curtius of the Netherlands Board of Trade in Deshima, the *bakufu* was persuaded to accept a steamer with the promise that a warship would be built when conditions permitted. During these negotiations Donker Curtius argued the necessity for instructors. Only after persistent and lengthy persuasion did the *bakufu* agree to accept a few teachers on a short-term basis. After the arrival of the steamer, Commander Gerhardus Fabius pressed and finally won a concession for a Dutch naval mission to teach naval technology to *bakufu* students.⁸

In a sense it is not surprising that the first foreign employees should have been Dutch since the Dutch for more than two centuries had engaged in peaceful trade with the Tokugawa government. With the precedent set by the first Dutch naval instructors, certain groups within the *bakufu* and the *han* became more amenable to the idea of hiring foreign technicians and instructors. Thus, by the end of the 1850s initiative in employing foreigners shifted to the Japanese. Japanese leaders were motivated by the pressing need for technical knowledge and foreign powers were motivated by their desire for trade. Various foreign powers converged on Japan in this era, and although the British Minister did not initially perceive the role of foreign employees as a wedge to commerce as did the Dutch and French, the single most conspicuous aspect of the employment of foreigners by the *bakufu* and the *han* was the rivalry and interplay of foreign powers, a reflection of their competition for trade.

Foreign Nationals in Government Service, 1854–67

AN ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY of sorts evolved from the Japanese government's relations with the foreign employees. Several aspects of these relations will be described here relating to engagement, administration, finance, and work as found in correspondence of the participants.

THE DUTCH

IN THE 1850s the Dutch initiated the pattern for official group missions of instructors. The first, led by Pels Rijcken, consisted of twenty-two men and served in Japan from 1854 to 1857, during which time it established a naval school in

⁷ Katsu Kaishū 勝海舟, 'Kaibō Ikensho' 海防意見書 (1853), in *Dai Nihon Komonjo: Bakumatsu Gaikoku Kankei Monjo 1853–1868* 大日本古文書：幕末外國關係文書, 1910, I, pp. 730–7.

⁸ Mizuta Nobutoshi 水田信利, *Reimeiki no Waga Kaigun to Oranda* 黎明期の我が海軍と和蘭, 1940, pp. 11–77.

Nagasaki. The vessel on which the Rijcken mission arrived was turned over to the Japanese and became the first foreign training ship.⁹

Under *bakufu* official Nagai Gemba¹⁰ the training school (*denshūjo*)¹¹ was opened in Nagasaki, and from the *bakufu* Katsu Rintarō (Kaishū)¹² and fifty other students were chosen. From the *han* some 130 students were selected, including Godai Tomoatsu and Kawamura Sumiyoshi (Satsuma) and Sano Tsunetami and Nakamuta Kuranosuke (Saga).¹³ Instruction was both practical and theoretical, and 105 students succeeded in passing the two-year intensive training course. Dutch was the medium of instruction, and the fact that two-thirds of the original class was graduated testifies both to the quality of the training offered and the quality of the students who succeeded. Graduates formed the nucleus for a new school in Edo, and Katsu remained in Nagasaki to supervise the next class.¹⁴

A second mission, led by Huyssen Van Kattendyke and composed of thirty-six persons, including doctors and engineers, taught in the training school from 1857 to 1859.¹⁵ Success appears not so marked with the second group.¹⁶ For medical studies a more sophisticated knowledge of Dutch was needed; this inadequacy on the part of students and official Japanese interpreters hampered progress. But a lower level of success is attributable also to a cholera epidemic which claimed the lives of teachers and students alike and to political difficulties attending the shogunal succession problem on the death of Iesada¹⁷ in 1858. The question of personalities is also a suggested factor. Captain Van Kattendyke was said to be more aloof and strict than Pels Rijcken. Kattendyke complained to the Dutch Colonial Affairs Minister that the Japanese were no longer so enthusiastic as before. He observed that the Japanese wanted everything they saw, but as soon as they had it, it was finished and they wanted something else. He saw the class system as a serious obstacle; students refused menial tasks. They lacked genuine scientific education but were flippant about their ignorance. They resembled the French, happy types but lacking patience. He noted and rejected as ridiculous the current opinion among Japanese that they had succeeded in establishing a navy in just four years and that foreign tutors were no longer needed.¹⁸

Certainly the Kattendyke report reveals the impatience of the Japanese to surge ahead on their own. And however premature the decision, in 1860 Katsu

⁹ Katsu Kaishū, *Kaigun Rekishi* 海軍歴史, in *Kaishū Zenshū* 海舟全集, 1927, viii, pp. 63-4, for lists of names, ranks, work, and salaries of the 22 members of the first mission; Mizuta, pp. 65-7 & 85.

¹⁰ 永井玄蕃

¹¹ 傳習所

¹² 勝麟太郎 (海舟)

¹³ 五代友厚, 川村純義, 佐野常民, 中牟田倉之助. Katsu, *Kaigun*, Ch. 5; lists of students, pp. 62 & 65-7. Those mentioned in the text and many others made significant contributions to

Restoration history.

¹⁴ NKGT, Pels Rijcken report, p. 21; documents, p. 38; Mizuta, pp. 108-14.

¹⁵ Katsu, *Kaigun*, pp. 86-7, for lists of names, ranks, work, and salaries of the 36-member mission.

¹⁶ Cf. NKGT, Doc. 1-5, B, pp. 42-3; Doc. 1-4, E, p. 38.

¹⁷ 家定

¹⁸ Mizuta, pp. 124, 138-9 & 157-61, for Kattendyke report.

Kaishū commanded the first all-Japanese-manned vessel to cross the Pacific to the United States, a remarkable adventurous accomplishment only six years after training had been initiated. Eleven Americans assisted, however.¹⁹

The second mission had included doctors and engineers. Among the naval doctors, Pompe van Meerdevoort, then but twenty-eight years old and perhaps best known in the West for his informative journal,²⁰ started lecturing on medicine. From this beginning and the establishment of a vaccination clinic, the Nagasaki medical school and eventually the university emerged. J. K. Van der Broek also assisted, and later A. F. Bauduin, K. W. Gratama, and C. G. Van Mansveld made noteworthy contributions in medicine and science.²¹ And Dutch engineers Le May, Ehreman, and later Freedenburg and Nering Vogel, together with Dutch technicians, began foundries and dockyards in the vicinity of Nagasaki, principally at Akunoura and Tatsugami.²²

However, changes in the diplomatic scene heralded changes in the position of Dutch employees. The Dutch feared losing their preferential trade position in Japan. For years they had taken pains to impress upon the Japanese the hostile designs of the British; and the Convention of 1854 by which Admiral Stirling obtained supply and refueling privileges in Nagasaki and Hakodate, although not an official British act, gave further cause for Dutch consternation.²³

The importance attached by the Dutch to the training mission is revealed by the fact that in 1855 the old office of Commissioner of Board of Trade in Nagasaki was abolished, and Donker Curtius became Netherlandsche Kommissaris, defined in Dutch correspondence as protector of political and economic rights in Japan.²⁴ One of his principal duties was handling all aspects of the employment of Dutch subjects in Japan. In 1857 the Netherlands obtained a Supplementary Treaty with minor concessions to serve, in opposition to anticipated British demands, as a conservative model for future Japanese treaties with foreign powers. And

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 144. See 'Tensei Jingo' 天声人語 in *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 May 1974, for criticism of the current NHK television program on Katsu Kaishū.

²⁰ Elizabeth P. Wittermans & John Z. Bowers, ed., *Doctor on Desima: Selected Chapters from JHR J.L.C. Pompe Van Meerdevoort's Vijf Jaren in Japan (1857-1863)*, Sophia University, 1970.

