The advance of Russia toward Japan has passed through two distinct phases: an early period of private initiative, ca. 1700 to ca. 1850, followed by a period of governmental leadership, ca. 1850 to the present. The Treaty of Shimoda, February 7, 1855, the first agreement between Russia and Japan, was already a product of the second phase. It did contain the seeds of Russo-Japanese trade, but its main provisions—delineation of boundaries, reciprocal extraterritoriality, appointment of a consul, etc.—were political in nature. Less than a year after the exchange of ratifications on December 7, 1856 a supplementary treaty was concluded at Nagasaki on October 24, 1857. This treaty expanded the limited commercial provisions of the Treaty of Shimoda; it stated that "henceforth the number of vessels and capital used in trade are not restricted by anything and all commercial transactions will be carried out by mutual agreement between the Russian and Japanese traders." The treaty encompassed further concessions of interest, such as permission to bring wives and families to Japan, provision for the use of Japanese language teachers, prohibition of traffic in opium, etc., but was superseded after less than a year by the Treaty of Edo, which was signed on August 19, 1858; ratifications were exchanged on August 8, 1859. Russo-Japanese relations following the "opening" of Japan were thus in a state of flux. The rapid succession of treaties bears witness not only to unrelenting Russian pressure but also to almost continuous intercourse between Russians and Japanese. The purpose of this article is to examine the nature of this intercourse, as exemplified by the experiences of the crew of one of the Russian vessels, the frigate "Askol'd."

I

The "Askol'd" arrived in Japan as flagship of Vice-Admiral Count Evfimii Vasil'evich Putiatin, negotiator of the Russo-Japanese treaties of 1855 and 1857. Putiatin had just concluded a treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation with China, June 13, 1858, and now hastened to Japan to obtain concessions similar to those recently promised to the United States of America. Stopping at Nagasaki only long enough to replenish her coal supply, the "Askol'd" cast anchor off Shimoda on July 26, 1858, side by side with the American men-of-war "Mississippi" and "Powhatan." The governor of Shimoda, Nakamura Tameya (Dewano-kami), who had associated with...

6 Ibid., p. 607.
6 "Pis'mo s fregata 'Askol'd,'" unsigned, dated Shanghai, Sept. 18, 1858, in RUSSIA, Ministry of the Navy, Naval Scientific Section, Morskoi sbornik, XXXIX, No. 1 (1859), 161; K. S. WEIGH, Russo-Chinese diplomacy (Shanghai, 1928), p. 37; H. B. MORSE, The international relations of the Chinese empire, I (Shanghai, 1910), 525.
6 Lieutenant LITKE, "Fregat 'Askol'd' v Iaponii," Morskoi sbornik, XLIX, No. 11 (1860), 331. Principal terms of full commercial treaty agreed upon by January 1858; treaty signed July 29, 1858.
8 LITKE, loc. cit., p. 332.
10 Incorrectly called "Nakashura-Dewano-kami" in the Russian letter ("Pis'mo," p. 164). Nakamura...
Putiatin during his earlier visits, came aboard and welcomed the admiral with extended arms, shouting “Putiatin! Putiatin?” in his hoarse voice. He expressed delight when Putiatin made him a present of a group photograph of the officers of his former flagship, the frigate “Pallada.” Other Japanese “inquired with great interest after those mariners who had not returned, remembered them all by name, repeated Russian words, and eagerly learned new ones. Many of them had written Russian alphabets which they knew well.” Putiatin was eager to proceed to the capital but agreed to tarry at Shimoda several days, lest his unannounced appearance embarrass Nakamura.

On July 30 Putiatin crossed over to Kanagawa with several Japanese officials aboard the frigate. In Kanagawa he was met by plenipotentiaries who had just arrived from Edo on a Japanese side-wheeler and conferred with them on the “Askol’d” for almost two weeks. When preparations for his reception had been completed in the capital, Putiatin departed thither by land, accompanied by several officers, among them the commander of the clipper “Strelok,” which had meanwhile joined the frigate at Kanagawa.

Upon arrival in Edo on August 12—the Russians entered “with that feeling of pride and strength which comes from the realization of [one’s] moral superiority before ignorance”—the negotiations, begun aboard the “Askol’d,” were resumed in Shiba Shimbuku Temple. Nagai Naomune, a man “extremely intelligent and clever,” who knew Dutch and English and was familiar with the structure of European governments and the habits and customs of “civilized” nations, was the chief spokesman on the Japanese side.

On August 19 the Russo-Japanese treaty of friendship and commerce was concluded and signed by Putiatin, Nagai (Naomune) Gembano-kami, Inoue Shina-no-kami, Hori Oribe-no-kami, Iwase Higo-no-kami, and Tsuda Hansaburō. The main body of this agreement governed relations between the two countries until 1904, and, among other things, provided for: the exchange and permanent residence of diplomatic and consular agents; the opening of Kanagawa, Hyogo, and one other, unspecified, port in western Honshu (the first two in addition to Hakodate and Nagasaki, the third in place of Shimoda, harbors already opened) in 1859, 1863, and 1860, respectively; the admittance of families; permanent residence in the open ports; freedom of movement within specified geographical limits; the leasing of land; the renting, buying, or building of houses, stores, and churches; residence in Edo and Osaka for commercial purposes only, as of 1862 and 1863, respectively; trade without government interference; the determination of import and export tariffs; the prohibition of traffic in opium; the limitation of weapon sales to the Japanese government and foreigners; the prohibition of rice, wheat, and copper exportation; the acceptance of foreign currency; extraterritoriality; and most-favored-nation treatment.

