TWO MENCIAN POLITICAL NOTIONS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN

Introduction

Tokugawa (1603–1867) Confucianism has often been characterized as a feudal ideology that viewed political change as anathema.1 Missing from such accounts, however, is mention of Mencius (Chin: Mengzi, 372–289 B.C.; Jpn: Mōshi), the ancient Confucian philosopher who boldly defended even violent opposition to tyranny by arguing that political obedience was a conditional matter. Humane governments merited obedience, but abusive regimes that betrayed morality and violated humanity would, Mencius insisted, be overthrown by the people acting as brokers of Heaven’s justice. Mencius also elucidated scenarios in which individuals might martyr themselves in order to realize, or at least make a stand for, ideals that they strongly believed to be right. Even a survey of Tokugawa understandings of these seminal notions reveals that rather than serving any single ideological role they were variously endorsed and criticized by scholars supporting and opposing the ruling samurai regime.

Mencius on Rebellion and Martyrdom

Mencius recognized Heaven (tian) as the creator of the natural cosmos and as the religious force conferring political legitimacy (ming) on rulers who governed reverently, humanely, and ethically. He added that Heaven withdrew its mandate from rulers who regularly violated these religious-ethical criteria. Mencius’ ideas thus reiterated ones earlier articulated in the ancient Chinese Classic the Book of History (Shujing) under the rubric of tianming, or “the decree of Heaven.” Several versions of the tianming doctrine appear in the History, but Mencius favored the ones giving the people authority to act, even violently, as the virtual equivalents of Heaven regarding issues of political legitimacy.

In the Mencius, a sketch of what this essay calls the Mencian tianming theory surfaces in response to a student’s question, “Did the ancient sage emperor Yao give Shun authority to rule?” Mencius answers that a ruler cannot confer such power: Heaven alone can do that. But he adds that Heaven displays its will in diverse ways. For example, if a prospective ruler is presented to Heaven and its spiritual forces respond positively, then that reveals Heaven’s acceptance of him. And if the candidate is recommended to the people and they are pleased with him, that shows their approval. Mencius thus concludes that the evident consent of the spirits and humanity is needed to make a ruler legitimate. He then quotes the Book of History: “Heaven sees with the eyes and hears
with the ears of the people”—observing that this conveys the essence of the matter.3

Mencius stipulates, however, that if a ruler abandons morality and religion, he thereby forfeits his authority and will be removed once Heaven sanctions someone to execute its decision. Mencius claims that such a removal is not regicide, even when the decommissioned king is murdered. His reasoning is that the former ruler, due to his misrule, is a criminal, one whose overthrow amounts to an act of justice performed for the sake of the spirits and humanity. Thus Mencius was once asked whether King Tang (r. 1751–1739 B.C.), founder of the Shang dynasty (1751–1112 B.C.), had banished King Jie (r. 1802–1752 B.C.), the last and allegedly debauched king of the Xia dynasty (2183?–1752 B.C.), and whether King Wu (r. 1121–1104 B.C.), founder of the Zhou (1111–249 B.C.) dynasty, had overthrown King Zhou Xin (r. 1175–1112 B.C.), the last and purportedly evil Shang ruler. Mencius admitted that such was recorded in the Book of History. But when asked more generally whether subjects may assassinate their rulers without blame, Mencius pointed out that “a violator of humaneness is a tyrant and a betrayer of righteousness and justice is a despot. They are the vilest sort of humans.” Killing such a person, he reasoned, is not murder but rather the just and proper execution of a common criminal. Mencius allowed that tyrants like Zhou Xin had been executed but denied knowing of any true kings who had been murdered.4