²¹ Numata Jirō 沼田次郎, 'Bakumatsu ni okeru Ranjin Kyōshi Pompe no Jiseki' 幕末における蘭人教師ポンベの事蹟, in *Shigaku Zasshi* 史學雜誌, 56:8, 1946, pp. 803-55; Nagasaki Daigaku Igakubu 長崎大學醫學部 ed., *Nagasaki Igaku Hyakunenshi* 長崎醫學百年史, Nagasaki, 1961, pp. 40-6, 85-116, 124-8 & 142-9. With the Meiji government, Bauduin became a Nagasaki Prefecture employee; Gratama became a Ministry of Education and later a Home

Ministry employee; and Van Mansveld eventually became a Home Ministry employee.

²² Gaimushō Hikitsugi Shorui 外務省引繼書類, in Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo 東京大學史料編纂所 [GHS]: 'Keiō 2-3, Nagasaki Akunoura seitetsujō narabi ni Tatsugami zōsenjō yatoi Ranjin no kyūryō zōka negaiide ikken' 慶應二・三年, 長崎飽ノ浦製鐵場並立神造船場雇蘭人ノ給料増加願出一件 (Dutch & Japanese correspondence).

²³ Montague Paske-Smith, *Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa Days, 1603-1868*, Kobe, 1930, pp. 138-9; Grace Fox, 'Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1854', in *Pacific Historical Review*, 10, 1941, pp. 411-34; P.E. Eckel, 'The Crimean War and Japan', in *FEQ*, 3:2, 1944, p. 109-18.

²⁴ Mizuta, p. 73.

with the treaty of 1858 the Dutch representative became Consul-General and Political Agent for the Netherlands. With these diplomatic arrangements the Dutch took yet a further step designed to retain their commercial position in Japan. In 1858, in order to remove a precedent which could be used by other foreign powers to claim similar privileges, J.K. de Wit recommended the termination of the naval mission and the employment of Dutch nationals on a direct individual basis by the Japanese government.²⁵

Both external and internal pressures on the *bakufu* had been increasing, but the Dutch were quite unprepared for the Japanese response, the summary closing of the naval school.²⁶ The action reflects the undercurrent of Japanese attitudes, desire for foreign technology but distaste for foreign tutelage, and also the inability to formulate a long-term plan owing to the exigencies of multiple pressures. But also by the end of the decade the *bakufu* was opting to strengthen its position in home territory and leave peripheral areas to local *bakufu* officials.²⁷ As a result most mission members were released. Local officials in the Nagasaki area, however, retained some doctors and engineers.²⁸

Even though the employment of Dutch nationals was technically separated from their government in 1859, the Dutch representative in Japan continued to supervise employment arrangements. Eagerness to continue and expand the activities of their nationals through the 1860s is clearly evident in correspondence between Count Van Polsbroek, Consul-General and Political Agent for the Netherlands in this period, and senior *bakufu* officials (*rōjū*).

Members of both Dutch missions had enjoyed dual employment, drawing salary as Dutch naval personnel stationed in the Dutch East Indies while receiving from the *bakufu* salary equivalent to or exceeding that paid by their own government.²⁹ When, for example, engineers and cartographers in the Nagasaki area were promoted in the Dutch navy, this information, along with suggested salary adjustments, was forwarded to Japanese officials. Recommendations for salary increases and preferential treatment for lower-echelon employees were also made on the basis of merit and length of service. Van Polsbroek kept himself current with *bakufu* treatment of other nationals and expected any differences to be equated. For example, comparing better salaries and housing for French employees in Yokosuka, he demanded and received the same conditions.³⁰ In addition he also secured contracts for Dutch naval personnel for ship training in the Kobe naval school (Kobe *kaigun sōrenjo*)³¹ and continued to oversee employment conditions

²⁵ Ibid., p. 140; *Ishinshi*, 2, pp. 147–8.

²⁶ Mizuta, pp. 137 ff. & 157 ff., quoting official protests.

²⁷ The fact that the second class at the Nagasaki school included very few *han* students reflects the change in *bakufu* attitudes. Katsu, *Kaigun*, pp. 89–90; Mizuta, p. 124.

²⁸ Katsu, *Kaigun*, pp. 93–119.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 63–4 & 86–7; Mizuta, pp. 78–80.

³⁰ GHS: 'Nagasaki Akunoura'.

³¹ 海軍練所. GHS: 'Keiō 2–3, Kaiyō Maru kaikō no setsu norikumi gaikokujin yatoiire ikken' 慶應二・三年, 開陽丸回航ノ節乗組外國人雇入一件 (Dutch & Japanese correspondence). Examples of monthly salaries at the Kobe naval school: 1st Lt Dinaux [Dinax], \$236; 2nd Lt Wittop Koning, \$104; Machinist Hardes, \$74; ordinary seamen, \$7.25 (with decorations, \$8).

of Dutch physicians.³² In his role as entrepreneur for his nationals in *bakufu* employ, the Dutch representative was very explicit in outlining in detail the duties to be performed and the remuneration expected, including the stipulation that Mexican silver (*yōgin*)³³ be the medium of payment.

The records of Dr Anthonius F. Bauduin offer several insights into conditions attending the employment of Dutch nationals.³⁴ As replacement for Pompe at the Nagasaki hospital, Bauduin was hired by the *bakufu* in 1862 for a three-year period at 400 *ryō* (1 *ryō*=\$1.25 Mexican silver) a month. In 1864 his appointment was extended, and by 1867 the *bakufu* desired his services in Edo and also for a new hospital contemplated for Yokohama. It is clear that the Dutch Consul-General was still handling engagements and that Bauduin was still in the Dutch navy. In submitting a draft for a new contract for Bauduin to *bakufu* officials in 1867, Van Polsbroek noted that it was necessary for Bauduin to return briefly to Holland for government permission to continue. This rare draft contract, although it omits the salary, illustrates the degree of obligation the Japanese government had come to assume financially for foreign employees. Earlier the Dutch had assumed transportation costs, but the French at Yokosuka set a precedent for round-trip transportation to be borne by the *bakufu* and by 1866 the Dutch expected the same. Also a contract stipulation reserving mediation of contract grievances to the employee's national representative in Japan had by 1866 become commonplace, except in contracts involving United States citizens.

Thus, despite the technical distinction between official mission and individual engagement made in 1859, the Dutch government continued to view Dutch employees as national emissaries. At the same time it is quite clear in this series of correspondence that the *bakufu* officials did not simply rubber-stamp Van Polsbroek's recommendations. For example, they refused his several requests that they accept another Dutch medical officer (De Meyer) in place of their own request for Bauduin to serve in the capital.³⁵ There were limits, even in the delicate diplomatic situation of the time, which the *rōjū* were unwilling to exceed. While they considered the precedent of inviting foreign employees into their Edo capital, they intended to reserve the selection to themselves.

THE BRITISH

EVEN BEFORE the closing of the Nagasaki naval school in 1859, the Dutch could see the writing on the wall. By the 1860s a trade monopoly of two centuries had

³² GHS: 'Genji 1, Oranda kōshi yori Nagasaki byōin yatoi-i Bōdoin atoyaku ni Mēeru yatoiire negai ikken' 元治元年, 和蘭公使ヨリ長崎病院雇醫ボードイン跡役ニメーエル雇入願一件; 'Keiō 3, Orandakoku gun-i Bōdoin shi o hompō kaigun gun-i ni yatoiire ikken' 慶應三年, 和蘭國軍醫ボードイン氏ヲ本邦海軍軍醫ニ雇入一件; 'Keiō 3, Orandakoku ishi DeMēru shi

Edo narabi ni Yokohama ni setsuritsu fūbun aru byōin e hōshi negaiide ikken' 慶應三年, 和蘭國醫師デメール氏江戸並ニ横濱ニ設立風聞アル病院へ奉仕願出一件 (Dutch & Japanese correspondence).