The treaty is also known as the Ansei treaty, or the Convention of 1867. The treaty as a whole was “annulled” by the Russo-Japanese War and was replaced in accordance with Article XII of the treaty of peace (Portsmouth, Sept. 5, 1905) by “the system of reciprocal treatment of the most favored nation,” pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation. Such a treaty was signed on September 11, 1907.

"Russia's Japan expedition," p. 78.


LITKE, Ioc. cit., p. 93; LITKE, loc. cit., pp. 336-37. The treaty was also known as the Ansei treaty, or the Edo alliance (B. TANAKA, Nichiro Kosho-shi [Tokyo, 1944], p. 67).

The appended tariff was superseded by the American treaty of 1867. The treaty as a whole was “annulled” by the Russo-Japanese War and was replaced in accordance with Article XII of the treaty of peace (Portsmouth, Sept. 5, 1905) by “the system of reciprocal treatment of the most favored nation,” pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation. Such a treaty was signed on September 11, 1907.

JAPAN, Treaties and conventions, pp. 607-20. Appended regulations: pp. 621-29; tariff: pp. 630-32. This treaty follows the pattern of the American treaty of the same year, negotiated by Townsend Harris. There are minor divergences, such as American preference for July 4 as opening date for most of the harbors. Article II of the American treaty is of particular interest. It states that “the President of the United States, at the request of the Japanese Government, will act as a friendly mediator in such
The negotiations were crowned by the reception of Putiatin by Tokugawa Iemochi,25 the young heir apparent of Shogun Tokugawa Iesada, and a farewell dinner. On August 20 Putiatin returned to Kanagawa, escorted by a colorful paper-lantern procession.27

On August 22 Putiatin departed for Shanghai on the clipper "Strelok," while the frigate "Askol'd" prepared to leave for Hakodate; but the "Strelok" got only as far as Shimoda. Boiler damage and the inability to continue onward solely by sail in the face of rough seas and strong unfavorable winds forced the vessel back to Kanagawa on August 24. Putiatin returned aboard the "Askol'd" and once more set out for Shanghai on August 25.28

The frigate headed rapidly toward the shores of China and was within seventy miles of Wusung when a typhoon almost sent her to the bottom of the sea. Seriously crippled, she did not reach Wusung until ten days later. Abandoning all hope for an early return to their country, the crew now had to seek out a place for the repair of the frigate. The high prices and bad climate of the Chinese coast induced them to select the quiet, easily accessible roadstead of Nagasaki, where timber was plentiful and cheap and provisions cost "almost nothing." As soon as Putiatin had left for Russia on a mail steamer, the "Askol'd" headed back toward Japan.29

Inclement weather beyond the Saddle Islands prolonged the voyage of the "Askol'd" by some three weeks—a stop-over was made in a relatively protected place behind Raffles Island—and contributed to the outbreak of a severe epidemic of malignant malaria and dysentery among the crew.30 Nagasaki appeared to the Russians as the promised land; Vitkovskii, the ship's doctor, estimates that, had it not been for rest and recuperation at that place, the frigate would have lost half of her crew and might never have made it back to Russia.31 As it was, the number of men who died in Nagasaki during the following eight months was so large that "the graveyard there was transformed from a Dutch one into a Russian one."32

The rehabilitation of vessel and crew could not have been accomplished without the good will and co-operation of the Japanese authorities. Fortunately, the governor of Nagasaki was most helpful.33 He provided the officers with quarters in the monks' dormitory at Gosinji temple—the monks were moved to the temple proper—order the construction of two adjacent barracks for the crew,34 and arranged for the housing of the sick.35 A level piece of land facing

25 At that time still known as "Tokugawa Keifu-ku" (Heibonsha [pub.], Shinsen dai-jimmei-jiten [Tokyo, 1937-41], IV, 393).

26 Russian sources assert that he was fourteen years old; according to Shinsen dai-jimmei-jiten, he was only twelve.


28 The slipper "Strelok," meanwhile, stayed to make the necessary repairs; upon completion of these it was necessary to carry out assignments in Shimoda and northern Japan before proceeding to Shanghai by winter ("Pis'mo," pp. 173-74).
the moorage was sold to the Russians, to provide them with space for a small “admiralty” and a supply dump.36

The Russians were permitted to follow their own laws and customs within the temple grounds. They set up mountain howitzers in front of the captain’s doors and a longboat gun, which was discharged daily at noon and sunset, behind the low stone enclosure. Even cattle, the slaughter of which was forbidden by Japanese law, were sold to the Russians, on the assurance that “it is extremely difficult for Europeans to live without meat,” and grazed in one part of the compound.37 The “colony” was “officially opened” by a banquet at which the Russians played host to the Japanese city authorities, including the governor and his replacement,38 and to Dutch officials.39

Meanwhile, ship repairs awaited the recuperation of the greater part of the crew. The patients in the lazaret has been well on their way to recovery—a month and a half after their arrival “even the memory of the epidemic had disappeared”40—when a new disease had begun to make serious inroads on the health of the crew, a disease “the causes of which were no longer conditions aboard ship, but conditions of the very life on shore.” More than one-quarter of the men who had survived the epidemic unharmed became infected with syphilis;41 and, while the treatment of syphilis with mercury proved “quite satisfactory,” the doctors found it particularly difficult to effect cures because, as one of them, D. V. Mertsalov, complained later on, “the sick were running away from the hospital into a near-by brothel, and bonzes and other Japanese were bringing alcoholic beverages to the hospital.”42

wherever possible, proposed that the officers stay in various houses in the city. The offer was declined because the Russian leaders believed that such separation would demoralize the crew and inconvenience themselves (LITKE, loc. cit., pp. 344-46).