Noteworthy here is that Mencius differed from Confucius regarding kings Tang and Wu. Confucius seldom referred to Wu though he praised Wu’s father King Wen (1231–1135 B.C.) for remaining loyal to the Shang dynasty long after he could have overthrown it. Mencius, however, applauded both Tang and Wu for benefiting humanity.5 Appraising Tang, Mencius said, “He punished tyrants and thus comforted the people like a timely rain. The people were greatly pleased.”’ Judging King Wu, he declared, “By one burst of his (righteous) anger Wu brought peace to the world.”6 Mencius’ praise for Tang and Wu shows that his brand of Confucianism sanctioned even violent, revolutionary moves against political tyranny. Mencius boldly forecast the fate of tyrants: they would be executed and their states lost. He also warned against cowardly submission to tyranny by noting, “If an inhumane man retains power his evil will be matched by the masses. When rulers lack morals the people will have no decent laws…. When rulers neglect propriety the people will ignore morality and lawlessness will run rampant. The state is thereupon doomed.” Mencius then recalled that dynasties won authority via humaneness and lost it via inhumane rule. Legitimacy, Mencius therefore concluded, derives from winning the hearts and minds of the people through humane government.7

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But Mencius also praised the exceptional integrity of Bo Yi (d. 1111
B.C.), famous in Chinese mythical history for remonstrating against King Wu’s plan to overthrow exile. After that military conquest, Bo Yi went into voluntary exile, refusing to eat the millet of the newly founded Zhou dynasty. He thus died of starvation, a martyr for the cause of personal integrity and dynastic legitimacy. Exalting Bo Yi as a sage, Mencius differed from Confucius, who only lauded Bo Yi as “a worthy.” It should be admitted, however, that Confucius had earlier adumbrated his own thoughts on martyrdom by observing, “The resolute scholar and humane man would never seek life by violating humaneness. Self-sacrifice might even be required in some circumstances for the sake of realizing humaneness.” Confucius further claimed that if one realized the Way in the morning, death that evening could come with peace. He even advised disciples to “defend until death the moral Way.” Martyrdom was hardly their central message, but Confucius and Mencius both advocated self-sacrifice as a last recourse for realizing absolute values.

Mencius abstractly explored the motives of individuals like Bo Yi by outlining a Confucian logic for martyrdom. Hypothetically he asked what one should do when one’s physical desires conflict with ethical imperatives. In response Mencius reasoned, “I desire life but also want what is right. If the two are incompatible, I would forfeit my life to do what is ethical.” He further explained, “I love life! But I also cherish ethical ideals more than mere existence. Therefore I would not do just anything simply to remain alive. Likewise I don’t want to die! But there are things that I detest worse than death. Given my priorities, hardships will be inevitable.” Mencius claims that such conflicts appear in everyone:

If people desired nothing more than life then why would they not do anything to insure that they remained alive? If people detested nothing more than death why would they not do absolutely anything to avoid it? People do recoil from evil even when they could save their lives by engaging in it. Because of this we know that people desire some things more than life and detest some more than even death. The moral consciousness exhibited belongs not only to worthies: everyone has it.

Mencius’ reasoning thus delineates the righteous logic operative in the minds of people like Bo Yi. Elsewhere Mencius describes Bo Yi as a man who refused anything improper, one who would only serve a just ruler governing a moral populace. Legends about Bo Yi suggest that when forced to choose righteousness or alternatives conducive to life such as eating, he chose righteousness even though it entailed death. Mencius never used the word yisi, Chinese for “martyr,” but he did admit that if rightness (yi) and life were incompatible, he would still choose yi. Implied, of course, was that with yi, he would also be choosing death (si).

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Little inference is needed to see in this choice a moral case for martyrdom, one modeled on the example of Bo Yi.

Neo-Confucian Modifications of Mencius

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), many Chinese scholars reasserted ancient Confucian values after centuries of Daoist and Buddhist domination. They thus crafted a new version of Confucianism, one with a somewhat materialistic ontology and a rather rationalistic metaphysics. Western scholars therefore generally refer to their thought as “Neo-Confucianism.” Neo-Confucians usually regarded Mencius as the last transmitter of Confucianism prior to the Song; thus Mencian ideas figured prominently in their novel rendition of Confucian philosophy. They did not, however, view Mencius as a sage, possibly because Mencius had so explicitly sanctioned violent opposition to people who at least claimed to be rulers. Neo-Confucians did not enthusiastically follow Mencius in advocating aggressive, even violent, confrontation with tyrants.