³³ 洋銀

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

disintegrated, and the plums of the Japan trade, Asia's last outpost, were falling to the British. One Japanese writer describes the education of the era as a transition from Dutch to English studies, and the statement is valid for many aspects of the *bakumatsu* era.³⁶ British influences on Japanese domestic politics from the negotiations for commercial treaties until the Meiji Restoration were considerable. Throughout the sixties British commerce constituted more than seventy-five per cent of the total foreign trade.³⁷ And by the mid-sixties some British diplomatic personnel had come to view Japan's future more in relation to the southwestern *han* than to the *bakufu*.

British merchants perhaps had more contact with various *han* during the *bakumatsu* period than did persons of any other nationality or occupation. These contacts increased gradually from the signing of the treaty of 1858. But only with British rapprochement with the *han* after the lessons of the Shimonoseki and Kagoshima bombardments in the mid-sixties were British subjects employed. British merchants sold arms and machinery clandestinely to regional daimyo, smuggled *han* students abroad, and variously sidestepped *bakufu* restrictions. And by 1865 British diplomats as well were acting against *bakufu* interests. Ernest Satow commented on the favorable attitude that he and Sir Rutherford Alcock formed toward Chōshū samurai after the bombardment, a refreshing change from 'devious' *bakufu* officials. Similar sentiments were later shared by Satow and Sir Harry Parkes toward Satsuma; both were impressed by the intelligence and eagerness for Western science displayed by the southwestern *han*.³⁸ One sees in their discussions with Saigō Takamori³⁹ and others a bifurcation between official and unofficial British diplomatic policy. British interest in free trade and wider markets was the major factor in Parkes' decision to meet the needs of the *han* as well as to continue bidding for *bakufu* commerce.⁴⁰

So while the Dutch endeavored to hold their position, the treaties and increasing contact with foreign powers made it clear to Japanese in both *bakufu* and *han* that the English-speaking world had to be reckoned with. In 1858 it had become necessary for the *bakufu* to open an English school in Nagasaki. And by the mid-sixties a small number of British subjects, about thirty in all, had become employees of *han* and *bakufu*. These were for the most part private persons, and included technicians from the Manchester firm of Platt Brothers for the Kagoshima spinning plant, language teachers and interpreters in *han* and *bakufu* employ, a few civil engineers, at least one customs employee, and, finally, naval instructors.

With the arrival of British Minister Sir Harry Parkes in 1865, the British trade position was in full ascendance. Like his predecessors, Parkes lacked interest in

³⁶ Numata Jirō, 'Rangaku kara Eigaku e' 蘭學から英學へ, in *Nihon Rekishi*, 14:3—15:4, 1949, pp. 30-5 & 47-51.

³⁷ Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century*, New York, 1955, p. 65, n. 8.

³⁸ Ernest Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan*,

London, 1921, pp. 129 & 174.

³⁹ 西郷隆盛

⁴⁰ Marius B. Jansen, *Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration*, Princeton U.P., 1961, pp. 253-8; Paske-Smith, p. 167.

placing British subjects in *bakufu* employ, but instead pressed the extension of trading interests of firms. Until the Restoration he did not seriously envision the employment of British subjects as an instrument to further commerce. Plans commenced in 1866 to hire engineers to construct lighthouses and harbor safety markings were in compliance with Article 10 of the British commercial treaty which placed the responsibility for this work with the Japanese government.⁴¹ Likewise the engagement of a British subject, Benjamin Seal (phonetic), in the same year by the Kanagawa Customs House to prepare customs and warehouse regulations and train personnel, answered a direct need to conduct smoothly the operation of port trade in accordance with the treaties.⁴² While he kept a close watch over contracts involving British subjects, Parkes concurred with, but did not press, British appointments. Gradually his ideas were to change.

The employment by the *bakufu*, in April 1867, of the mining engineer Erasmus H. M. Gower to develop the Iwanai coal mine in Hokkaido may be cited as indicative of the British Minister's basic attitude. Hakodate officials desired to hire Gower for a three-year period at 6,000 *yōgin* a year, or \$500 a month.⁴³ The commercial possibilities for British interests excited Parkes' imagination. Through his brother Abel Gower, British consul at Nagasaki, Gower had connections with British entrepreneur Thomas B. Glover, with whom Parkes worked closely in these early years.⁴⁴ In giving the necessary consular permission, the British Minister's reply reveals his driving preoccupation with commerce, which in his opinion was a better means of protection than fortifications.⁴⁵ But the more affirmative attitude toward employment of British subjects by the *bakufu* had its origins in personal rivalry between Parkes and the French Minister Léon Roches.

Two examples may suffice. One is obviously also related to the growing requirement for English-language study since the opening of the ports. Earlier, through lack of positive British interest, American missionaries had been appointed to English-language schools in Nagasaki and Yokohama. Parkes proposed a school in Edo. Negotiations culminated in a lengthy memorandum submitted to *bakufu* officials on 25 June 1867 in which Parkes undertook to procure teachers and arrange details of their engagement.⁴⁶ Four lay graduates of English universities were to be hired: the headmaster to teach history, political economy, and international law; two tutors to teach English language; and one for mathematics and

⁴¹ Text of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Commerce, 26 August 1858, in *State Papers*, eds. Parkes, Field, and Thomson (London, from 1825,) 48, 1857-8, pp. 28-38.

⁴² Yokohama Zeikan 横濱税關, ed., *Yokohama Zeikan Enkaku* 横濱税關沿革, Yokohama, 1902, 5th ed., pp. 416-9.

⁴³ GHS: 'Keiō 3, Yezochi Iwanai sekitan kaikutsu no tame Eikokujin Gawaru shi yatouire ikken' 慶應三年, 蝦夷地岩内石炭開掘ノ爲メ

英國人ガワル氏雇入一件 (English & Japanese correspondence).

⁴⁴ W.B. Mason, 'Thomas B. Glover, A Pioneer of Anglo-Japanese Commerce', in *The New East*, 2, Tokyo, 1918, pp. 115-7.

⁴⁵ GHS: 'Yezochi Iwanai'.

⁴⁶ GHS: 'Keiō 3, Eikoku daigaku yori hompō e kyōshi yatouire ikken' 慶應三年, 英國大學ヨリ本邦へ教師雇入一件 (English & Japanese correspondence).

natural science. Parkes noted that engineering could not be taught until basic English had been mastered, and at that time he felt engineers already in Japanese government employ should be used. Chemistry could be taught by the Hollander Dr Koenrad W. Gratama, already in *bakufu* service.

Details concerning salary, housing, transportation, and length of service were worked out, the headmaster to receive \$4,800 and each of the tutors \$2,400 a year for a period of five years. The necessity of high-quality housing and separate quarters for married teachers was also stressed. The latter privilege was a concession acquired in part by the French in 1865, insisted on by the British, and extended later to other nationals.⁴⁷

In the proposal for these tutors, Parkes also made provision:

In case the Japanese Government should dismiss anyone of them before the stipulated time without assigning a valid reason such as misconduct or incapacity on the part of the dismissed, passage money back to Europe will be paid as above and such further amount of compensation as H. M. Minister may consider just.⁴⁸

Also,

Should any disagreement of opinion arise between them [the (Japanese) Minister of Public Instruction and the Headmaster] the Headmaster will be invited to refer the matter to H. M. Representative for discussion with the Taikun's cabinet ministers.⁴⁹

In stipulations such as these it may be seen how the employment of foreigners was to flow through diplomatic channels.