36 LITKE, loc. cit., p. 345.
37 The stipulation was made that the Russians themselves must kill the animals.
38 This seems to have been the first time since the “opening” of Japan that a Japanese governor had visited foreigners on shore.
40 Ibid., p. 344.
41 “Russkii beregovoi,” loc. cit., pp. 92-93.
42 Ibid., p. 95.

In November repairs were begun in earnest and continued with but one interruption—a four-day New Year’s celebration, during which the crew made merry with compatriots from the newly arrived clippers “Dzhigit” and “Strelok.”43 The Russians worked simultaneously on three projects—carpenter work done aboard the frigate, mast work done near the “admiralty,” the sloop work done near the temple44—but hastened as they might, there were delays due to slow delivery of necessary materials, the training of carpenters from among the crew,45 and the discovery of further rot. It was June 1859 before the reloading and rearming of the “Askol’d” could be begun.46 On June 26 the work “which the foreigners, and particularly the Dutch, had considered impossible”47 had been successfully completed, and the frigate pulled out onto the roadstead, fully prepared to undertake any kind of voyage.48

During Putiatin’s visit to Edo in August 1858 his entourage, guided by printed Japanese maps, had seen sights in the capital and had ridden into the surrounding countryside,49 while the remainder of the crew at Shimoda had strolled along shore in a wooded area near town.50 There had been neither time nor occasion for extensive contacts with the population. It was different at Nagasaki, where the proxtracted moorage of the “Askol’d” provided ample opportunity for rapprochement.

According to Russian testimony the Japanese were, in general, well-disposed toward them:51

As their oldest acquaintances, the first who had settled on shore for a longer [period of] time and had

43 LITKE, Morskoi sbornik, XLIX, No. 12 (1860), 156. The “Strelok” later went to Shanghai to obtain new wood of “excellent Oregon pine” for the topmast of the “Askol’d.”
44 For a detailed discussion of the repairs, materials used, etc., see ibid., pp. 148-61, and No. 13, pp. 388-89. Consult also Lieutenant UKHTOMSKII’s article in Morskoi sbornik, No. 6 (1858), unofficial part, p. 319.
45 Some assistance was given by Japanese crafts- men.
47 Ibid.
48 “Pis’mo,” pp. 171-72.
entered into the closest relations with them, we enjoyed the utmost confidence and respect of the private inhabitants of Nagasaki as well as of government personnel. In regard to the former we could notice this from the good and polite reception which we constantly met in whatever private home we happened to enter. In stores we bought various things better and cheaper than other foreigners; several objects which the Japanese were not permitted to sell to foreigners they secretly brought to the temple at our request, and we had occasion thus to obtain different things [such as swords] for foreign acquaintances who had tried in vain to get them in stores. As regards officials, the preference which they gave us before all other nations which visited Nagasaki was obvious. In all [their] difficulties with foreigners they usually turned to us for advice before reaching a decision. Often, merely to oblige us, they satisfied demands [which were] not in accordance with their laws and customs, and in general, by all their actions, showed respect and trust [toward us].

This pro-Russian or, perhaps more correctly, less anti-Russian feeling, similar to the prediction which in the early 1850's had led some Japanese to advocate an alliance with Russia, was attributed to several fortuitous circumstances. Japan's social scale, for example, placed the warrior and official above the merchant. Most of the foreigners who frequented Nagasaki after the "opening" of the country were traders, whereas Russia was represented exclusively by naval personnel and bureaucratic officials. The resultant misconception that Russia was without a merchant class favorably impressed the population. Furthermore, the position of the United States had been compromised by the wanton destruction of property and assaults on shopkeepers on the part of sailors from the men-of-war "Mississippi" and "Powhatan"; that of Great Britain by the attempt of one Englishman to smuggle opium into Japan, the passing of forged assignments in payment for Japanese goods by a countryman of his, and the wounding of a Japanese guide during a hunt by a third Englishman; and that of France by a French merchant's transporting his Japanese maid to Shanghai. Exceptional as these American, English, and French transgressions may have been, they did discredit their nations in the eyes of the Japanese, for it is a truism that the many suffer for the sins of the few.

Not all the Japanese, however, differentiated between Russians and other "barbarians." One day, for example, a Russian midshipman who had trespassed into the courtyard of one of the lordly houses was promptly ejected by officials within. Although such intrusion as the mariner had committed was expressly prohibited by treaty, the Russians felt that the action of the Japanese called for "swift and strict punishment." Deviating from his policy of seeking satisfaction through the Japanese authorities, the captain commanded the officials in question to report to him without delay on pain of having their house leveled by Russian guns. When they appeared, they were deprived of their swords and made prisoners. They were not released until after a representative of their lord—the lord of Chikuzen—had made a public apology in the latter's name and had promised that they would be punished in accordance with Japanese law.

The incident might have proved less embarrassing, had the captain not felt called upon soon afterward to advise the Japanese in another matter. The secretary to the Dutch commissioner had slapped the face of a Japanese official. When the Japanese authorities thought of


62 Japanese officialdom's well-known disdain for merchants was shared by the Russian bureaucracy. Russian writers frequently inveighed against English and American "shopkeepers." See, for example, K. SKAL'KOVSKIi, Russkaia torgovlia v Tikhom okeane (St. Petersburg, 1883), p. 358.
punishing this insult as the Russians had done, the captain instructed them that such things were not done among European nations, that a foreigner could not be confined unless his government had been notified beforehand, and that every member of an embassy or commissariat was further protected by diplomatic immunity, the violation of which would rupture friendly relations between the states concerned. He brushed aside Japanese reference to his own recent measures by telling them to proceed as they wished, without concern for the laws and customs of "civilized" nations, once their shores were studded with guns and protected by a powerful fleet; meanwhile, such action would be "careless." The Russians had an alliance with the Dutch— their rulers were even related—and if the Japanese tried to touch a single hair on the secretary's head, the Russians would demand satisfaction, if need be by open force.66

