Sonnô Jôi:
The Leaps in Logic in the Modern Japanese Political Scene

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Abstract: This article studies the mechanism of *sonnô jôi* ("Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians"), which caused the dissolvement of *bakuhan* system and consequently brought about Meiji Restoration. *Sonnô jôi*, originally means crying for the expulsion of western powers, came to consent to *kaikoku* (opening ports) and accept westernization, displaying great changeability in logic and goal as Japan's foreign and domestic political situation developed.

The uncertainty of the logic of *sonnô jôi* stems from the basic fragility of the dual political structure of the *bakuhan* system, in which the *shôgun*, as a practical executioner of political power, and the *tennô*, a symbolic authority with little power, coexisted. The Bakufu's ambiguous political ground never allowed Japan to have a sound national ideology like Korea. The absence of a value system that was strong

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enough for ideological control led to the rise of *kokugaku* and its impact on *sonnô jôi*.

If we should establish a long-range national strategy, first we had better conclude peace treaties with both America and Russia, and then taking advantage of the Russo-American confrontation, enrich and strengthen Japan, develop Hokkaido, acquire Manchuria, occupy Korea, and annex the Southern islands. After achieving all of these, we should conquer America and cause Russia to surrender. This will surely lead us to success.[1]

Introduction

After the mid-nineteenth century, East Asian countries had to face the need of taking some measures against persistent invasions by western powers, who had been growing increasingly aggressive in order to achieve their goal of expanding capitalistic markets. At the sight of China being involuntarily incorporated into the treaty system, Korea and Tokugawa Japan decided to hold their ground by maintaining a traditional world view of *hua-i* (K. *hwa-i*; J. *ka-i*; literally meaning the "civilized" and the "barbarian") and expel the "western barbarians."[2]

The expulsion of "barbarians," as a subject of discourse and a movement, had its theoretical and ideological basis on *wijông ch'ôksa* (to reject heterodoxy <Christianity and other western values> in

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1. *Yoshida Shôin zenshû* 2, Yamato shobô, 1973, p. 320. Borrowing Igeta Ryôji's translation from "Reform of Law in the Meiji Restoration," *Acta Asiatica*, 35 (1978), p. 75.
2. For the impact of the Opium War on the development of *sonnô jôi*, see Konishi Shirô. "Ahen sensô no wagakuni ni oyoboseru eikyô," *Komazawa shigaku*, 1 (1953).

defense of orthodoxy <Confucianism>) in Korea and *sonnô jôi* in Japan.[3] The two ideas, which took different developmental courses, had great impact on the formation of the modern histories of the two countries. While the former remained relatively consistent despite occasional changes in form, the latter, by contrast, underwent dramatic transformation in nature and practice, greatly influencing the political scene. The "sudden stop of *jôi* movement"[4] was followed by *tôbaku* (subjugating the Bakufu) movement, which turned into *kaikoku* (opening ports) movement, and finally another *tôbaku* (overthrowing the Bakufu) movement,[5] inducing the fall of the Bakufu and leading to the establishment of the new Meiji government.

While the nature of *sonnô jôi* doctrine and movement is so confusing that it often prevents the comprehension of modern Japanese history, the secret of the success of the *ôsei fukko* (restoration of archaic *tennô* authority) *coup d'etat*, or the Meiji Restoration, could be found in the mechanism of its incessant changes. Furthermore, an understanding of *sonnô jôi* will enable one to clarify the determinants of the totally different "modernizations" of Korea and Japan. In that sense, the study of *sonnô jôi* provides one with an opportunity to gain insight into not only Japanese but Korean history. Inceptively this article discusses the change of *sonnô jôi* and its mechanism in *bakumatsu*, or "end of shogunate" era from 1853 to 1868.

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3. There are a variety of translations of *sonnô jôi,* including: "Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians," "Revere the emperor, repel the barbarian," "Restore the emperor and expel the foreigners," "the ideology of emperorism and expulsionism," "Honor the Emperor and Expel the Barbarians," or "redeeming their honor against the foreign menace."
4. Hattori Shisô. "Ishinshi hôhô jô no sho mondai," in *Hattori Shisô zenshû* 4: *Ishinshi no hôhô,* Fukumura shuppan, 1973, p. 52.
5. As a Japanese historical term, *tôbaku* has two definitions of "subjugating the Bakufu" and "overthrowing the Bakufu," namely, the abolishment of the *bakuhan* system (the Tokugawa political system) in general. The latter has broader sense and includes such ideas as the return of political rule to *tennô* and the adoption of elements of the western parliamentary system into the shogunate. For further discussion on the details of their differ-

Ideological Background

It is said that the phrase *sonnô jôi*, originated not in Chinese classics but in *Kôdôkan ki* (1838, Record of the Kôdôkan) by *Fujita Tôkô* [1806-55], a Mito scholar. *Sonnô*, the original meaning of which is to revere *tennô*, embodies the idea of enforcing national unity under *tennô*, the traditional monarch. *Jôi* conveys the meaning of defense against outer invasion and the maintenance of national integrity.[6] It is generally said that *sonnô jôi* is ideologically grounded in *kokugaku* (National Learning) and *Mitogaku* (Mito Learning; a school of thought derived from *Shintô* and Confucianism), especially the late *Mitogaku*.

Kokugaku, which pursued *yamatogokoro* (the pure Japanese spirit), originated in the studies of *Shintô* and ancient Japanese classics like *Man'yôshû* (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves) by seventeenth-century literati such as Kamo Mabuchi [1697-1769]. *Kokugaku* scholars, whose main concern was indigenous Japanese tradition, focused on interpreting the texts of such ancient classics as *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters) and *Nihon shoki* (Chronicles of Japan, also rendered as the *Nihon'gi*), excluding the influence of foreign thoughts like Confucianism and Buddhism from their scope of consideration. Compiled under Emperor Tenmu's order to legitimate the rule by his clan, *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* are full of mythological and fictitious accounts on *tennô* and the "unbroken imperial line" of his family. In spite of the implausibility of these literatures as a source, *kokugaku* scholars attributed the origin of Japanese culture to the myth of *tennô*, and fabricated the idea that it was superior to Chinese and western cultures through arbitrary interpretation. Literally and fully accepting the account of these classics, they asserted that the legiti-

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ences, see Ikeda Yoshimasa. "Tôbakuha no kôryô ni tsuite," *Nihonshi kenkyû*, 50 (1960).