Parkes' participation in this school project resulted from his concern for British prestige in the foreign community, and the same motivation may be seen in another example of his self-initiated cooperation with the *bakufu*. Although not interested in earlier *bakufu* requests for British military instructors, Parkes was chagrined by French acceptance of the commission. He was engaged in blatant personal rivalry with Léon Roches, the French Minister in Japan, and anger sparked his decision. According to one of the British legation employees, Parkes declared:

What do you think that fellow Roches has just told me? He is going to have

⁴⁷ The Dutch had not been allowed to bring their wives, and in fact the restriction was a reason advanced for the necessity of high salaries (Mizuta, pp. 100–4). However, regular brothel service was made available to the Dutch. The French Yokosuka agreement permitted ten of the first forty employees to bring wives at Japanese government expense,

but the Japanese clearly stated that the provision would not apply to wives acquired while in Japan. Waseda University Library, Ōkuma Monjo 大隈文書, A2970: 'Yokosuka seitetsujo kensetsu ni kansuru shoyakujōsho' (1865) 横須賀製鐵所建設ニ關スル諸約定書, 元治二年.

⁴⁸ GHS: 'Eikoku daigaku'.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

a mission militaire out from France to drill the shogun's army. Never mind! I'll get even with him. I'll have a mission navale.⁵⁰

Thus it was necessary for the British Minister to remind the *bakufu* of their request made some two years earlier, but it was now the *bakufu*'s turn to be unenthusiastic, owing in no small part to the formation of a pro-French clique in the foreign affairs branch of the government. On 26 May 1866, Parkes wrote to Japanese officials insisting the matter be resolved, for his attempts to meet them had been rebuffed with various excuses of indisposition. He stated in part:

The Undersigned accordingly agrees to postpone his visit to Yedo for a few days, provided their Excellencies will at once despatch an officer to Yokohama with the letter from their Excellencies proposing that Instructors in Naval Matters should be substituted by Her Majesty's Government for the services of the military officers which the Japanese Government applied for at the close of 1864. . . . It is inconvenient that this question and also that relating to the instruction of young men in England should continue unsettled. . . .⁵¹

In what smacked of an ultimatum, Parkes indicated that if he did not receive an immediate reply, he would proceed to Edo in person.

In the end the *bakufu*, reluctant to antagonize the British overtly and moved by the recommendation of the French Minister, acceded to Parkes' proposal.⁵² After some stalling an announcement was issued by the *bakufu* that English naval officers would be employed to teach Japanese students and the latter were to be under eighteen years of age.⁵³

The first contingent of naval teachers began to give instruction in late 1867. The formal terms of agreement were set out by Parkes on 5 December 1867. The fact that of the first twelve instructors only four were officers (Lt Comdr Tracy (as head of mission referred to as Captain Tracy), Lt Wilson, Surveyor Grant, and Engineer Robson) did not prevent Parkes from referring to them all as officers and subordinate officers. The services of these men were placed at the disposal of the Japanese government for two years with salaries 'in conformity to the scale already adopted by the Japanese government in the case of the French officers employed for purposes of military instruction.'⁵⁴ One instructor

⁵⁰ Lord Redesdale (A.B. Mitford), *Memories*, London, 1915, I, p. 378; cf. Ôtsuka Take-matsu 大塚武松, *Bakumatsu Gaikōshi no Kenkyū* 幕末外交史の研究, 1952, pp. 346-7. The *bakufu* had initially asked that British troops in Yokohama be engaged to train a new *bakufu* army, but the request was treated coldly by Alcock and his successors.

⁵¹ GHS: 'Keiō 2-3, Eikoku yori kaigun kyōshi yatoiire ikken' 慶應二・三年, 英國ヨリ海軍教師雇入一件 (English & Japanese correspondence).

⁵² Meron Medzini, *French Policy in Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime*, Harvard East Asian Monograph, 41, 1971, p. 251.

⁵³ NKGT, Doc. 4, p. 46.

⁵⁴ GHS: 'Eikoku yori kaigun'. Katsu also states that the French pay scale was used, but quotes a lower scale: pp. 372-3. He seems to be quoting *ryō* at the *bakufu* official rate, while Parkes more than compensated for the fluctuation in the treaty ports.

in chief (naval commander) was to receive £120 per month; three officers of instruction (lieutenant, acting lieutenant, chief engineer) to receive £80; of the subordinate officers, two at £28, one at £18, and five at £14 a month. Salaries quoted in sterling were to be paid in dollars or Japanese coin at the current rate of exchange of four shillings and threepence per dollar.⁵⁵

Housing and transportation expenses were to be borne by the *bakufu*. Parkes noted,

As they came out not on duty in their own service but as supernumeraries to be employed by the Japanese Government, the English pay and allowances which they received while on the voyage should not be borne by Her Majesty's Government, but by the Japanese.⁵⁶

The *bakufu* reimbursed Parkes for these expenses, and it is clear from this correspondence that British instructors, unlike the Dutch, did not simultaneously draw salary from their own government and from Japan. The British also rejected a commercial or consular agent go-between as paymaster, and Japanese officials were obliged to make direct payment to the chief of the mission, Cmdr Tracy.⁵⁷

Hired to instruct Japanese youths in 'naval science, seamanship, and discipline', the members of the mission did not engage in the establishment of foundries, dockyards, or medical facilities, as did the Dutch and French parties. The origins of the mission precluded any broad objectives. British naval instructors took up their tasks on the eve of civil war. In February 1868, the school was closed; the immediate concrete results were negligible.

THE FRENCH

IN THE mid-1860s the French as well as the British were pressing for economic advantage in Japan. The French Minister, Léon Roches, arrived in 1864 and within a year had succeeded in forming within the *bakufu* a group friendly to France.⁵⁸ The result of this rapprochement was positive French support for the *bakufu* at a time when the British, despite Parkes' official stance, were less than enthusiastic. Through the influence of Roches, the *bakufu* was moved to undertake several projects with French cooperation. French employees in the *bakumatsu* era constituted the largest national group, and at least eighty-four were hired by the *bakufu* and two by *han*; except for a few mining engineers and a husband-wife teaching team, French employees were largely members of official missions. In addition to language schools two, major projects were the construction of a foundry and dockyards in Yokohama and Yokosuka, and a French military mission to train the *bakufu* army.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ōtsuka, p. 345. Members of a *shinfutsuha*

親佛派, Oguri Chūjun 小栗忠順 and others, became closely aligned with Roches and French Foreign Affairs Minister Drouyn de Lhuys.

The Yokosuka project was prompted by the fact that major ship repairs were not possible in Nagasaki and under the stress of the times the *bakufu* desired an establishment nearer the capital. Roches immediately interested himself in the matter, and in a report to his home government noted that Dutch engineers were employed in Nagasaki, Americans had agreed to build some warships, English merchants were selling ships and arms to the *han*, and Prussia was selling new rifles, so French help could not be criticized by other foreign powers. Such a project as this, he felt, would lead to future development projects which in turn would assure France's trade position.⁵⁹

Meanwhile Roches persuaded the *bakufu* to pay François L. Verny, marine engineer and French naval lieutenant, to visit Japan on his way back to France from Shanghai, where he had set up a shipyard and built four gunboats for the Chinese. Even the English had been impressed by Verny's work in China, and in Japan he submitted a detailed estimate for the Yokosuka project.