Whatever resentment and mistrust the captain's double standard had aroused among the officials was exorcised during a conflagration which destroyed most of the Dutch buildings on Deshima67 and threatened to engulf the city of Nagasaki. Awakened one night by the frantic shouts of the monks, the Russians hastened to the scene of disaster across the bay. While the Dutch lacked the manpower to cope with the blaze and the Japanese firemen seemed to regard Deshima as outside their jurisdiction, the Russian sailors, at the risk of their lives, prevented the spread of the conflagration and saved many possessions of the Dutch and Japanese. While the Russians were thus valiantly engaged, foreign merchantmen sent out sloops to loot the property preserved by the former and piled up by the Japanese along the shore out of reach of the fire. Warned by the Japanese, the Russian sailors drove away the intruders and recovered the property, which, in their words, "had been plundered to our shame by Europeans before the eyes of almost the whole population of Nagasaki." Again the misconduct of others project ed Russian assistance in high relief. Their firefighting deeds were celebrated in picture and song, and, as they noted, "not one person passed us on the street without saying something nice, and we were received with joy and honor in private houses . . . and the friendly relations [established] remained unbroken until the very departure of the frigate."68

Closer individual contacts—so important in undermining prejudices—had been multiplying for some time, as merchants catering to the sailors had swelled "the dead little village" near the temple into a "huge live settlement." Russians studied Japanese; Japanese, Russian. The Japanese learned rapidly, more rapidly than the Russians, and the Russians encouraged Japanese efforts, aware of the importance of cultural penetration.59 Officers who could be spared from repair duties spent whole mornings in study with a considerable number of young people from the merchant class and even from among officials.60 Among the officials who thus learned Russian and "listened to the affairs of the West," there was, for example, Shiga Shimpo (1842–1916), who was to become one of Japan's foremost experts on Russia.61

Russo-Japanese amity culminated in a series of farewell parties given by the villagers. Ac-

66 Ibid., p. 400. The rationale of the captain's argument is reflected in the words of Litke: "Here there were neither Hollanders, nor Russians, nor Englishmen, in a word, there was not a separate nation; there were Europeans who found themselves all without exception in alliance with each other for the attainment of a common purpose" (ibid., p. 400). Baron Rosen asserts in his memoirs that, toward the end of the Portsmouth conference (1905), an American newspaperman informed him that American enthusiasm for the Japanese cause had cooled off—further Russian defeats would have endangered the balance of power in the Far East. "I replied smilingly: 'This is indeed very gratifying intelligence, but permit me to ask whether this complete change is due to the fact that you have found out that, after all, we are white.' 'Well,' said he, 'that's about the long and the short of it' " (Forty years of diplomacy [London, 1922], I, 267).

67 An artificial fan-shaped little island to which the Dutch had been confined during the "seclusion" of the country. A colorful reproduction of a Japanese map of this settlement can be found in Y. S. Kuno, Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent (Berkeley, 1940), II, 90–91.


69 The Russians themselves were susceptible to Japanese influence. A. Kornilov II expressed the feeling that it is easier for a Russian to become a Chinese or a Japanese than to turn French, English, or German ("Izvestiia iz Iaponii," Morskoi sbornik, Vol. XLVI, No. 4 [1860], Part 4, p. 99).


71 Shiga was sent to Russia by the shogunate (1867) and by the imperial government (1873–75). When Prince Aleksii visited Japan (1872), Shiga acted as interpreter at the imperial reception (Heibonsa, Shinzen, III, 221).
according to Russian accounts, “both men and women without distinction” embraced and kissed the sailors and cried. “During the embarkation, in spite of the fact that the sailors were led in formation, they found means of separation, in spite of the fact that the sailors were ing, and it cost great pains to seek them out in the houses where the Japanese literally hid them from the officers.” Prominent members of the community called on the officers with gifts. One official who for several weeks had been confined to bed by illness had himself carried aboard to bid the Russians goodbye. When the “Aksol’d” weighed anchor, Japanese shouted farewell in Russian. Japanese boats surrounded the frigate, and several Japanese actually traveled aboard the vessel to the very opening of the bay “and cried like little children.” As Litke asked rhetorically: “How can one fail to acknowledge after this the sincerity of the disposition and friendship of the Japanese?”

II

En route to Russia by way of Cape Horn—the southwest monsoon dominated the China Sea—the “Aksol’d” entered Hakodate harbor to take home gifts which Consul Josif Goshkevich had received for his country. Before she could continue on her voyage, however, Adjutant General Count Nikolai Nikolaevich Mrav’ev-Amurskii arrived on the steamer “Amerika” on August 3, 1859, and required her services. “Here I move aboard the frigate “Aksol’d” to Unkovskii, where I shall also raise my flag,” he wrote in a letter, “and in Eedo [Edo] I shall have a pretty good squadron gather—this will, of course, help to conclude the Sakhalin matters, but I fear the slowness of the Japanese, and that I shall have to return to the Amur very late.”