6. In *Kôdôkan ki*, the phrase *sonnô jôi* is used to admire Tokugawa Ieyasu's political achievements. Bitô Masahide. *Nihon bunka no rekishi*. Iwanami shoten. 2000, pp. 200-205.

macy of a ruler unconditionally resided with *tennô*, a divine descent, and it was a truth inalterable even by authority, virtue, or benevolence. *Kokugaku* was a contained realistic vision of the world, expressed in the idiom of archaicism.

    Kokugaku discourse is said to have originated with the demolishment of Japanese *hua-i* thought, particularly the one in which Japan is considered as the center of civilization.[7] One of the major preconditions for the establishment of *kokugaku* was the shift in Japanese attitude toward China from reverence toward the "land of sages" to a strategic stance that produces a negative image of it as a "foreign land" with alien language and thought. In other words, *kokugaku* established itself as a "self(Japan)-referent" discourse by introducing the perspective of stressing otherness in China to its discourse.[8]

    With its nationalistic tone as seen in the views of Japan by Motoori Norinaga [1730-1801], "the master of the world," and Takeo Masatane [1833-74], "the greatest country of all the world," *kokugaku*, which was further developed by the late *Mitogaku*, became the foundation of the *sonnô jôi* movement at the *bakumatsu* era. It was also the inception of not only ultranationalism after the Meiji Restoration (advocated by those who opposed the Meiji government's westernization policies), but also the idea of *kokutai* (national

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 7. In his study of the changing process of pre-modern Japan's image of self and others, Katsurajima Nobuhiro propounds three phases of Japanese *hua-i*; "courtesy and literature sinocentrism," "Japanese style *hua-i*," and "Japanese sinocentrism." "Courtesy and literature sinocentrism" was Japanese Confucians' acknowledgment of China and Korea's cultural superiority to Japan, the "barbarian." "Japanese style *hua-i*," which presumably emerged from the dynastic change from Ming to Ch'ing, means the awareness of "Japanese interior" by the Japanese Confucians from the latter half of the seventeenth century to the former half of the eighteenth century. "Japanese sinocentrism" drew closer to "China as the barbarian" view, criticizing China and claiming that Japan is the center of civilization. Katsurajima Nobuhiro. "'Kai' shisô no kaitai to kokugaku teki 'jiko' zô no seisei," *Edo no shisô*, 4 (1996).
 8. Koyasu Nobukuni. *Motoori Norinaga*, Iwanami shoten, 2001, pp. 36-40.

polity) that sustained the *tennô* system.[9]

   Mitogaku came into being in the compilation process of *Dai Nihonshi* (History of Great Japan, completed in 1906) in Mito *han* (domain), a center of Confucian scholarship during Edo period. It was the first and only case of a *han* creating a learning on its own. The leading theory of the reform movement at a time when a sense of national crisis mounted in the face of the weakened *bakuhan* system and the threat of foreign powers, *Mitogaku* became the driving force of the *sonnô jôi* movement in *bakumatsu* and later functioned in sustaining the *tennô* system ideology. *Mitogaku* can be periodized into early, late, and *bakumatsu*. Along with its project of compilation of the historiographies, the early *Mitogaku* constructed itself on the ground of Confucian *meibunron* (knowing one's proper place, i.e., knowing one's status in society) and emphasized worshipping the imperial family until the mid-eighteenth century. Its historical thought was developed into political discourse in the late *Mitogaku* by such people as Fujita Yûkoku [1774-1826], Fujita T ko, and Aizawa Seishisai [Yasushi; 1782-1863]. With foreign crises deepening after the end of the eighteenth century, they kept their attention on current affairs, formatting and endeavoring to disseminate leading theories of domain reform, *sonnô jôi*, and *kokutai* theory. The thought systematized during this period grew nationally influential and was put into practice in the form of han reforms and memorials to the Bakufu after the mid-1840s, which is called the *bakumatsu Mitogaku*.[10]

   Aizawa Seishisai wrote *Shinron* (New Theses) in 1825, which became a "virtual bible" among many prominent political figures and *shishi* ("patriots of high resolve"). The work obtained a broad range of appeal among readers because, apart from the author's

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9. Matsumoto Sannosuke. "Bakumatsu kokugaku no shis shiteki igi: Shu toshite seiji shisô no sokumen ni tsuite," in *Kokugaku undô no shisô*, Iwanami shoten, 1971, p. 653.
10. Hon'gô Takamori. "Fujita Yûkoku 'Seimeiron' no rekishiteki ichi: Mitogaku kenkyû no genzai," in Kinugasa Yasuki (ed.), *Kinsei shisôshi kenkyû no genzai*. Kyoto: Shibunkaku shuppan, 1995, pp. 155-56.

good intention, it gave an ample space for them to interpret and use in support of their own standpoints on reforms. While lower-class samurai, who aimed at social rise, stressed Aizawa's proposal of *fukoku kyôhei* (enrich and strengthen the nation), *daimyô* (lords) and their advisors focused on his assertion that the Bakufu went too far in its control over domains and should allow them more autonomy. Authoritative Bakufu leaders, on the other hand, would refer to the section on national defense in the work to insist on the necessity of increasing the Bakufu's power and authority. Reformers who wished to see quicker reformation of the Bakufu found hope in Aizawa's opinion that the governing method of the Tokugawa family was so old-fashioned that it should be overthrown. Some *shishi* were inspired to dream a more radical picture of removing the Bakufu and returning to *tennô's* direct rule: namely, *ôsei fukko*.[11] It could be safely said that the complexity of the later *sonnô jôi* stems from this wide variety of interpretations of *Shinron*.

Development of Sonnô Jôi

The Bakufu's failure in reform efforts like the Tempo reform in the 1830's and 1840's and its inability to cope with the foreign crises after the coming of Matthew C. Perry [1794-1858] allowed the rise of such leading *han* as Satsuma, Chôshû, Tosa, and Higo. Successful in domestic reform through the establishment of western-style armament and the buildup of bureaucratic systems by taking talents, these *han*, with lower-lass samurai at the helm, were making a move to take the initiative in reshuffling the *bakuhan* system with *tennô* as its center. On the other hand, the Bakufu started to invite leading *han* to participate in decision making, and headed toward a coalition government with the pinnacle of *tennô*, whose court was growing

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11. Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. *Anti-foreignism and Western Learning in early-modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. ix-x.

influential.