With Zhu Xi (1130–1200), the foremost author of the new Song Confucianism, Mencian ideas on tianming were relatively muted, while those praising ethical martyrdom became more pronounced. Zhu Xi’s “Essay on Humaneness,” for example, praised Bo Yi for appealing to Wu not to overthrow the Shang dynasty. Zhu next alludes to Confucius: “Self-sacrifice might be required for the sake of realizing humaneness,” and then to Mencius: “There are things that people desire more than life and detest more than death.”13 Zhu thus saw martyrdom as a legitimate and even laudable alternative for people faced with political situations wherein acting rightly left no option except death. Significantly, Tang and Wu, and their overthrow of the Xia and Shang dynasties, did not gain Zhu Xi’s commendation in his “Essay on Humaneness.”

Yet in tracing the transmission of the Way, Zhu included Tang and Wu while remaining silent about Bo Yi.14 He did this by distinguishing “the moral Way” (dao) from “expedients” (quan), and then deeming Tang’s and Wu’s deeds to be examples of the latter. Zhu explained that while expedients are consonant with what is right, they are not the moral Way, which should be followed whenever possible. Expedients were thus allowed only if the moral Way could not be enacted. Tang’s overthrow of Jie and Wu’s of Zhou Xin were, according to Zhu, such exceptions.15 Zhu, moreover, discouraged resorting to expedient means: only sages could rightly undertake them. While Zhu Xi followed Confucius in praising King Wen over Wu, he sided with Mencius in allowing that if Zhou Xin’s tyranny had reached its nadir during Wen’s day, then even Wen would have overthrown him.16 Most Neo-Confucians followed Zhu Xi, generally lauding martyrdom without reservation while reluctantly sanctioning violent confrontation with tyrants via appeal to the expedient as enacted by a sage.
Two points about this reluctance should be borne in mind. First, in Zhu Xi’s day the most likely contenders for political power, if violent military techniques were allowed, would have been the “barbarian” Jurchen peoples, who already ruled what had once been the northern heartland of Song China. Jurchen rule was anathema to the Chinese; rather than sanction a theory that could be manipulated to justify barbarian rule, Zhu Xi remained relatively silent about Tang and Wu. Second, the opinions of other scholars about the Mencius were much more conservative than those of Zhu. Sima Guang’s (1019–1086) Questioning Mencius (Gi Meng) and Chao Yuezhi’s (1059–1129) Censuring Mencius (Di Meng) criticized Mencius’ ideas about opposing despotic rulers, thus making Zhu Xi’s ideas appear relatively liberal by comparison.17

In the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Wang Yangming (1472–1529) further modified Mencian ideas on tianming and martyrdom; he recalled, for example, how Confucius judged that King Wu was “not perfectly good.” Wang explained that appraisal while also defending Wu by adding, “Under the circumstances Wu could not have done other than overthrow the Shang.” Wang differed from Zhu Xi in adding hypothetically that if Wu’s father, King Wen, had been alive when Wu attacked the Shang, then Wen’s goodness would have precluded the use of such military force.18 Without completely disparaging Wu, Wang Yangming, like Zhu Xi, extolled a more admirable and ethical exemplar than the conqueror king. Thus Wang, in ranking the ancient sages according to their weight in gold, assigned Tang, Wen, and Wu a collective cash value of “seven or eight thousand pounds” as compared to “four or five” for Bo Yi alone.19

Endorsing Mencius and the Tokugawa Regime

Extended discussions of Mencian ideas on the propriety of violent political confrontation and/or martyrdom were first elicited in Japanese history by sociopolitical exigencies arising from a sixteenth-century upheaval that culminated in the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu, or samurai government (1603–1867). Its founder, Tokugawa leyasu (1543–1616), had once pledged his loyalty to Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598), the samurai hegemon of Japan throughout most of the 1590s. However, after Hideyoshi’s death in 1598, leyasu began engineering an ad hoc political order that would avert renewed civil war. With the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, the victorious Tokugawa were acclaimed national overlords; in 1603, leyasu was formally appointed shogun by the emperor. But leyasu believed that if his new regime was to gain secure control, then the Toyotomi would have to be eliminated since they were a likely locus of rebellion, one fully capable of aborting the nascent political order.