The “Aksol’d” proceeded to Kanagawa, accompanied by the “Amerika” and the corvetts “Rynda” and “Griden’,” which had also been “caught” in Hakodate. Reinforced by the corvetts “Novik” and “Voevoda” and the clipper “Plastun,” the men-of-war then, on August 16 or 17, steamed up to Shinagawa, where they were eventually joined by the clipper “Dzhigit,” on August 27, and two other vessels. But although Murav’ev-Amurskii had collected such a numerous squadron to impress the peoples of the

60 Murav’ev-Amurskii had stopped at Hakodate earlier in the year (June 23) en route from Nikolaevsk to the Gulf of Pechili with three corvetts—“Voevoda,” “Boiarin,” “Novik”—one transport—“Japonets”—and one steamer—“Amerika” (I. P. BARSUKOV, Graf Nikolai Nikolaeovich Muravev-Amurskii po ego pis’tam, ofitsial’nym dokumentam, razsказom sovremenikov i pechatnym istochnikam [Moscow, 1891], I, 558–59; RUSSIA, ministry of the navy, Oobsor zagranichnykh plavanii sudov russkogo voennago flota s 1850 po 1868 god [St. Petersburg, 1871], pp. 600–601). He had left word that he planned to return from the shores of China in a month—on August 2—pick up Goshkevich at Hakodate, and proceed with him to Edo to confer with government officials (Murav’ev-Amurskii to E. P. Kovalevskii, June 24, 1859, BARSUKOV, II, 266–67; I, 557). “Properly [speaking] I cannot complain about my voyage,” he noted; “so far it has been quite fortunate, only frequently I am being driven mad by the seamen, whom I scold accordingly, and soon I shall also begin to change commanders” (BARSUKOV, I, 558).

61 BARSUKOV, I, 556–57.

62 Vessels from Fligel’-adiutant Popov’s unit.

63 The Japanese sources cited above give the date as August 16, the Russian sources as August 17.

64 There is a considerable amount of discrepancy in the various sources concerning the number of vessels which steamed into Edo Bay. Litke gives eight, an English dispatch ten, a Japanese source ten, another one seven, as the number. The Russian naval ministry’s survey of foreign voyages lists seven vessels, later on, ten. It appears, therefore, that the squadron consisted of seven vessels when it approached Shinagawa and was reinforced by three more during its stay there.
Far East with Russia's naval might, the Japanese were not cowed. As Litke admits, "they had already become accustomed to seeing foreign men-of-war and squadrons at their place and ours did not produce the desired effect." On August 22, two days after receiving the Japanese plenipotentiaries Endō Tajima-no-kami and Sakai Ukeonosuke aboard the "Askol'd," Murav'ev-Amurskii went ashore with a large retinue, including an honor guard of three hundred sailors and a drum and bugle corps. He opened the negotiations with the following remarkable statement: In the friendly treaties, concluded between our two great states, one important matter has not been completed. Since remote times Japanese fishermen have engaged in their industry in Aniva, on the southern tip of the island Sakhalin or Karafuto; both these ancient names bear witness to the fact that this island is homogeneous with the river, which is called Sakhalin-Ula or, in Russian, Amur, and that for the past one hundred and seventy years it was considered Chinese, i.e., much before [the time when] Japanese fishermen founded their business there; but before that time the river Sakhalin-Ula, and therefore also the island Sakhalin, belonged to Russia. Following the voice of justice and desiring to preserve friendly relations, both states—the Russian and the Chinese—agreed between themselves that the Russians occupy Sakhalin-Ula (Amur) as before, and consequently six years ago a Russian guard was placed on the southern tip of Sakhalin, in Aniva Bay; but our people were falling sick because of their fewness [in numbers], and Admiral Putiatin, fearing that they would all die, ordered the guard temporarily removed from Aniva, having left the buildings in the care of the Japanese who were there. But now, when the number of land and sea forces under my command in Eastern Siberia has increased considerably and when these forces have moved up to the mouth of the Amur, I can send a sizable unit to Aniva, and construct good buildings; then there will be no danger that our people will get sick from the difficult service, as was [the case] in 1854. But as my great Ruler ordered me in all border matters first to talk [things] over with the bordering friendly states—Japan and China—and to this purpose provided me with the necessary authorization, I hasten to come here to confer with the wise Japanese statesmen in order to put an end in writing to all doubts concerning Sakhalin.

The interest of both our states demands that this matter be decided definitively as quickly as possible, because foreigners may take advantage of the uncertainty of its condition and occupy for themselves a place on the island Sakhalin, [something] which, of course, can no longer happen when the whole island will be acknowledged in writing [as] in Russian territory, and will be under the protection of the forces entrusted to me. The Japanese government itself sees now what significant naval forces are already at the disposal of Russia here; but the building up of these forces here was begun only five years ago, and [they] will increase each year. For the above mentioned reasons it is essential for mutual security that the whole island be under our protection.

Anxious as the plenipotentiaries were to settle the boundary issue, they failed to see the validity or honesty of this argument. Pointing to Article II of the Treaty of Shimoda, they refused to draw a line of demarcation between Russia and Japan south of Sakhalin Island, which their government, in conformity with the letter of the above-mentioned article, considered indivisible between Russia and Japan. They offered to compromise on a line across Sakhalin at latitude 50° north, but Murav'ev-Amurskii would not settle for less than the whole island. He even asserted that Putiatin had not been empowered to discuss Sakhalin, as Sakhalin was within his own jurisdiction as governor-general of eastern Siberia—an interesting assertion in view of the fact that Murav'ev-Amurskii himself had advised Putiatin in August 1854 that "it is better to leave the