However, as western pressure for *kaikoku*[12] (opening ports) and the movement toward western-style capitalism mounted and the Bakufu's incompetence was exposed, middle- and lower-class samurai disputed the conclusion of a commercial treaty with the U.S. on the grounds of *sonnô*, insisting that it was against the court's will, and opposed to its *kaikoku* policy under the slogan of *jôi*. The confrontation between the Bakufu and the leading *han* became obvious over such issues as the signing of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1858, the shogunal succession dispute,[13] and *kôbu gattai undô* (movement for unity of court and the Bakufu).[14]

Inside the Bakufu, a group of *daimyô* who were in central positions attempted to check the leading *han* under the initiative of Ii Naosuke [1815-60], *tairô* (regent). In 1858, the fifth year of Ansei, Ii signed the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce for which, hampered by the leading *han* and Hitotsubashi Keiki [Yoshinobu; 1837-1913] and his faction, he could not obtain the *tennô's* permission. He also placed Tokugawa Yoshitomi [1858-66] to the fourteenth

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12. Both Abe Masahiro [1819-57], who opted for opening port, and Tokugawa Nariaki [1800-60] of Mito, who insisted on *jôi*, knew that Japan's force was too inferior to fight western powers. Tôyama Shigeki. "Kindaishi gaisetsu," in *Iwanami kôza Nihon rekishi* 14: *Kindai* 1. Iwanami shoten, 1962, p. 4.

13) During 1857-58, a political controversy arose over the successor of the 13th *shôgun* Tokugawa Iesada [1824-58], who was childless.

14. Literally, "*kô*" means *tennô* or court and "bu" samurai, that is, the Bakufu or the leading *han*. *Kôbu gattai undô* was a political movement which attempted to maintain and strengthen the *bakuhan* system by forging a more unified leadership under the authority of the court, which was on a rapid rise. The movement contained a struggle for leadership among the Bakufu and the leading *han*. Takagi Shunsuke. "Tôbakuha no keisei," in Rekishigaku kenkyûkai and Nihonshi kenkyûkai (eds.), *Kôza Nihonshi* 5: *Meiji Ishin*. Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1970, p. 122. Tentative goal of *shishi* was *sonnô*, rather than *jôi*. Ultimately, it was even the negation of *kôbu gattai*. Hayashiya Tatsusaburô. "Bakumatsuki no bunkateki shihyô: Bakumatsu bunka kenkyû josetsu," in Hayashiya Tatsusaburô (ed.), *Bakumatsu bunka no kenkyû*. Iwanami shoten, 1979, p. 35.

shogunate while suppressing the opposing *daimyô*, court nobles, and domain samurai. This purge, which is known as *Ansei Taigoku* (Ansei Purge) of 1858,[15] resulted in prompting the reformist lower-class samurai and court nobles to assume more anti-Bakufu tone in their *sonnô jôi* discourse,[16] although neither subjugating nor overthrowing of the feudal Bakufu was within their scope yet.[17]

The proponents of *sonnô jôi* plagued the Bakufu especially by their terrorism against the westerners, whom they viewed as "beasts." Their perception was equally shared by Emperor K mei [1831-67] and became his ground for supporting *jôi*,[18] and the position of the court was reinforced by the increasing expectation from the *sonnô jôi* camp.[19] The proclamation of *jôi* by the name of the *tennô*, which was brought about under the impetus of the courtiers who had joined a secret league with Chôshû's radical leaders, marked the remarkable rise of *jôi* movement and its dominance over the Bakufu.[20]

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15. Besides the execution of eight people such as Hashimoto Sanai [1834-59] and Yoshida Shôin [1830-59], the object of the purge included Tokugawa Nariaki, his son Hitotsubashi Keiki, and Matsudaira Yoshinaga [1828-90] of Fukui. Although *Ansei Taigoku* is often said to be an unduly ruthless purge by the conservative wing of the Bakufu led by Ii, it was in a way the only solution for them, who were faced with such unprecedented political crises as liaison between the leading *han* and the court, in which people like Hashimoto and Saigô Takamori [1828-77] played active roles, and the resulting political interference by the court. Miyachi Masato. "Ishin shiryô shûhô ni miru rekishikan," *UP* 304 (1998), p. 9.

16. Hayashiya Tatsusaburô. *Nihonshi kenkyû josetsu*. Osaka: S gensha, 1965, p. 86; Ono, Masao. "Bakuhan sei seiji kaikakuron," in Rekishigaku kenkyûkai and Nihonshi kenkyûkai (eds.), *Kôza Nihon rekishi* 6: *Kinsei* 2. Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1985, p. 335.

17. Beasley, W. G.. *The Meiji Restoration*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1972, p. 147.

18. Ishii Kanji. *Nihon keizaishi*. Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1991, p. 1.

19. Oka Yoshitake. *Kindai Nihon seijishi*. Sôbunsha, 1967, pp. 38-40.

20. Norman, E. Herbert. Ôkubo Genji (tr.), "Nihonban jo ni kaete," in his *Nihon ni okeru kindai kokka no seiritsu*. Jiji tsûshinsha, 1947, p. 7. Yet, as discussed in the following section, at the back of this "culmination" of *jôi* was the strata-

In July, 1863, an armed skirmish between a British naval squadron and Satsuma, which occurred over the Richardson Affair of August the previous year, developed into *Satsu-Ei sensô* (Kagoshima Bombardment).[21] The battle, which ended with Satsuma's nominal victory, made it realize the power of western military technology and shift to the implementation of an open ports policy.[22] *Shimonoseki sensô* (Bombardment of Shimonoseki; 1863-64) was also significant in that it triggered the change from *jôi* to *tôbaku*.[23] In May, 1863, Chôshû fired on the ships of America, France, and Holland in Shimonoseki. The shelling prompted a French and American countercharge, and a later retaliation bombardment. The following month, the U.S. attacked a Chôshû fort, and the representatives of the three countries and Britain decided to attack the *han*. On August 5 the following year, a combined fleet of 17 ships (9 British, 3 French, 4 Dutch, and 1 American) bombarded and immediately destroyed the Shimonoseki forts.[24] The damage urged Chôshû to make a quick move toward making peace, and a peace agreement was signed on the 14th, in which Takasugi Shinsaku [1839-67] represented the *han*, joined by It Hirobumi [1841-1909] and Inoue Kaoru [1835-1915].

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gem of the Bakufu, and the nature of *jôi* at this stage was quite different from its original. See footnote 35.