Troubled by ethical issues surrounding this action, leyasu consulted
Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), a Neo-Confucian serving the regime. He asked rather euphemistically whether Tang and Wu had rightly overthrown the Xia and Shang dynasties. Ieyasu’s real anxiety was more contemporary: might his regime legitimately eliminate the recalcitrant and potentially rebellious Toyotomi loyalists? Ieyasu, repeating Zhu Xi’s views on Tang and Wu, said that they acted expeditiously but not according to the middle path. Razan, aware that Ieyasu had risen to power via warfare as had Tang and Wu, replied diplomatcally, claiming that Tang and Wu embodied both the middle path and the expedient. Razan’s answer apparently suited Ieyasu: he besieged Osaka Castle in 1614–1615, crushing the Toyotomi.20 Two and one-half centuries of peace followed—in a utilitarian way justifying the attack.

But Razan did not praise Tang and Wu simply to flatter Ieyasu. Writing eight years earlier, he had done basically the same in noting diverse Confucian appraisals of Tang and Wu and the martyrs Bo Yi and his brother Shu Qi. Razan recalled that Confucius himself avoided discussing Tang and Wu even though he extolled Bo Yi and Shu Qi; but Mencius approved of Wu’s execution of the tyrant Zhou Xin, denying that the deed was regicide. Mencius’ analysis, which Razan endorsed, praised Tang and Wu as ancient sages.21 Razan’s esteem for Tang and Wu was thus not mere sycophancy: it preceded his service to Ieyasu and was based on his knowledge of Mencius.

Razan also endorsed Mencius on martyrdom. His ethics primer Anthology of Spring Admonitions (Shunkanshō) explained the famous Mencian passage, “I desire life but I also want to do what is right. If the two are incompatible I would forfeit my life to do what is right.” Since Razan’s colloquial Japanese explication accurately recapitulates Mencius’ words, it need not be quoted. Suffice it to say that Tokugawa familiarity with the Mencian line on martyrdom derived partly from Razan’s promotion of it.22 Razan’s affirmation of the Mencian notions of tianming and martyrdom significantly exemplifies the Confucian readiness to sanction strategies of confrontation for the sake of establishing political order or realizing moral ideals.

Muro Kyūsō (1658–1734), an eighteenth-century Neo-Confucian scholar who also long served the bakufu, followed Razan in endorsing Mencian ideas on tianming. Kyūsō did so as an unrelenting critic of the school of Neo-Confucianism founded by Yamazaki Ansai (1618–1682) and known for its alleged fidelity to Zhu Xi’s ideas. Kyūsō claimed that the Kimon school’s insistence on submission to even tyrannical rulers showed that it fathomed the duties binding rulers and subjects but misconstrued the political significance of Tang and Wu. Kyūsō admitted the severity of Mencius’ judgment that Jie was executed for his tyranny and that true kings had never been murdered. But he insisted that Mencius’ warnings against tyranny were meant for all rulers.23 The latter, Kyūsō
thought, must be aware of Mencius’ admonishments if they hoped to escape the tragic fates that befell Jie and Zhou Xin. Significant here is that Kyūsō’s acceptance of Mencius was not meant to legitimize a questionable regime so much as to instill a heightened sense of responsibility in rulers whose authority, at least in the early eighteenth century, was not widely challenged.