70 "The English will not be surprised by this," noted Marav'ev-Amurskii, "as they, of course, can enumerate all our vessels in the Pacific Ocean" (Murav'ev-Amurskii to Grand Duke Constantín Nikolaevich, May 14, 1859, BARSUKOV, I, 555). 71 Litke, loc. cit., No. 13, p. 411. 72 Kornilov, loc. cit., pp. 112–13; Russia, ministry of the navy, Obšor, pp. 601–2; Litke, loc. cit., No. 13, p. 411; Tanaka, p. 83. 73 Indefensibility against expected English and French attacks during the Crimean War was another reason for the evacuation of this post. 74 BARSUKOV, II, 278–79. 75 Article II reads as follows: "Henceforth the boundaries between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands Iturup [Etorofu] and Urup [Uruppu]. The whole island Iturup belongs to Japan and the whole island Urup and the other Kuril Islands to the north constitute possessions of Russia. As regards the island Krafto [Karafuto] (Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan, as been [the case] to this time" (Lensen, "Russia's Japan expedition," p. 182). 76 Murav'ev-Amurskii to Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov, Oct. 29, 1858 (marked "Very urgent"). 77 Tanaka, p. 81.
boundary question undetermined as before than to confirm them in even the smallest part of Sakhalin." He explained his stand in a letter to Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov, the minister of foreign affairs: "Considering that the rights of the Japanese are just as indeterminate as ours ... I could not agree to any division of it [i.e., Sakhalin] between Japan and us, and particularly in consideration of the fact that, because of Japan's weakness, any foreign state can easily take possession of that part which will be recognized Japanese, consolidate [its position] there, and inflict on us thereby considerable damage for all times to come, especially in relation to La Perouse Strait, which constitutes the nearest and only exit for our vessels from the Strait of Tatary into the Pacific Ocean."79

Undaunted by Japanese opposition, he wrote his sovereign: "The occupation of a point on the southern tip of Sakhalin is essential for us, and does not contradict the treaty of the year 1855. Of course, this will not please the Japanese government, yet it will not break up our peaceful relations with it and will further strengthen that influence which we have on it as the closest and strong neighbors."80

It is easier to understand why Murav'ev-Amurskii's crude attempt to gain possession of southern Sakhalin by double talk aroused resentment among the Japanese than why Murav'ev-Amurskii stooped to such tactics in Japan, in view of his appreciation of the success of Putiatin's friendly and sincere approach, the relatively good disposition of the Japanese toward Russia, and their acumen and astuteness, he wrote:

Having been in Japan I agree with the opinion of Putiatin [and Murav'ev-Amurskii did not often agree with Putiatin] that it is much pleasanter to have dealings with this people than with the Chinese; I must also give him credit that the relations which he began with this people have left them with a good impression of the Russians: they like us more than the Americans; I must also give him credit that the relations which he began with this people have left them with a good impression of the Russians: they like us more than the Americans; but here, too, I do not understand the passion of Putiatin to teach them everything without us, particularly navigation; we had better learn ourselves than teach people who will soon surpass us.

77 Murav'ev-Amurskii to Putiatin, Aug. 30, 1854, BARSUKOV, II, 115–16.
78 BARSUKOV, II, 276–77.
81 BARSUKOV, I, 558–59.

He expressed the same idea in a letter to Egor Petrovich Kovalevskii, director of the Asiatic department.82

I do not understand the Russian people who wish to teach everything to the Japanese and Chinese, and arm [them]; they will be taught without us, and we had better study ourselves in order not to fall behind at least the former, who are very enterprising and capable. In all fairness to the Japanese in general [one must say] that they are well disposed toward us, particularly the common people, [a fact] which, it is said, is not very pleasing to their government, but [pleases] me greatly.

Why, then, did Murav'ev-Amurskii blunder in his approach? Perhaps the simplest, and kindest, explanation can be found in Litke's notation: "Unfortunately the time at the disposal of Count Murav'ev was too short, particularly in view of prevalent conditions."83 Pressed for time, Murav'ev-Amurskii had tried a bluff and lost; "lost," for the stakes included not only Sakhalin but confidence in the sincerity of the Russian government. The expedition did accomplish one objective: Goshkevich exchanged "without obstacle" the ratification of the treaty of Edo, which Putiatin had negotiated the previous year.

For some time the representatives of strong naval powers had met with insults in the streets of Edo, though they studiously ignored them, to avoid incidents for which they were not yet prepared.84 Murav'ev-Amurskii's conduct had not endeared the Russians to the increasingly restless population of the capital, and now they, too, became targets of affront and injury. They had felt, not without reason, that assaults on members of other foreign missions were partly the fault of the foreigners themselves, but, as the English noted with glee: "They have been mobbed at Jeddo [Edo] since ... with a perfectly impartial rudeness."85

One day, for example, three unarmed Russians went sightseeing in Edo, unmindful of the fact that others had been stoned in town the day before. When they left the main streets, an unruly crowd gathered behind them and began pelting them with little stones. Unable to shake off their pursuers, though they zigzagged "like a rabbit chased by dogs," the Russians sought

82 Ibid., II, 266–67.
84 KORNILOV, loc. cit., p. 114.
refuge in a small hotel. There were anxious moments as the locked-out rabble threatened to break through the flimsy doors and walls, but fortunately police, summoned by the reluctant host, arrived in time to escort the “tourists” out of their district unharmed. Similar protection was required several more times in other districts until the vicinity of the palace grounds was reached. Turning into a familiar street, the Russians swaggered “like dandies from Nevskii Avenue” into a restaurant frequented by Westerners. Here they were surrounded “with all possible respect and comfort...including a fifteen-year-old beauty who [would come up to them] on her knees offering [them] sweet cake.”

Such incidents discouraged individual strolls about town, and the Russians ventured ashore in larger groups and saw sights in the company of Japanese officials, but they still went whither they pleased, ignoring warnings about madding crowds and conservatives. “Sometimes,” wrote Michman (Midshipman) Kornilov, “we did indeed chance upon relatively large throngs of people, who looked at us in the same way as in our [country] peasants look at a bear on a chain, that is, they met us largely with shouts and laughter, but in these shouts and laughter there could be heard much more astonishment and curiosity than enmity and ridicule.”