21. Beasley. 1972, p. 183, 191, 199.
22. Britain, which also suffered heavy losses, recognized Satsuma's capacity. Thereafter the two approached each other and came to cooperate. In passing, the adequacy of the bombardment was questioned at the British House of Commons from a humanitarian viewpoint. In the discussion, one of the speakers maintained that, while the murder of Richardson was undoubtedly a shameful act, it was also true that the Bakufu could not yet abolish the 300-hundred-year-old law which allowed the killing of foreigners standing at the sight of the procession of *daimyô*. Minamura Takeichi. *Za Taimuzu ni miru bakumatsu Ishin*. Chûô kôronsha, 1998, p. 61, 53.
23. Furukawa Kaoru. *Bakumatsu Chôshûhan no jôi sensô: Ôbei rengô kantai no raishû*. Chûô kôronsha, 1996, p. ii.
24. Preoccupied with its own civil war, America participated for mere form's sake, to get a share of the anticipated claim as a result of the attack. Furukawa. 1996, p. 181.

Realizing the impracticability of *jôi* by force, Chôshû opted to relin-quish its advocacy of the notional *sonnô jôi* and immediately became the central force of activism.

Sonnô jôi movement was a political movement the original purpose of which was to rectify and maintain the *bakuhan* system through criticizing the Bakufu's policies. After the *Satsu-ei sensô* and *Shimonoseki sensô*, however, it turned into the *tôbaku* movement, which was aimed at overthrowing the Bakufu. The new movement began in practice in Chôshû with the rebellion led by Takasugi against the *han* conservatives. Of the two expeditions mounted against Chôshû by the Bakufu, the first one of December, 1864, ended virtually without fighting upon the declaration of submission by the *han*.[25] However, the intransigence of the radicals led by Taka-sugi, who had taken control of the *han* government, instigated the Bakufu to plan its second expedition in 1866. The plan was opposed by other *han* and the court, and Satsuma refused to send its troops from the earliest stages. Chôshû, united under the *tôbaku* faction by this time, entered a military alliance with Satsuma and over-whelmed the Bakufu troops.

The second Chôshû expedition started on June 7, 1866, when peasants' uprisings and urban riots were intensifying. When *Shôgun* Iemochi (formerly Tokugawa Yoshitomi) died in Osaka castle on July 10, it was kept as a secret, and the decision was made in favor of Hitotsubashi Keiki, who was chosen as the 15th *shôgun*, to take the field on Iemochi's behalf. Keiki, however, had no alternative but to give up the continuation of the expedition at the news of the fall of Kokura castle.[26] Although the Bakufu was barely able to save face by making peace on account of Iemochi's death and discharging the army using the occasion of Emperor Kômei's funeral,[27] its *de facto*

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25. The part of the reason was that the Bakufu did not really wish military occupation.

26. Yasumaru Yoshio. "1850-70 nendai no Nihon: Ishin henkaku," in *Iwanami kôza Nihon tsûshi* 16: *Kindai* 1. Iwanami shoten, 1994, p. 29.

27. Miyachi Masato. "Ishin seikenron." in *Iwanami kôza Nihon tsûshi* 16: *Kindai*

defeat in a war to a single *han* considerably undermined its authority. Consequently, the concept of *tôbaku* came to be perceived as a realistic political goal, for which Satsuma and Chôshû, in alliance, came to influence the national political situation as a new leading force. It was the beginning of the political force called the *tôbaku* faction. With the Bakufu on the verge of degrading itself to a mere *daimyô* force,[28] Tokugawa Keiki (formerly Hitotsubashi Keiki), who ascended to the shogunate, implemented vigorous political reforms in desperate efforts to regain its authority and control over *han*. While assuring the foreign ministers that the Bakufu was the legitimate ruling power of Japan, Keiki performed (with the help of Leon Rochés [1809-1901], a French envoy) reform efforts, including taking talents to higher positions, reconstruction of the vocational system, and the naval and military modernization under the guidance of a French officer.[29] However, these radical reform projects left the Bakufu with various internal problems, and the procurement of imperial permission to open Hyôgo port, hastily made against fierce opposi-

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1. Iwanami shoten, 1994, p. 103.

28. Miyachi. 1994, p. 104. Some assert it is incorrect to say that the Bakufu practically fell to the position of a *daimyô* after *kaikoku*. According to them, the laws instituted by the Bakufu were still nationally effective, and the issue in the conflicts among *han* was how to get a say in the Bakufu's policymaking. In spite of the inadequacy of its aged ruling system and *han's* refusal to support the Chôshû expedition, these researchers say, the Bakufu stayed at the helm of feudal lords until the dissolvement of the *bakuhan* system. For further details, see Ono Masao. "Bakuhan sei seiji kaikakuron," in Rekishigaku kenky kai and Nihonshi kenky kai (eds.), *Kôza Nihon rekishi* 6: *Kinsei* 2. Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1985, p. 337.

29. After a French attack on Kanghwa, Korea, in November, 1866, in revenge for the General Sherman incident and the murder of its missionaries that had occurred earlier that year, the Bakufu tried to act as an intermediary between the two countries and America. This attempt to gain international recognition and support, however, ended in vain as Korea rejected any negotiations. This scheme of a Japanese government using its relationship with Korea in order to obtain legitimacy and lift its authority was taken from earlier Japanese history. Miyachi. 1994, p. 105.

tion of anti-Bakufu forces, became one of the factors motivating Satsuma, under the initiatives of Saigô Takamori and Ôkubo Toshimichi [1830-78], to pursue *tôbaku* by force. Another damaging blow to the Bakufu was the sudden death of the pro-Bakufu Emperor Kômei. It facilitated the return of anti-Bakufu court nobles like Iwakura Tomomi [1825-83] from exile, and, with Iwakura's maneuvering in cooperation with Ôkubo, resulted in the court's inclination to *tôbaku*.