Kyūsō reinterpreted Mencian ideas on self-sacrifice in service to righteousness by deeming them descriptions of the unique duties of Tokugawa samurai. Kyūsō differentiated samurai from merchants by linking samurai to righteous duty and merchants to profit. Modifying Mencius further, he added,

Samurai dedicate themselves to the Way so they can defend righteous duty. All men desire wealth but if it violates the Way then samurai will quickly shun it to honor the moral nature that they defend. Everyone desires life but if samurai must decide between existence and duty they will preserve righteous duty and forfeit life…. For samurai nothing is more paramount than duty.24

Kyūsō’s fusion of Mencian ideas on martyrdom for righteous duty and the emerging samurai ethic of Tokugawa Japan was echoed in Yama- moto Tsunetomo’s (1659–1719) Hagakure:

When faced with a life or death situation samurai will choose death…. Everyone prefers life to death but so often people just make excuses for remaining alive. But if the righteousness for which they lived is not realized then they lived as mere cowards. But if one chooses death then even if righteousness is not realized still cowardly disgrace does not blemish one’s decision.25

With Kyūsō, then, Mencius’ notion of tianming served not simply as a legitimizing strategy: it also warned rulers against tyranny. Kyūsō additionally modified Mencius’ ideas on martyrdom so that they no longer advocated a moral strategy for everyman, but instead described an element in the samurai ethic of commitment to righteous duty.

Challenging Mencius and the Tokugawa Bakufu

Before waging the Osaka campaign against the Toyotomi, Ieyasu posed the same question to Fujiwara Seika (1561–1619) that he had asked Razan. Seika, the preeminent Kyoto-based Neo-Confucian, had in 1604 recommended that Ieyasu hire Razan, who was then his student, as a scholar in service to the bakufu. Replying to Ieyasu in 1612, Seika, unlike his erstwhile disciple, frankly denied that the military conquests of Tang and Wu were consonant with ethical principles. He even had the temerity to ask Ieyasu what relevance military expeditions had to duties binding rulers and subjects?26 Razan said little about Bo Yi because Bo Yi’s martyrdom for the overthrown Shang made him more a potential exemplar for Toyotomi loyalists. Seika’s personal stance vis-à-vis the
*bakufu*, especially his withdrawal from public life, vaguely alluded to Bo Yi. Razan and Seika thus expressed diametrically opposed views regarding political legitimacy, but both were gleaned from Mencian ideas about confrontational behavior. Razan, accepting the Tokugawa as legitimate rulers, justified their attack on the Toyotomi; Seika, harboring loyalties to the Toyotomi, embodied Bo Yi’s path of principled withdrawal. Not an ideology exacting blind submission from all, Mencian Confucianism offered diverse strategies of confrontation and justified uniformly ethical stands, albeit for diverse understandings of what was the legitimate polity in Tokugawa Japan.

Kumazawa Banzan (1619–1691), a founder of the Ō Yōmei (Wang Yangming) school in Tokugawa Japan, was also an unrelenting critic of the Tokugawa regime. His relationship with the *bakufu* was therefore problematic at best. Banzan’s critiques were of course meant to strengthen the sociopolitical order; but still the *bakufu*, not appreciating his unsolicited advice, branded him an enemy. Banzan’s ties with Mencius are paradoxical: while partly relying on Mencius in challenging the *bakufu*, Banzan also often criticized major tenets of Mencian thought. His masterwork, *Dialogue on the Great Learning* (*Daigaku wakumon*), opens by asserting that rulers gain legitimacy by winning the minds-and-hearts of the people. But it adds, “Being humane in thought alone, without instituting humane government, is merely ‘an empty gesture of goodness.’”27 Banzan’s thinking alludes to Mencius twice. First, it reiterates Mencius’ analysis of political legitimacy, which states,

> It was by losing the people that Jie and Zhou lost legitimate rule, and by losing the minds-and-hearts of the people that they lost the people. There is a way to gain legitimate rule: win the people and you have won the empire. There is a way to win the people: win their minds-and-hearts and you will win them. . . . The people turn to humaneness just as water flows downwards.28

Second, the phrase “an empty gesture of goodness” alludes to Mencius’ view that simply knowing the Way does not make government truly humane. The latter rather depends on actively instituting the Way. Thus Mencius’ dictum, “Empty gestures of goodness do not make good government.”29 These allusions show that the same text that Razan relied upon to sanction Tokugawa rule was used by Banzan to critique the same. Banzan called for humane government, doubting that the Tokugawa regime was enacting it; and he explained how a ruler wins legitimacy, fearing that the shogunate was losing the same. With Banzan, then, the double-edged nature of Mencian political thought is especially manifest: it could be used as easily by a regime to justify its behavior as by the opposition intent on questioning it.