The misgivings of the officials were justified, and tragedy was to mar the rest of the “As-kol’d’s” stay. Having found it inconvenient to obtain provisions through governmental authorities, the Russians did their own shopping in Yokohama, which had rapidly been transformed from an “empty dale” into a “rather significant little city where officials settled.”

One evening, August 25, Michman Roman Samoilovich Mofet and two sailors, Sokolov and Korol’kov, had completed their purchases and were on their way back from the shops to the longboat—Sokolov, carrying a box with unspent money, walked with Mofet, Korol’kov some distance ahead—when suddenly several Japanese with drawn swords set upon them from a side street. Sokolov was killed on the spot. Mofet fled some distance but collapsed mortally wounded. “They were left in a pool of blood, the flesh hanging in large masses from their bodies and limbs. The sailor was cleft through his skull to the nostrils, half the scalp sliced down, and one arm nearly severed from the shoulder through the joint. The officer was equally mangled, his lungs protruding from a saber gash across the body, the thighs and legs deeply gashed.”

Korol’kov was warned by shouts from Mofet and managed to escape alive, though not unwounded, by rushing into a Japanese shop. When Michman Avinov, who had remained with the longboat, reached Mofet, he found him surrounded by Americans, “but in spite of the help immediately given by a Japanese doctor and later on also by an American one, all attempts to prolong Mr. Mofet’s life were doomed to failure.” Two hours after receiving the wounds Mofet was dead.

Wrote an English correspondent:

The ruffians, it appears, were not content with simply killing and robbing, but must have taken pleasure in cutting them to pieces. All three, unfortunately, were unarmed; but numbers of people were either in sight or in close vicinity. Was it, then, a mere highway robbery with murder as an accompaniment, or was it an act of hatred and revenge? It is said that one or more officers had been dismissed, on the complaint of General Mouravieff, for insults offered to some Russians in Jeddo; and it is believed the parties had come down to Kanagawa. This is certain—by the depositions of the stewards and of the officer, who did not expire until some of his companions had reached the spot—that one or more of the attacking party wore the two swords distinctive of an officer’s rank in Japan. A sandal was left on the ground, which by its marks proved also the rank of the wearer to be above that of a coolie. A vest, too, had been torn off, but with no distinguishing badge or mark, and a piece of a broken sword was found by the bodies—all useful means of tracing the assassins. But the Governor, when the British Acting Consul, Vyse, went to him at 4 o’clock in the morning, on being informed of what had happened, treated the whole matter with a kind of brutal levity (such, at least, was the impression he gave), and there is little hope that any steps will be taken, unless General Mouravieff can impress the Government with a salutary fear of consequences. It is, perhaps, so far fortunate that such a tragedy should not have happened before the arrival of the Russian squadron, as it is some six weeks since any British man-of-war has been seen here, nor is there any on the Japan station, unless one has recently arrived in the south. An American man-of-war has not been seen for a still

66 KORNILOV, loc. cit., pp. 115-17.
67 Ibid., pp. 119-20.
69 HIOKI, p. 108; KORNILOV, loc. cit., p. 120; IV. ZHUHOK, Russkie i Iaponiia (Moscow, 1945), pp. 133-34.
70 The London Times, p. 5.
71 KORNILOV, loc. cit., pp. 120-21.
72 The London Times, p. 5.
longer period, not is it likely any will appear frequently, since it is seldom that more than one or two are ever stationed in the China Seas.... In the present state of affairs in Europe it would certainly be a strange eventuality if England, France, and America all should owe to the intention of a Governor-General of Siberia, and the unforeseen presence of a powerful Russian squadron, the personal safety of their diplomatic agents in Japan, as well as the possibility of maintaining their position.

To the chagrin of the other foreigners, a committee of inquiry appointed by Murav'ev-Amurskii reported that the murders must be considered a simple act of brigandage. They did not agree. "Each had his own plan of what ought to be done: some were for burning the town down, others for attacking Yedo; one or two sensible ones proposed that the authorities should forbid their officials to wear swords within the districts opened to foreigners. All expected that some severe act of retribution would, of course, be inflicted on the murderers if caught, but, if not, on the government, by the large Russian squadron in the neighborhood, as a warning and a lesson that it would be called to account for the life of every foreigner by all European governments combined." Instead, Murav'ev-Amurskii departed with his squadron on September 5—he had moved back aboard the "Amerika"—leaving only the "Askol'd" behind to conclude the settlement of the incident. The authorities had promised to do everything in their power to ferret out the assassins, to send a deputation of dignitaries aboard the "Askol'd" to convey the government's official regret, to dismiss the governors of Yokohama, and to execute the murderers in the presence of Russian witnesses on the spot where the crime had been committed. The officers and midshipmen of the squadron had contributed to a fund for the erection of tombstones on the graves of Mofet and Sokolov, and the Japanese agreed to guard their burial place in perpetuity. Murav'ev-Amurskii made no demands for a financial indemnity, because, as he put it, "Russia does not sell the blood of her subjects."97

On September 29, 1859 the "Askol'd" went out to sea and headed for home.98 Thus ended the second and final phase of her crew's experiences in Japan.