The comparative ease with which Roches obtained French government concurrence with the Yokosuka project is largely attributed to Paris banker Fleury Herard's influence with French bankers and the obvious commercial advantages of the proposed enterprise. In 1865, when the *bakufu* sent emissaries to France to negotiate machinery purchases with the government-related *Société générale*, Herard was engaged for the special position of commercial agent for the *bakufu*. In line with his own interests and with this appointment, Herard handled the Yokosuka proposal expertly. Through his good offices *bakufu* officials toured the Toulon shipyards and met with government officials in Paris.⁶⁰

The resulting agreements provided a four-year plan with a two million dollar budget for the building of a foundry and dockyards, two-thirds the size of the Toulon shipyards, and the training of two thousand Japanese by some forty French personnel.⁶¹ And in preparation for Japanese cooperation with French engineers, a French-language school was set up in Yokohama in 1865. *Bakufu* employee Mermet de Cashon, who had been in Hakodate as a missionary and was at this time serving Roches as interpreter, directed the school, and Roches himself took an active interest in the students.⁶²

All the French officials and workers who came to Japan under the Yokosuka agreement were French government employees and they entered into four-year contracts with the option of terminating after one year. Average salaries were set at \$400 a month for engineers, second class; \$150 for chief workers and foremen; and \$75 for workers, with a possible fluctuation (upward or downward) of twenty

⁵⁹ Ōtsuka Takematsu 'Fukkoku kōshi Reon Rosshu no Seisaku Kōdō ni tsuite' 佛國公使レオン・ロッシュの政策行動について, in *Shigaku Zasshi*, 46:7, 1936, Pt. 1, p. 820.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 823-4; Katsu, *Kaigun*, p. 413, Ōkuma Monjo, A3027 (n.d.): 'Yokosuka seitetsujo kensetsu ni kansuru yakujōsho narabi

ni kankei shorui' 横須賀製鐵所建設ニ關スル約定書並關係書類.

⁶¹ Ōkuma Monjo, A2970, provides details.

⁶² Katsu Kaishū, *Rikugun Rekishi*, Ge 陸軍歴史, 下, in *Kaishū Zenshū*, VII, pp. 255-9, for list of students, and pp. 259-60 for school regulations.

per cent at the director's discretion. As director and marine engineer, first class, Verny was paid \$10,000 a year. Other emoluments included transportation, housing, and medical care.

Verny had complete control of French workers subject to French consular review and considerable control over Japanese workers, including their salary scale, work hours, and discipline. Foundry regulations provided explicitly that only the director would deal with direction, repair, and expenditures, and despite a *bakufu* amendment that prior consultation with Japanese officials was necessary on matters of expenditure, in practice Verny chose to ignore this provision.⁶³ Also for administrative purposes four Japanese officials were appointed: a general manager, a general accountant, a warehouse custodian, and a steward to handle Japanese workers' conditions. However, the French considered themselves in complete charge, and in the agreement itself the *bakufu* overtly concurred. The only amendments to the French draft had been made in areas of finance.

In practice many disagreements arose. Verny protested often to the French Minister that Japanese officials countermanded his orders, absented themselves from their posts at their own, and not the director's, discretion, incited Japanese workers to disobey French work orders, gave false reports of actual conditions, and variously hampered the general routine, including refusal to accept dismissal.⁶⁴ Roches was obliged to forward these complaints officially to senior *bakufu* officials, bluntly pointing out that the French government had confided the entire responsibility for the mission to Verny and that the continued interference and ill-will of Japanese officials who were 'subaltern employees' might well oblige him to cancel the mission as a matter of national honor. Internal conditions in Japan precluded forfeiting French assistance, and leading *bakufu* officials made efforts to assuage both Roches and Verny.⁶⁵

Perhaps most basic to these disputes in the Japanese view was the matter of finance. It is difficult from existing records to discern the facts. It is probable that \$2,000,000 of the proposed four-year budget (1865-9) had been expended by March 1868. Verny reported that the actual amount spent between August 1865 and March 1868 was \$1,568,425.21, showing a credit of \$831,575.59 against the original budget.⁶⁶ Verny's figures do not take into account unpaid purchases from abroad, fluctuation in currencies, or income from ship repair. It has been suggested that the amount spent may in fact have been \$4,000,000.⁶⁷ In any event

⁶³ Manuscript agreement with *bakufu* amendments in red: Ōkuma Monjo, A2970.

⁶⁴ GHS: 'Keiō 2, Yokosuka zōsenjo narabi ni Yokohama seitetsujo yatoi Futsujin Ueruni shi ni taishi fusōtō no shochi arishi mune dōkoku kōshi yori kujō moshiide ikken 慶應二年, 横須賀造船所並横濱製鐵所雇佛人ウエルニー氏二對シ不相當ノ處置アリシ旨同國公使ヨリ苦情申出一件 (French & Japanese correspondence).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Waseda Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo 早稻田大學社會科學研究所, ed., *Ōkuma Monjo*, 1962, v, p. 61 (pp. 29-85). Documents are adumbrated in these published selections. A3024, 'Yokosuka seitetsujo kankei shorui' 横須賀製鐵所關係書類, offers a summary.

⁶⁷ Ōtsuka, 'Fukkoku', Pt. 1, p. 822.

the source of funding is obscure, but it is known that France presented the Meiji government with a bill for a half million dollars.⁶⁸

How much of the expenditures went directly to foreign employees has been a point of academic interest to Japanese. The 1870 Civil Affairs—Finance Ministry (Mimbu-Ōkurashō)⁶⁹ report estimated salaries for an average of forty-five foreigners at \$80,820 a year; for the same period forty-three Japanese officials were paid 8,638 *ryō*, or about one-third of the salary received by the French.⁷⁰ In actual fact, from December 1866 to March 1868 the number of foreign employees ranged to fifty-five, allowing for replacements due to death or other reasons. The monthly salary breakdown for these years is very interesting: one (Verny) at \$833, three at \$400, two at \$300, one at \$250, 17 between \$100 and \$155, 29 between \$50 and \$95, and two below \$45.⁷¹ In addition, of course, there was transportation at \$500 to \$650 each way and housing. Salary-wise, however, more than eighty-seven per cent of the French workers received \$155 or less a month. On this point Verny kept close to the original budget, and the general picture is one of sound administration, though undoubtedly the strain was very great on the *bakufu*.

Bakufu officials also encountered serious difficulties with the French military mission. Roches had pressed hard for this,⁷² and fourteen officers and men arrived in Japan in January 1867 under three-year contracts.⁷³ Their number increased to eighteen by early 1868. While the mission remained in Japan about eighteen months, the actual training given covered about a six-month period owing to internal political conditions.⁷⁴

Despite the mission's brevity, two occurrences exacerbated friction already present in Franco-Japanese relations. In both French and Japanese versions of the contracts for the French military, salaries quoted in francs were to be paid in local currency, *ryō* and *ichibugin* (silver one-piece) being variously cited. Thus Captain Jules Chanoine, head of mission, was to receive 6,000 francs or 375 *ryō* or 1,500 *ichibugin* a month; middle-rank persons, 4,000 francs or 250 *ryō* or 1,000 *ichibugin*; and lower ranks, 2,000 francs or 37.2 *ryō* or 350 *ichibugin*. A discrepancy may be noted immediately in the last citation,⁷⁵ but an even greater discrepancy

⁶⁸ *Ōkuma Monjo*, v (A3024), pp. 65–7.

⁶⁹ 民部大藏省

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁷¹ *Ōkuma Monjo*, A2985 (2 folios), 'Yokosuka seitetsujo yatoi Futsujin kyūryō chōsho' 横須賀製鐵所雇佛人給料調書; A2986, 'Yokosuka seitetsujo yatoi Futsujin meibo' 横須賀製鐵所雇佛人名簿; *Gaimushō Kiroku* 外務省記録, 'Kaku shōchō fuken gaikokujin kanyatoi ikken' 各省廳府縣外國人官傭一件, 3 fols; *Yokosuka Chinjufu Meibo Enkakushi Hensan'in* 横須賀鎮守府名簿沿革史編纂委員, in *Yokosuka Zōsenshi* 横須賀造船史, 1880, pp. 75–8 & 96–9. The above reflects the same pattern found in

Verny's account for 45 persons given in *Ōkuma Monjo*, A3024

⁷² Ōtsuka, 'Fukkoku', Pt. 1, p. 831.