Securing national independence came to be recognized as an urgent need, as antagonism toward the western powers and a sense of national crisis deepened due to western pressure and *kaikoku* problems.[30] As a consequence, the *tôbaku* movement took the direction of pursuing national unity by relinquishing the dual sovereignty of the Bakufu and the court, which became obvious through their rivalry.[31] In the light of the apparent lack of capacity on the part of the Bakufu to reconstitute itself from the administration of the Tokugawa family into that of Japan as a whole, it was in due course that the *jôi* movement changed its goal to the abolishment of the Bakufu and, further, the establishment of a new national government that would replace it. The protagonists of the movement with a new orientation of *ôsei fukko* (Restoration of imperial rule) were not Mito samurai but people like Ôkubo of Satsuma or Takasugi Shinsaku and Kido Takayoshi [1833-77] of Chôshû.[32]

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30. Oka. 1967, p. 88. The sense of national crisis turned into expansionism in advocacy for which various discussions were made after Perry's arrival. Expansionism, which took the shape of *seikanron* (subjugation of Korea), was supported by both pro-*jôi* and pro-*kaikoku* camps, based on the strong sense of foreign pressure and the pursuit of national unity. Kimura Naoya. "Bakumatsuki no Chôsen shinshutsu to sono seisakuka," *Rekishigaku kenkyû*, 679 (1995), p. 19.
31. There is a view that the goal of the *tôbaku* force to achieve national unity was only in terms of coping with foreign powers. According to this view, every effort was made by the *tôbaku* force to secure the independence and autonomy of *han*. *Nihon keizai shinbun* 19th December 1998 (yûkan).
32. Tôyama Shigeki. *Tôyama Shigeki zenshû* 2. Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1992

It can be said that western pressure induced the explosion of the energy accumulated during the Edo period and politically activated the Japanese society, with various social strata including samurai and *gônô* (wealthy cultivators) with different political orientations actively pursuing their goals. Western impact also brought to the surface such structural problems as peasant rebellions, financial disorder, and uncontrollable business customs, and *sakoku* (national seclusion) policy under challenge, none of which the Bakufu could handle by itself. Furthermore, *kaikoku* and the development of foreign trade that followed triggered price increases, aggravating the financial difficulties of the Bakufu, *daimyô*, and samurai, which had already come into existence with the growth of commercial capital. This served the *tôbaku* movement well as a factor to justify its cause.[33]

From this political chaos emerged the *tôbaku* faction from Satsuma and Chôshû that was to pursue a westernization line. Replacing the Bakufu with a new Meiji government, this group of people would grow into the officials of a "modern" state in a short while.[34]

[1973], p. 170.

33. Oka. 1967, p. 36.

34. Takahashi Hidenao. "Haihan chiken ni okeru kenryoku to shakai: Kaika e no kyôgô," in Yamamoto Shirô (ed.), *Kindai Nihon no seitô to kanryô*. Tokyo sôgensha, 1991, p. 90. The established view is that the Satsuma-Chôshû Alliance was based on the agreement to confront the Bakufu by force, whether the two *han* had a vision of unifying the whole country under the *tennô* system or under the alliance of the leading *han* as the only polity. There is, however, an opinion that the goal of the alliance was solely to avoid a civil war and therefore it is inadequate to regard it as a military alliance for the purpose of subjugating the Bakufu by force. See Aoyama Tadamasa. "Satchô meiyaku no seiritsu to sono haikei," *Rekishigaku kenkyû*, 557 (1986), p. 1. On the other hand, Umegaki says, "the absence of the corresponding monarchical center made it necessary for that alliance to become a surrogate monarchy as the foundation of absolute power in the place of the bakufu which had lost the basis to grow to be the monarchical center itself." Umegaki, Michio. *After the restoration: The beginning of Japan's*

The Mechanism of the Changing Doctrine and Movement

As I mentioned earlier, what is confusing about modern Japanese history is the fact that *sonnô jôi*, while crying for the expulsion of western powers, actually consented to *kaikoku* and accepted westernization. To the Japanese, the concepts of *jôi* and *kaikoku*, and westernization that followed, did not conflict in fundamentals, so that many of them professed to stand for *jôi* but transformed themselves into the executors of *kaikoku*.[35] This all comes from the correlation and inseparability of *sonnô* and *jôi*, about which Tokutomi Sohô [1863-1957] gives a felicitous description:[36]

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modern state. New York and London: New York University Press, 1988, p. 11. Tanaka words the logic of *tôbaku* as a skillful combination of the sonn force's absolute reverence for *tennô* and the relativity seen in *kôbu gattai* force. Tanaka Akira. *Kaikoku to tôbaku*. Shûeisha, 1992, p. 187.

35. Terao Gorô. *Tôbaku no shiso: Sômô no ishin*, Shakai hyôronsha, 1990, p. 250. It is said that the typical evaluation of *sonnô jôi* in Japan during W.W. II was that it was the manifestation of national awareness, leading people to fight against the intention of western powers to colonize Japan, defend national independence, and succeed in establishing the Meiji Restoration. See T yama Shigeki. "*Sonnô jôi* shisô to nashonarizumu," in Tôyama Shigeki, Hattori Shisô, and Maruyama Masao. *Sonnô jôi to zettai shugi*. Hakujitsu shoin, 1948, p. 3. Contrary to the wartime interpretation, Herbert Norman says, "*sonnô jôi* was accepted by the political leaders out of sheer necessity: Neither the Bakufu nor even the most radical *jôi han* were against the idea of having close relationships with western powers, which was barely hinted by the *jôi han's* language and behavior. It can be even said that they were willing to seize every opportunity to earn the diplomatic support of the western powers, for the purpose of purchasing arms and winning the domestic power struggle. Thus, *jôi* was one complicated movement and the feudal ruling classes supported it because … they aimed at appeasing antiestablishmentarians and averting people's attention from their struggle against feudalism … lower-class or masterless samurai advocated it because it was the strategic and decisive weapon for taking power from the Bakufu. (After all,) *jôi* did not facilitate social revolution but put political power into the hands of lower-class samurai." See Norman. 1947, pp. 7-9.

36. Tokutomi Sohô. *Yoshida Shôin*. Iwanami shoten, 1981, pp. 125-26.

> At that time, it seemed like *sonnô* and *jôi* were almost identical concepts with different names, and inseparable. Some people started with *sonnô* and came to advocate *jôi*, and others *jôi* to sonnô. To put them into historical order, first, a sense of *jôi*, or antagonism toward the foreign powers, was lit up by their pressure, and aroused *sonnô*, or reverence to *tennô*, which had been accumulated in the people's hearts.

As the sense of crisis heightened over Japan's possible semi-colonization by western capitalist powers after the coming of Perry, the tide of Japanese politics rapidly turned from *sakoku* to *kaikoku*, and from *shôgun* to *tennô*. These changes politicized *tennô*, who had been traditional and apolitical, making way for the creation of a centralized nation under his name.[37] Yet *sonnô jôi*, the determinant of these drastic changes, did not orient itself towards overthrowing the Bakufu at first. It was rather aimed at bolstering up the *bakuhan* system, shaken by the increased appearances of western boats,[38] which

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37. In the discourse of *kokugaku*, which ardently admired the *bakuhan system*, *tennô* was "sacred" and a cultural symbol, but never a political existence. However, as western pressure increased political unrest and a concept of a new polity called "Japan" was generated, the cultural symbol came to take on a political hue. *Tennô* in *Mitogaku* was one of these manifestations, which was further developed by Yoshida Shôin. Thus, through the changing process of *sonnô*, *tennô* departed from a cultural symbol (*kokugaku*) to the embodiment of the *bakuhan* system (*Mitogaku*), then to the symbol of national political unity. Inoue Isao. "Sonnô jôiron," in Hashikawa Bunsô, Kano Masanao, and Hiraoka Toshio (eds.), *Kindai Nihon shisôshi no kiso chishiki*. Yûhikaku, 1971, p. 5.