There is a tradition that Japan and Russia are "historical" enemies. Propagated by different persons for different reasons, whether out of malevolence to disguise or justify their own designs, out of ignorance, or wishful thinking, this tradition probably owes its origin to the lack of relevant Japanese and Russian diaries in translation—few people had the time or training to peruse the original sources—as well as the nature of commonly available diplomatic papers and press reports, which, by necessity, deal primarily with disputes and similar "newsworthy" material rather than "human interest stories." In such a way, for example, the incidents just related, incidents larded with intrigue, murder, and duplicity, found their way into histories to the exclusion of the more pedestrian experiences of the first phase, which remained buried and neglected in the memoirs and correspondence of some of the participants.99

A very different picture is gained when Russo-Japanese relations are examined in detail. The illusion of consistent policy, whether "for" or "against" Russia, gives way to a pattern of ambivalence. The experiences of the "Askol'dians" form but one fragment of Russo-Japanese relations; yet, when viewed as a whole, they serve to illustrate the vicissitude of these relations.

No inherent xenophobia plagued the Japanese. Anti-Russian demonstrations on the part of the populace, like similar demonstrations against other foreigners, were primarily a reaction to the higher cost of living,100 attributed to

97 KORNILOV, loc. cit., p. 121; TREAT, I, 91–92.
99 Thus Iurii Zhukov in his survey of Russo-Japanese relations skips from a chapter on Golovnin ("Three years in Japanese captivity") to Murav'ev-Amurskii's expedition ("Crime in Yokohama") without any mention of the friendly dealings between Russia and Japan in 1853–55 and 1858.
100 Prices almost doubled during the period of the "Askol'd"s" stay in Nagasaki. American and English vessels congregated in Nagasaki harbor as early as October 1858, nine months before the treaties of 1858 were scheduled to go into effect (LITKE, loc. cit., No. 13, pp. 393–94).
the unbalanced development of foreign trade. In Nagasaki social contacts had lessened friction, but in Yokohama relations were confined to business and, as one of the Russians observed, "under such circumstances rapprochement is impossible."^{101}

THE AMERICAN NAVAL MISSION IN EGYPT

FREDERICK J. COX

In the spring of 1870 the first members of the American military mission commissioned by Khedive Ismail reenlisted his army and navy arrived in Egypt. They had been recruited in New York by General Thaddeus P. Mott, Ismail's American aide-de-camp, in conjunction with General William T. Sherman.\(^1\) By the end of 1873 the military mission numbered approximately fifty. Nine of the officers were naval specialists, although only eight—John L. Lay, William H. Ward, Alexander McComb Mason, Beverley Kennon, Charles C. Graves, William P. Campbell, Cornelius Hunt, and James M. Morgan—usually served in a naval capacity in Egypt.\(^2\) All except Lay, a naval engineer, were Annapolis graduates but were given army ranks in their Egyptian service.

Although an army officer, General Charles Pomeroy Stone, Ismail's chief of staff, surprisingly enough was an ardent exponent of naval science and tactics. In his plans for the reshaping of the Egyptian military forces he made foresighted provisions for a naval arm, especially the submarine branch. For that specific purpose he brought Lay, Ward, and Kennon to Egypt.\(^3\) The other five active naval officers were given various assignments. Mason and Campbell, for a short time, were placed in charge of the khedivial mail steamers plying between Alexandria and Constantinople and then transferred to the third section of Stone's general staff for geographical reconnaissance in the Sudan. Hunt was assigned to the coastal defense forces under the command of Kennon.\(^4\) Graves was responsible for the establishment of the many Egyptian lighthouses stretching from the Gulf of Suez to the Gulf of Aden. His major accomplishment was the naval survey of Cape Guardafui in 1878. There he built a lighthouse which provided the first real navigational aid to ships entering the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean.\(^5\) Morgan was placed first on the khe-

\(^1\) In 1869 General Sherman visited Egypt, and Ismail commissioned him to enlist twenty American officers to replace Colonel Mircher's French military mission. See James Morris Morgan, Recollections of a rebel reefer (New York, 1917), p. 266. There are many evidences of General Sherman's continued interest in Ismail's affairs. Upon Sherman's specific recommendation, Charles P. Stone became the Egyptian chief of staff. On May 17, 1873 Ismail wrote General Sherman a personal letter thanking him for his advice and remarked that he was highly pleased with the two new army officers, Colonels Edward Warren and R. E. Colston, whom Sherman has recommended (Archives Abdin, Cairo [hereafter cited as "A.A."] , List A, uncatalogued dossier). E. M. Seabrook, a South Carolina cotton planter, was given a recommendation from General Sherman to come to Egypt to advise Ismail on his cotton and rice crop (A.A., doss. 12/6). A document entitled "Notes et papiers divers" in an uncatalogued file in Archives Abdin contains a notation for payment of £125 to General Sherman and £185 to General Mott. On December 3, 1874, Ismail wrote the general, congratulating him on the occasion of the marriage of his daughter. As a souvenir of friendship, the khedive sent the daughter a gift of wedding jewels so costly that General Sherman telegraphed Ismail on March 17, 1875, asking him to pay the custom duties, which he could not afford (A.A., Periode Ismail, doss. 6/1).

\(^2\) The other naval officer was W. B. Hall, of Georgia, who remained in Egypt for a very short time and performed no actual service.

\(^3\) Lay was a submarine expert who had invented an automatic torpedo suspension mine, as well as a self-propelled submarine which the United States Navy adopted; Kennon had gained fame as a Confederate torpedo expert by his naval operations in the James River during the Civil War; Ward was a well-known hydrographer and naval surveyor.

\(^4\) Hunt married a Miss Sarah Keables of Connecticut in November 1870—the first marriage in Egypt between Americans (National Archives, Washington, MSS, Department of State, Consular reports, Vol. VI: Egypt; Butler to Fish, dispatch 27, Dec. 1, 1870).

\(^5\) Besides his naval surveys of the coasts of Eritrea and Somaliland, Graves taught navigation at the general staff school. During the eclipse of the moon in Cairo on August 23, 1877, Graves computed the longitude of the eastern gate of Esbekieh Garden

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