⁷³ GHS: 'Keiō 1–3, Hompō rikugun kyōshi ni Futsukoku shikan yōhei ikken' 慶應一・二・三年, 本邦陸軍教師二佛國士官傭聘一件 (French & Japanese correspondence).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*; Ōtsuka, *Bakumatsu*, pp. 350–5 & chart following p. 272; Katsu, *Rikugun*, pp. 264 ff. & 282; Ernst Presseisen, *Before Aggression: Europeans Train the Japanese Army*, Tucson, 1965, pp. 1–23.

⁷⁵ GHS: 'Hompō rikugun kyōshi'; Presseisen, p. 7.

occurred in fact. One *ryō* (*koban*) equalled four Tempō *ichibugin*, but as arbitrarily fixed by foreign treaty powers, three Tempō *ichibugin* equalled one Mexican silver dollar (*yōgin*), the most common treaty port currency.⁷⁶ The *bakufu*, however, had found it necessary to make adjustments and issued a new *ichibugin* (Ansei) of less weight. Foreigners objected to this and other debasements, and in ensuing arguments foreign employees and foreigners in general increasingly demanded payment in Mexican silver dollars as distrust of the Japanese coins grew. Regardless of the arrangement citing French or Japanese currency, Captain Chanoine, for example, calculated from francs to treaty port dollars and expected to receive \$500 Mexican silver. When he and the others did not receive their salary according to this ratio, Roches obliged the *bakufu* to make reimbursement.⁷⁷

The military mission had in fact come too late to be of much service, because the *bakufu* position was rapidly deteriorating in its conflicts with southwestern *han*, although French advisers were present at the action at Fushimi. But in the end the last shogun refused to involve the nation in full-scale civil war and rejected further military assistance proffered by Roches.⁷⁸ But serious tension was created when, upon the capitulation of the Tokugawa regime in 1868, five members of the French military mission, with the knowledge of their superiors, joined *bakufu* dissidents in Hokkaido; another five French soldiers, not related to the mission, also joined the rebels.⁷⁹ This action quite naturally created an international incident and gave the new government grounds to cancel the mission.

THE AMERICANS

EVEN THOUGH Americans were responsible for the overt action that brought a formal end to Tokugawa seclusion by forging the first major treaty which served as a wedge for further foreign pressures, perhaps no more than ten or a dozen United States citizens became *bakufu* or *han* employees during the *bakumatsu* era. With a few exceptions all came as missionaries with the opening of the ports in 1859. The ban on Christianity was still in force so they were obliged to turn their efforts to Japanese language study or the teaching of English or other languages

⁷⁶ Horie Yasuzō, 'Ichibugin' 一分銀, in Honjō Eijirō 本庄榮次郎, ed., *Nihon Keizaishi Jiten* 日本經濟史辭典, 1965, I, p. 50; cf. Correspondence between Great Britain and Japan, Alcock to Malmesbury, No. 13 (August 1869), esp. Enclosures 1 and 4, *State Papers*, 56, pp. 518-28. Since according to the American treaty of 1858 'all foreign coins shall be current in Japan and pass for its corresponding weight of Japanese coins of the same description' (Art. 5), U.S. Minister Townsend Harris for expediency fixed the ratio at 3 to 1 by the simple method of weighing one hundred silver dollars against Tempō *ichibugin* and finding

that 311 equalled 100 silver dollars. Other treaty powers concurred.

⁷⁷ GHS: 'Hompō rikugun kyōshi'.

⁷⁸ Ibid.; Ōtsuka, 'Fukkoku', Pt. 2, p. 993; Shibusawa Eiichi 澁澤榮一, *Tokugawa Keiki Kō Den*, 徳川慶喜公傳, 1918, VII, pp. 105-6, 206-8 & 416-8; Ōtsuka, *Bakumatsu*, p. 355. In view of the changing policies of the French government, it is highly unlikely that Roches could have delivered any significant military aid.

⁷⁹ Ōtsuka, *Bakumatsu*, pp. 359-65. Cf. chart following p. 272 for list of participants.

while biding their time. Although many missionaries came, only a half dozen found employment in government schools.

The most famous of these were Dr Samuel Rollins Brown and Guido F. Verbeck. Both taught first in Nagasaki, but Dr Brown soon moved to Yokohama. There he participated in what emerged in 1867 as a joint English-French language school operated by the *bakufu*. Brown had previous experience in China, and within three years of coming to Japan he prepared a grammar and phrasebook in Japanese. Much respected, he continued in Ministry of Education and Kanagawa prefecture employment in the Meiji era.

Guido F. Verbeck, a Dutch-American missionary, had been educated first as an engineer and then in theology; he was master of four European languages and became proficient in Japanese as well. He was employed at the English-language school in Nagasaki when it developed into the Seibikan⁸⁰ in 1864. During the next five years a number of future Meiji statesmen studied with him and became acquainted with the two texts he used: the New Testament and the Constitution of the United States of America. These special friendships provided his entree to Meiji government employ.⁸¹

Other than language teachers there may have been only three Americans in Japanese government employ. Thomas Hoag (phonetic) was employed for the Kanagawa Customs House in 1866 and continued in this post until 1869.⁸² Earlier, however, two American mining engineers, William Phipps Blake and Raphael Pumpelly, were employed by the *bakufu* to survey mineral resources in Hokkaido. The process of employment of these two men illustrates American government and employee attitudes toward Japanese government service. The U. S. Minister, Townsend Harris, was asked by the *bakufu* to obtain two competent mining engineers. Through Charles Wolcott Brooks, a commercial agent for the Japanese government in San Francisco, Harris was able to complete the arrangements in 1862.⁸³

According to their contracts Blake and Pumpelly were hired 'to act in the capacity of Mineralogists and Mining Engineers in the employment of the [Japanese] Government, to examine its mines, and instruct its people in the best methods of working them.' They were hired 'by virtue of authority from the Government of Japan, through the Honorable Townsend Harris, Minister of the United States resident in Japan' and through C. W. Brooks, 'acting on behalf of the Japanese people as their representative.'⁸⁴ The euphemism of Brooks representing the

⁸⁰ 濟美館

⁸¹ 'Four American Makers of Japan' and other items in the William Elliot Griffis Collection, Rutgers the State University Library, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

⁸² *Yokohama Zeikan Enkaku*, pp. 416-9.

⁸³ GHS: 'Bunkyū 1-3, Yezo chihō kōzan tanken no tame Beikoku kōshi yatōiire ikken'

文久一・二・三年，蝦夷地方鑛山探檢ノ爲メ米國鑛師雇入一件 (Dutch, English & Japanese correspondence). Brooks and Fleury Herard in Paris served the *bakufu* in this unique capacity and continued with the Meiji government as hired consuls (*yatoi ryōji* 傭領事).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Japanese 'people' is rather quaintly American, but Harris' instrumentality in this engagement is of special interest in view of the diplomatic and consular act of 1856 prohibiting diplomatic officers from recommending appointees to foreign governments, a restriction which continued until 1874.⁸⁵

Harris, however, pursued a policy of cooperation, and one of persistence when cooperation was impossible. Neither he nor Robert Pruyn after him pressed American candidates on the *bakufu*, but neither did they ignore opportunities. In the *bakumatsu* era American ministers postured aloofness from quarrels among treaty powers, even though in the 1858 treaty the United States offered 'to act as friendly mediator' between Japan and European powers. In the actual course of events the British acted and the Americans abstained or concurred. Only after 1863 did United States Minister Robert Pruyn actively cooperate with the British at Shimonoseki and Hyōgo. In Ernest Satow's words, the Americans 'partially abandoned the affectation of acting on different lines from the "effete monarchies of Europe"'.⁸⁶ The uncompetitive spirit of U.S. ministers in the *bakumatsu* era may be accounted for in part by the preoccupation of the home government with civil war and reconstruction.