38. Fujita Satoru argues that *sonnô jôi* thought was established in the early nineteenth century as a political theory to strengthen the *bakuhan* system. According to Fujita, a view was expressed inside the Bakufu that *tennô* had entrusted it with sovereign power, and it was clearly stated in Matsudaira Sadanobu's memorial to *shôgun*. Furthermore, the Bakufu not only defined its position in the state system and its relations with the court, but also demonstrated the idea by submitting a foreign affairs memorial to the court around the first to seventh years of Bunka (1803-10). At the background of the emerging of the idea was the Bakufu's recognition of people,

was not surprising, considering that the reverence for *tennô* coexisted with loyalty to *han* lords and the shogunate in *Mitogaku*.[39]

Then, what was the theoretical structure of *sonnô jôi*, and how did it change? I would like to discuss these points by concluding it.

Jôi of the *bakumatsu* period had the elements of both feudalistic antiforeignism and budding nationalism. Yet, when expulsion of western powers was advocated in a country which had the long tradition of developing its culture by adopting foreign things and thoughts, it was on the tacit premise that foreign culture, especially science and technology, should be absorbed.[40] This mindset is clearly demonstrated in the fact that the most active figures in *ôsei fsukko* were the most eager promoters of *kaika* (enlightenment), or "progress," which practically meant westernization. As a matter of fact, *fukko*, much talked about in *bakumatsu*, did not only mean *tennô's* return to the center of politics. When Tokugawa Iemochi declared in 1862, at the occasion of westernizing the military system, that Japan was going back to the time prior to the Kan'ei period (1624-43), when the ruling Tokugawa clan was the most powerful in its history and foreign trade was flourishing, the Bakufu was justifying its westernization reform by use of the phraseology.[41]

Sakatani Shiroshi, a member of *Meirokusha*, a society of scholars

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as well as the presence of western powers, as a threat to its ruling system. Fujita Satoru. *Bakuhan sei kokka no seijishi teki kenkyû*. Azekura shobô, 1987, p. 204.

39. In his noteworthy work, Koschmann sees in the late *Mitogaku* the resurgence of Confucian-*shintô* in the age of internal and external troubles, understanding it to be an intertexture of the intellectual experiences of the eighteenth-century Japan. Victor J. Koschmann. *The Mito ideology: Discourse, reform, and insurrection in late Tokugawa Japan, 1790-1864*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987; Tajiri Yûichirô and Umemori Naoyuki (trs.), *Mito ideorogi-: Tokugawa kôki no gensetsu, kaikaku, hanran*. Perikansha, 1998, p. 264.

40. Yoda Yoshiie. *Nihon no kindaika: Chûgoku to no hikaku ni oite*. Hokuju shuppan, 1989, p. 61.

41. Mitani Hiroshi. "Bakumatsu Ishin wa fushigi no yama," in *Bakumatsugaku no mikata*. Asahi shinbunsha, 1998, pp. 20-21.

that disseminated the idea of "enlightenment" from 1874 to 1875, even says that *sonnô jôi* meant "to honor the emperor by expelling from Japan the barbaric elements that did not conform with the mores of an enlightened and civilized world."[42] What had to be removed, says Sakatani, was Japanese civilization or culture, and there was enough ground for *sonnô jôi* to change into "enlighten-ment," that is, *kaikoku*.

It could be said that, in post-*sakoku* Japan, there was a kind of general agreement on westernization, which was not held by the Bakufu alone but nationally shared. While professedly advocating *bunmei kaika* ("civilizing and enlightening"), the Japanese had what could be almost called a manifest premise that their survival be protected against the western imperialistic powers by adopting their culture.[43] The "national agreement" was later developed into a nationalism oriented towards the expansion of national power and defense buildup, which was the only course available for an impul-sive antagonism against "western barbarians," if intellectually con-trolled. Even the proclamation of *kaikoku* and amity was a part of a national defense plan, in which *jôi* was included as a possibility.[44] The seemingly conflicting ideas of *jôi-sakoku* and *kaikoku*-amity were consonant.

As a matter of fact, the focus of the national debate on *kaikoku* in 1850s was not on the pros and cons of the signing of the "unequal treaties," but how this kind of decision should be made. *Kaikoku* was not a matter of choice, but a *fait accompli*.[45] The fact would be fairly

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42. Sakatani Shiroshi. "Sonnô jôi," *Meiroku zasshi*, 43 (1875). Borrowing William Reynolds Braisted's translation from *Meiroku zasshi: Journal of the Japanese enlightenment*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 531.

43. Hirakawa Sukehiro. *Wakon yôsai no keifu: Uchi to soto kara no Meiji Nihon*. Kawade shobô shinsha, 1971, p. 348.

44. Hirakawa. 1971, p. 335; *Seiô no shôgeki to Nihon*, Kôdansha, 1985, pp. 111-12.

45. Satô Seizaburô. "Bakumatsu ni okeru seijiteki tairitsu no tokushitsu," in Yoshida Tsunekichi and Satô Seizaburô, N*ihon shisôshi taikei 56: Bakumatsu seiji ronshû*. Iwanami shoten, 1976, p. 574; Najita Tetsuo. *Japan: The intellec-*

understandable if one remembers that, back in 1842, the *Ikokusen uchiharai rei* (Order for the Repelling of Foreign Ships), the basis of the maritime defense policies since 1825, was already abrogated to avoid conflicts with western powers. At that point, Japan practically abandoned *sakoku* policy, or *jôi* as a foreign policy, and, on this keynote, smoothly reached the conclusion of the Treaty of Kanagawa without major conflict when Perry came in 1853 and 1854. One of the peculiarities of *jôi* is that it had the scope for, and was a means of, implementing *kaikoku*.

It should be also pointed out that the logic of *jôi* had to change in accordance with the development of the domestic political scene. As I stated earlier, *sonnô jôi* was intrinsically not only oriented toward maintaining the *status quo* by bolstering up the enfeebled Bakufu; it was also motivated to change the situation as another logical consequence of denouncing its misgovernment. It goes without saying that this ambiguity of *sonnô jôi* made it a common slogan of various political forces with different orientations in *bakumatsu*.[46]

When the Bakufu fell under the power of the conservatives, their chief concern was to sustain the present political structure; they purged reformists, and the Bakufu became incapable of either leading nationwide reformation or coping with the changing domestic and foreign situation. Thus, losing identity, the Bakufu kept "wandering in the highly volatile situation."[47] Such inefficiency of the Bakufu drew increasing criticism from Mito,[48] and gave rise to the "authority problem" of *shôgun*.[49] As the weakening of the Bakufu, or shogunate, became obvious, the *daimyô* and lower-class samurai of the

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tual foundations of modern Japanese politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 63.

46. *Rekishigaku jiten* 7. Kôbundô, 1999, p. 448.
47. Ishii Takashi. *Nihon kaikokushi*. Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1972, p. 406.
48. Najita. 1974, p. 50.
49. Harootunian, H. D. "Ideology as conflict," Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann (eds.), *Coflict in modern Japanese history*. Princeton: Priceton University Press, 1982, pp. 59-60.

leading *han*, as well as the Bakufu itself, started making a move to use *tennô* and the court.[50]

While the Bakufu tried to enforce its shaky power foundation by using *tennô*, *daimyô* attempted to expand their political influence through the medium of the court, undermining the power of shogunate by *sonnô*. Lower-class samurai, recognizing foreign pressure as a national crisis and equipped with the doctrine of culminating *sonnô jôi*, endeavored to achieve their political goals by making *tennô* the central point in fixing the national course. Furthermore, such ruled strata as *gônô* and *gôshô* (wealthy merchants) also supported *sonnô jôi*, as they sought to have an opportunity to participate in politics by changing the existing social system under *shôgun*.[51]

Next, a few vulnerable points of the logic of *sonnô jôi* should be indicated. First, it had such a variety of advocates that their assertions and causes ended up running to patterns, and their discussion becoming changeable. Second, while *sonnô jôi* had a blanket target of expelling whatever was threatening national independence, it basically remained the composition of two incompatible causes. *Tennô*, a nominal and sometimes inviolable ruler, was an object of manipulation after all, and his usability changed depending on the rise and fall of the *shôgun's* authority and the political strategies of the leading political force.[52] The logic of *sonnô jôi* could change whatever

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50. It seems that the Bakufu still maintained its power at the time of commotion caused by the coming of Perry. On his second arrival, the Bakufu requested some *daimyô* to dispatch forces as a part of the efforts to quiet Edo residents. No *daimyô* rejected the request, although they were concerned with the financial difficulties that would arise from this responsibility. While the coming of Perry is generally regarded as the beginning of the Bakufu's enfeeblement, this example illustrates that its control over *daimyô* was still functioning at this point. See Uematsu Toshihiro. "Peri-raikô to kokuji daimyô no dôin," *Nihon rekishi* 645 (2002) for detail.

51. Hon'gô Takamori. "Sonnô jôi ron," in *Kokushi dai jiten* 8. Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1987, p. 682.

52. Defining the Bakufu as the "powerholder" or the "regency" and arguing that it should demonstrate its "virtue" by worshipping *tennô*, Fujita

way according to its surroundings, its goal varying from *tôbaku* to *kaikoku*, to even patriotism.[53]

  Such a two-sided characteristic of *sonnô jôi* is typically embodied in Yoshida Shôin, a *bakumatsu* thinker, many of whose students became protagonists of the Meiji Restoration. He was a zealous *jôi* advocate and an outspoken *kaikoku* proponent,[54] and an aspect of his expansionism, or invasionism, that accompanies his advocacy of

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  Yûkoku insisted that the Bakufu is in charge of politics and should "rule kingly" in his *Seimeiron* (1791, On the reflection of Names). Aizawa Seishisai, in his *Shinron*, made some proposals for rebuilding the malfunctioning and oscillating *bakuhan* system by practicing *sonnô jôi*. Considering that the ground for the existence of the Bakufu was sought in the "practice of *sonnô jôi*," it seems the "productive use" of *tennô* was not aggressively pursued at this point. See Tôyama Shigeki. *Meiji ishin,* Iwanami shoten, 2000 [1951], p. 85. Even *kokugaku* in *bakumatsu*, typically seen in Nakazui Unsai, — although it aggressively insisted on *tennô's* legitimacy and later became the ideological foundation of the Meiji government, which claimed the right-eousness of *tennô's* "direct rule"— could not utilize *tennô* as a political tool, even though it placed him at the center of the national polity. See Terawaki Megumi. "*Sonnô jôi* undô no shisô: Nakazui Unsai o chûshin ni," *Rekishigaku kenkyû*, 553 (1986), p. 31. There is a great discrepancy between the *kokugaku* scholars and *sonnô jôi* advocates like Yoshida Shôin or the pro-tagonists of *ôsei fukko coup* and the new Meiji government, who "produc-tively used" *tennô* by the name of *sonnô jôi*.

53. On the difference of the *bakumatsu* political movements among *han*, there is an opinion that it was the product of not their difference in recognizing the concepts of *jôi* or *kôbu gattai*, but the different "methods" they used to justi-fy themselves in order to maintian their lordships. This view proposes a unique perspective to the conventional framework constructed by such post-war Japanese historians as Tôyama Shigeki and Inoue Kiyoshi. Inter-preting the moves of the *han* in the framework of the Chôshû-led radical political movement, these people had considered the *tôbaku* movement as the consequence of the majority of *han's* advocacy of *jôi*. Sasabe Masatoshi. "Jôi to jiko seitôka: Bunkyû ki Tottori han no seiji undô o sozai ni," *Rekishi hyôron*, 589 (1999).

54. Just as Yoshida Shôin went through drastic changes of ideas several times, his image and evaluation in later ages kept changing as time went on. For the images of Yoshida Shôin since Meiji era to the present, see Tanaka Akira. *Yoshida Shôin: Hentensuru jinbutsuzô*. Chûô kôron shinsha, 2001.

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kaikoku can be seen in the quotation at the opening of this article. Shôin and other *jôi* thinkers held that it would be a national disgrace and equal to abandoning Japan's own act of volition to open its ports following the demand of foreign powers, incurring their contempt and even threatening future national independence. Therefore, they maintained, Japan should deny the western demand and temporarily opt for *jôi* and, later, implement *kaikoku* as its own decision. In their concept, *kaikoku* was the ultimate goal and *jôi* only just a part of the strategy to achieve it.[55]

Tôyama Shigeki, a renowned scholar of modern Japanese history, once described *sonnô jôi* movement as following:[56]

> … it was turned to *tôbaku* by not negating *sonnô* but putting even more emphasis on *sonnô*. It was then turned to *kaikoku* for *jôi*, or *kaikoku* for expansion abroad, or invasion, precisely, by not negating *jôi* but putting even more emphasis on antagonism against foreign powers.