The contracts of Blake and Pumpelly provided for first-class transportation, housing, and \$5,000 a year. They were to 'have a social position and rank in Japan relatively equal to that of scientific men in similar positions in other countries.' The concern for status treatment, which reached contest proportions among Meiji-era foreign employees, was already viewed seriously in the *bakumatsu* era. While it was comparatively easy to deal with persons holding military or government rank, it was more difficult to determine the social status of a non-military private citizen of a republic. But the Americans were undaunted. In reply to Japanese inquiries about their rank and position in the United States, Blake, for example, listed a dozen academic affiliations and pointed out, 'In America, Scientific men take position according to merit and public services or experience and as Engineers, they rank with officers of Engineers of the Army, from whom the most able Generals and Commanders are selected.'⁸⁷

However, more significant in indicating attitudes and current conditions was a contract clause stating 'that full protection of life shall be afforded him by the Government of Japan, while in its service, whether at mines, traveling or in any of the cities or towns, he acting in conformity to the laws and regulations of said Government.'⁸⁸ Japan of the 1860s held special hazards for foreigners since samurai were prone to cut down foreigners in the streets for real or imagined faults. But of more interest is the recognition that these engineers admitted to the interior beyond extraterritorial areas prescribed for foreign residence were to conform to Japanese law. Of the several contracts extant for foreign employees in

⁸⁵ Cf. *United States Second Congressional Record*, 1874, 3629, 4876, 5210.

⁸⁶ Satow, p. 143.

⁸⁷ GHS: 'Yezo chihō kōzan.'

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

the *bakumatsu* era and the hundreds that exist for the Meiji period, this clause is most unusual. Nor is any mention made of recourse to the U.S. Minister. There may be no doubt that, had occasion arisen, *bakufu* officials would have been obliged to consult with the American Minister, but the absence of this stipulation illustrates a certain trend in American attitudes before and after the Restoration.

THE GERMANS

A FEW GERMANS may also be counted among *bakumatsu* foreign employees. Carl Troester, a veterinarian, later with Komaba Agricultural School, was probably employed around 1861. While several Germans are found in *han* employment by 1868 they were not, properly speaking, *bakumatsu* employees, although plans for their engagement were made before the Restoration.⁸⁹ There were, of course, from the earlier period Germans as well as Austrian and Swedish physicians and scientists associated with or employed by the Dutch in the Nagasaki area; but these were not Japanese government employees, though some ventured into the interior under varied pretexts.

The scarcity of German and other foreign employees in government service was due to the relatively limited commercial activities of their nations in the treaty ports. German states were undergoing the stresses of political unification. However, by the end of 1867, the Prussian Minister Maxim von Brandt called this oversight to the *bakufu*'s attention when he sought implementation of Article 21 of the treaty with Prussia in which communication was to be carried out in the German language. Von Brandt was chagrined that no steps had been taken to inaugurate German-language instruction and so Dutch translations were still being used.⁹⁰

The 1861–2 Harris correspondence concerning Blake and Pumpelly had been conducted in Dutch, but by the mid-1860s several English and French language schools were in operation and these languages came to be widely utilized in diplomatic business. Von Brandt wanted similar instruction in the German language to be started in Yokohama. He also desired Japanese students to be sent to Prussia in the same way as they were being sent to France, England, and Holland. At the close of 1867 *bakufu* officials obviously had more pressing matters at hand, and although they sent assurances, von Brandt insisted on 'actual evidence of the government's intent to establish a German school and send students to Prussia.' So in January 1868, *bakufu* officials forwarded to the German Minister \$3,300 silver to bring two German teachers to Japan; \$500 was for

⁸⁹ Cf. Shigehisa Tokutarō 重久篤太郎, 'Wakayama Han ni okeru Doitsujin' 和歌山藩におけるドイツ人, in Kyōto Rangaku Shiryō Kenkyūkai 京都蘭學資料研究會, ed., *Kenkyū Hōkoku* 研究報告, No. 166, 16 January 1965, pp. 1–8.

⁹⁰ GHS: 'Keiō 3, Doitsugogaku kyōshi yatoi-ire ikken' 慶應三年, 獨逸語學教師雇入一件 (German, Dutch, English & Japanese correspondence).

books, \$800 for two-months advance salary (each at \$200 a month), \$1,000 for transportation, and the remainder as a preparation and moving allowance.⁹¹

This arrangement was made in the last days of the Tokugawa regime and the outcome is not known. The case, however, indicates the momentum gathered in the trend among foreign treaty powers to enter claims for the employment of their nationals.

Significance of Late Tokugawa Precedents

IN EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES for hired foreigners in the *bakumatsu* era, a basic pattern was set in the midst of variables of motivation, cultural disparities, and types of work. The most favored nation clause marked the tempo; any privilege obtained by one nation or national established grounds for the extension to all. First, the very fact of hiring the nationals of one country opened the way for others also. Although as early as 1859 the Dutch hoped to preclude future group missions by initiating the cancellation of their own, the precedent remained and the technique was reactivated. Given the dominance of international trade rivalry, group missions, on account of their official posture, provided participating powers with a stronger lever to apply pressure. But even the engagement of individual foreigners had a pronounced official cast since selection, the terms of engagement, and legal status were supervised by diplomatic representatives in Japan. Foreign ministers were thus not only brokers for their fellow nationals but scrupulous guardians of their interests in the turbulence of treaty port politics. And the *bakufu* was obliged to accede to financial and other adjustments put forward by foreign ministers. Yet while the activities of foreigners employed by the Japanese government were initiated in a milieu of foreign commercial competition and flawed by cultural misunderstandings, strong concern to accomplish good work was everywhere in evidence. Almost all these foreign nationals were experienced and skilled, and endeavored to fulfill the primary purpose of their employment to train Japanese. Certainly they helped to prepare the ground for the future.

The long contact at Deshima had grown into a comfortable arrangement, and the Nagasaki area became a center for Dutch studies. Over the years a *bakufu* bureau translated many volumes of scientific works from the Dutch. Many of these had been translations of German and other authors so that the Western knowledge being introduced was not solely of Dutch origin.⁹² As the *bakufu* moved to implement reforms, machinery and arms were purchased and training schools established with Dutch help. While treaties were signed and while more nations appeared on the Japanese diplomatic scene, despite the vicissitudes described above, it would seem that Dutch employees assumed an unofficial position of senior *yatoi*. They were always highly respected by the

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Numata Jirō, in *Nihon Rekishi*, 14:3 | —15:4, 1949, pp. 30–5 & 47–51; NKGT, pp. 48–50 & 52–4.

Japanese and undoubtedly their competence and professional posture contributed to their reputation. Despite the natural impatience and critical attitude of Japanese in pursuit of modernization, an affinity with the Dutch remained. Though the Japanese came to appreciate that much of the learning received through the Dutch language was actually of diverse Western origin and this knowledge became a factor in displacing Dutch primacy, particularly in naval and medical sciences, a certain aura of respect still accompanied Dutch employees as their employment continued into the Meiji era. Without question they laid a strong practical foundation in naval and medical sciences. One needs only to glance at names of graduates from Dutch training schools for a list of future Meiji leaders.