It could be safely said that Shôin's thought falls into this framework, although attention should be paid to the fact that his ultimate goal was not *tôbaku* but the preservation of national polity, for which purpose he came to advocate *tôbaku*. The following words of Tokutomi Soh are explanatory of Shôin's thought.[57]

> Shôin started from *jôi* and reached *sonnô*. He was a realistic *jôi* advocate and no utopian *sonnô* advocate. This is where he differed from Mito scholars. Of course, he revered *tennô*. Through

55. Oka. 1967, pp. 31-32. Yoshida Shôin regarded *tennô* as the authority by which the Bakufu should be chastised, although, in his last years, he conceived the idea of demanding *tennô* to sacrifice himself for *tôbaku* and Japan. He had twoconflicting images of *tennô* in his mind; *tennô* as an idea and as a reality. Okazaki Masamichi. *Itan to han'gyaku no shisôshi: Kindai Nihon ni okeru kakumei to ishin*. Perikansha, 1999, p. 53.
56. Tôyama. 2000 [1951], p. 117.
57. Tokutomi. 1981, p. 126.

his life, he was consistent in his spirit of *sonnô*, which became even stronger at the end. It should not be forgot, however, that he came to espouse *sonnô* out of his reverence of national polity. Therefore, he was not a *tôbaku* proponent from the first. Nor did he become one until the end. Seeing that *jôi* could not be executed by the Bakufu, nor could the national polity be preserved by it, he recognized the need to go out of his way to support *tôbaku*. Yet, even at that point, he did not set *tôbaku* as his final goal. He only came to support it out of sheer necessity in order to preserve the national polity, enlighten and inspire people, and enhance national glory.

Having pressed the Bakufu with the importance of ocean defense and having insisted on war with foreign powers, Mito scholars advocated *kaikoku* after all, and their slogan of *sonnô jôi* turned out to be a mere means to that end. In the background of this "defection" was the need of a policy, that would bring people to a national agreement. In other words, they resolutely cried for *jôi* but, seeing little prospect of succeeding, turned to *kaikoku*. Even Aizawa Seishisai, who had zealously propagated *jôi* in his *Shinron*, declared his reversal of opinion, stating that he had spent hundreds of thousands of words in asserting that Japan should not make peace with western barbarians, avoiding the unnecessary disclosing of his real intention.[58]

Behind this transformation was a logic that one needs to advocate *jôi* in order to become the subject of reform and a political leader, and, to stay as a subject, it was necessary to practice *kaikoku*. Based on this logic, the Meiji government, which came into being under the slogan of *jôi*, thoroughly switched to *kaikoku* policy as soon as it was established, informing the ministers from foreign countries of the completion of *ôsei fukko* and domestically proclaiming amity with western powers.[59]

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58. Andô Hideo. *Meiji ishin no genryû*, Kinokuniya shoten, 1994, pp. 214-15.
59. Kataoka Keiji. *Jôiron*, Izara *shobô*, 1974, p. 179.

Its meaning as a goal lost, *jôi* became a method, or an excuse. While *kaikoku* for *jôi's* sake was advocated in *sonnô jôi* discourse, *jôi* for *kaikoku's* sake was discussed in *tôbaku* discourse.[60]

In short, the overthrow of the Bakufu, the success of the *ôsei fukko coup d'etat*, and the establishment of the Meiji government were made possible not by practicing *jôi* movement, but by its sudden stop.

Such changeability of the logic of *sonnô jôi* stems from the basic fragility of the dual political structure of the *bakuhan* system, in which the *shôgun*, as a practical executioner of political power, and the *tennô*, a symbolic authority with little power, coexisted.[61] The Bakufu's ambiguous political ground never allowed "Tokugawa ideology"[62] to become a sound national ideology like (Neo-)Confu-

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60. Kano Masanao. *Nihon kindai shisô no keisei*, Ibaraki: Henkyôsha, 1976, p. 94.

61. If we encompass the cultural aspect in our discussion of the transition, the following explanation would be applicable; "…overall, the transition of *jôi* into *kaikoku* to *bunmei kaika* was made with comparative flexibility. One of the reasons was that the *bakuhan* system was fragile in its social and political structures and ruling ideology, while the other being the absence of solid structure in the international and cultural awareness of Japanese people, ruling orruled." Tôyama Shigeki. "Henkaku no shutai to minzoku mondai," in *Iwanami kôza Nihon rekishi* 24 <*bekkan* 1>, Iwanami shoten, 1977, p. 120.

62. In his study of the relationship between the early seventeenth-century Neo-Confucianism and the social and political order under Tokugawa rule, Ooms sees in Yamazaki Ansai [1618-82] Tokugawa ideology as the first and the only ideology Japan has created, or "ideological completion." Ooms shocked many Japanese scholars who had assumed Confucianism, particularly Neo-Confucianism, was the Bakufu's orthodoxy. Instead of equating Tokugawa ideology to Neo-Confucianism, Ooms defined it as a domestically created ideology which is characteristic of its components of Japanese religious mores including Buddhism and Shintoism. Kasai Hirotaka states that, in Ooms' discussion, the concept of ideology is used not for explaining the dynamics of social change, but as a tool for clarifying the unchangingness of history. Herman Ooms. *Tokugawa ideology: Early constructs, 1570-1680*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 288-89; Kasai Hirotaka. "(Shohyô) J. V. Koshuman cho, Yûichirô Tajiri, Naoyuki Umemori yaku,

cianism of Korea. Instead, it necessitated that the Bakufu modify Confucian thought, which would otherwise have bestowed it, like it did to China and Korea, with an ideological consistency through the ideas of rule-by-virtue and *yi-xing* (K. *yôksông*, J. *ekisei*) revolution (change of dynasty).[63] The absence of a value system that was strong enough for ideological control led to the rise of *kokugaku* and its impact on *sonnô jôi*. The instability and fragility of "Tokugawa ideology" is fully displayed in the fact that Confucianism was exposed to the unreserved attack of *kokugaku* once the need arose to emphasize the *tennô's* sacredness.

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63. Hon'gô. 1987, p. 681.

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