The British contribution eludes evaluation. The lack of interest in securing Japanese government employment for British subjects until almost 1867 was a reflection of British domestic policy to find relief for flooded home markets and of empire policy proclaimed in 1858 by Lord Russell to secure new markets without the use of force or involvement in Japanese politics.⁹³ Though British ministers tended to interpret home policies according to their own lights, and had to answer on the floor of Parliament for excesses overseas (the incendiary destruction of Kagoshima, for example), the largely private nature of technological assistance precluded an overall or coordinated plan. And, of course, British Minister Parkes, who had ties with Old China Hands, was a devotee of private enterprise. Unlike some junior diplomats in the field, Parkes upheld official British neutrality toward the civil war, not permitting rumor or fact to deflect him from his first concern, the development of British commercial interests.⁹⁴

British employees were few in number, and the largest business arrangement was that of the Platt Brothers Manchester firm with Satsuma *han*. Thomas B. Glover was the English entrepreneur, and contracts were made in November 1866. With E. Home in charge, B. Shillingford, Sutcliff, and Harrison together left for Japan immediately, John Trotow as factory head and two other technicians following in January 1867. By May a spinning and weaving factory with two hundred workers was in operation. E. Home was to stay two years at 5,000 Mexican silver dollars annual salary, and the other technicians for three years at about \$100 monthly salary. While Japanese accounts credit them with initiating machine spinning in Japan, critics suggest that their contribution was negligible.⁹⁵ The Englishmen disliked the 'barbarous nation'. And in fairness, although four

⁹³ Correspondence between Great Britain and Japan, Russell to Alcock, No. 44, February 1860, in *State Papers*, 56, pp. 559-65; Foreign Secretary Malmesbury's circular (1858), quoted in W.G. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858*, London, 1951, pp. 168 ff.

⁹⁴ See Gordon Daniels, 'The Japanese Civil War (1868)—A British View' in *Modern Asian Studies*, 1:3, 1967, pp. 241-63, and 'The

British Role in the Meiji Restoration', in *ibid.*, 2:4, 1968, pp. 291-313.

⁹⁵ *Kagoshima Kenshi* 鹿兒島縣史, 1926-8, III, pp. 74-7; Saigusa Hiroto 三枝博音, Nozaki Shigeru 野崎茂 & Sasaki Shun 佐々木俊, *Kindai Nihon Sangyō Gijutsu no Seiōka* 近代日本産業技術の西歐化, 1960, pp. 135-7, 300, 315, 325, 331 & 342.

years had elapsed since the bombardment of Kagoshima, Japanese attitudes were still hostile. The technicians remained only long enough to set up the plant, and all abandoned their posts within a year. Revolution was in the air and political conditions prevented *han* leader Shimazu Tadayoshi's⁹⁶ attention to the enterprise. Some Japanese scholars contend the Kagoshima *bōsekijo*⁹⁷ was an abortive project in the *han*'s industrialization program.⁹⁸

The brevity of British ventures, including the naval training experiment, militates against any concrete assessment. One should not read Meiji developments into the *bakumatsu* experiment in this case. Employment of British subjects was marked by an individual, rather than a group, orientation, just as British policy in the *bakumatsu* era was characterized by encouragement of individual commercial enterprise. Nevertheless, British contacts were perhaps more significant and more amenable to future enlargement than those of any other nationality, owing to their *laissez-faire* spirit, their involvement in *han* politics, the weight of respect engendered by might, their obvious competence in technology and efficiency in business. These were qualities which brought British diplomatic leadership to the fore and may help to account for the fact that fifty per cent (perhaps 2,000 persons) of all government foreign employees in the Meiji era would be British.⁹⁹

But of all the projects undertaken in the *bakumatsu* era, the Yokosuka-Yokohama dockyards and foundry complex perhaps best provides a prototype of the Meiji style of nation-building. French efforts were both coordinated and solid, and speak well for the abilities of Roches and Verny and for their quality selection of military and technological instructors. To be sure, there were misunderstandings. The French, like the Dutch, were committed tutors, and the Yokosuka agreement gave Verny precise and almost full powers. But he appears to have administered the same strict chastisement to recalcitrant French workers as to Japanese. Undoubtedly *bakufu* bureaucrats were offended by his authoritarian bent and by his literal interpretation of contract regulations. But his report to the new Meiji government reveals positive achievements in education and in the practical work of shipbuilding and repairs.¹⁰⁰ The defects of the arrangement would be eliminated, but the necessity of clear regulations properly enforced, quality selection of personnel, industry, dedication, and tangible results would not escape Meiji leaders.

Little can be said of contributions of Americans and Germans other than the fact that individual contacts appear to have left favorable impressions with the Japanese, impressions which would linger into Restoration years. Their

⁹⁶ 島津忠義

⁹⁷ 紡績所

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ H.J. Jones, 'The Formulation of the Meiji Government Policy Toward the Employment of Foreigners', in *MN*, 23:1-2, 1968, pp. 9-30, and 'Meiji Seifu to Oyatoi Gaikokujin'

明治政府と御傭外國人, in Meiji Bunka Kenkyūkai 明治文化研究會, ed., *Meiji Bunka Kenkyū*, 1969, III, pp. 139-155.

¹⁰⁰ Saigusa Hiroto, *Gijutsushi* 技術史, in *Gendai Nihon Bummeishi* 現代日本文明史, 1940, XIV, p. 197, quoting a report from Verny.

employment did not raise the specter of foreign political involvement to the degree that occurred with group missions or contacts with the volatile Parkes.

But the Meiji government necessarily inherited the problems of the *bakufu*. *Bakufu* diplomacy had succeeded in confining major foreign activities to the port areas of Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Hakodate through a series of treaties with Western powers. *Bakufu* diplomacy, however, failed to preserve Japanese sovereignty unimpaired by its granting concessions of extraterritoriality in port areas and officially surrendering defense responsibilities, at least in Yokohama, to foreign powers. Further, the *bakufu* through lack of regional control, over southwestern *han* in particular, failed to prevent infiltration of foreign commercial activities in those areas. Finally, the *bakufu* was constrained by internal economics and political conditions, and it allowed, and some factions actively sought, further exceptions to the policy of limited *kaikoku*¹⁰¹ (open country).

The *bakufu* brought foreign engineers into the interior, British and Americans to Hokkaido and French to Karafuto, utilized Dutch naval instructors in the Kobe naval school, ensconced a large complement of French engineers and workers at Yokosuka, and introduced foreign doctors and teachers into the capital itself. With the exception of the French, numbers were few, but precedents were set contrary to the avowed policy of containment of foreigners within open port areas. Also to a large extent foreign employees held the reins of administration.

An explanation may be found not so much in the inevitability of foreign pressure as in the Japanese practice of using foreign capital. This permissive attitude toward foreign capital gave the French an edge in management of Yokosuka and the British an edge in *han* industries. Although at the time of the Restoration only one *bakufu* loan was outstanding, the *han* had contracted numerous debts.¹⁰² The majority of these, though privately arranged, had been taken out in the names of *han*.¹⁰³ The new government, if it was to succeed as the responsible, centralized authority, was obliged to honor prior commitments of both *bakufu* and *han*. The Meiji government was unable therefore, even if so inclined, to chart a completely new course in foreign relations because treaties and foreign capital prevented this. Included in these commitments were contracts for foreign employees guaranteed for the most part by foreign governments.

Even so the immediate reaction of the new government was to dismiss foreign employees as supernumeraries. Certain officials, however, recognized Japan's need for some foreign instruction. Those foreign employees whose political affiliation with their own governments appeared tenuous were retained, while formal decision was taken to sever official missions, the French and English military and naval groups, and the French technicians at Yokosuka—a decision which proved difficult to execute in the face of *bakufu* commitments and foreign pressure.

¹⁰¹ 開國

¹⁰² Shimomura Fujio 下村富士男, *Meiji Ishin*

| *no Gaikō* 明治維新の外交, 1948, pp. 128 ff.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 132–3.