Banzan recoiled from endorsing Mencius’ claim that the people might legitimately overthrow tyrants. He was moreover an outspoken
critic of Tang and Wu. Banzan declared, for example, that those who mimicked Tang and Wu in Chinese history were mere rebels. While recognizing that Jie and Zhou were evil tyrants, he contrasted them with Yan Hui, Confucius’ favorite disciple, who died early, rather than Tang and Wu, their conquerors. In praising the great sages of China, Banzan sometimes lauded Yao, Shun, and the Duke of Zhou, omitting Tang and Wu. When he included Tang and Wu, Banzan added that they were the nadir of sagacity while Yao and Shun were its apogee. Banzan advocated martyrdom along Mencian lines, stating that the gentleman is unafraid of death if righteousness requires it, while commoners with their false bravery die even when death is unnecessary but flee when duty demands it. Banzan’s writings show that some Mencian ideas—those emphasizing the importance of instituting humane government rather than “empty gestures of goodness,” and the need for popular support if one wished to claim political legitimacy—were cited by thinkers challenging the bakufu.

Opposing the apparent dominance of Chinese thought, National Learning scholars revived the study of distinctively Japanese subjects while advocating an almost wholesale rejection of Chinese notions, especially those associated with Confucianism. Many National Learning scholars especially despaired Mencian political ideas, seeing in them teachings that promoted rebelliousness and treachery, which would ruin the national character of Japan. For example, Kamo Mabuchi (1697–1769), alluding to the evil that Tang and Wu instigated, characterized Chinese history after the Shang and Zhou dynasties as a rather chaotic alternation of anarchy and order. Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) also radically rejected Mencius in declaring that renunciation with a ruler was wrong, even when he was a despot. Norinaga charged that Mencian ideas about deposing tyrants in fact facilitated usurpation. Norinaga therefore judged that reverent submission to the emperor was the only proper stance for Japanese subjects. Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843) similarly lambasted Tang and Wu as scoundrels who had abandoned the great duty defining relations between rulers and subjects.

Ironically, Ōkuni Takamasa (1792–1871), a disciple of Atsutane, borrowed ideas from the ancient Chinese Legalist Han Feizi (d. 233 B.C.) in advancing his National Learning critique of Mencius. Takamasa thus repeated Han Feizi’s view of Chinese history, arguing that after Tang and Wu, ceaseless treachery ensued. Takamasa thus concluded that while in China disloyalty had been the constant principle, Japan, since antiquity, had never been tormented by the sort of rebellious subjects plaguing Chinese history. In Takamasa’s view, Japan therefore fully manifested the virtues of loyalty and duty, and thus relations between its divine ruler and his subjects remained correct. The radical opposition to the Mencius vented by these scholars shows that many who challenged the bakufu...

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kufu also questioned Mencian Confucianism, though without necessarily linking the two.

Opposing Mencian Rebellion and Supporting the Tokugawa Bakufu

Scholars affiliated with Yamazaki Ansai’s (1618–1682) Kimon school of Neo-Confucianism, known for its supposed devotion to Zhu Xi’s writings, regularly served the bakufu in one capacity or another during the final century and a half of its existence. Among other things, they proved that opposing Mencius was not tantamount to opposing the bakufu. In this context, Ansai’s “Prison Lament” (Kōyūsō) became the ambiguous touchstone by which the Kimon school allegedly defined itself, quite euphemistically, regarding the political problematic centering on the status of Tang and Wu. As a text, “Prison Lament” purports to explain Han Yu’s enigmatic “Lament on Youli Prison,” which, according to the comments of the Song Neo-Confucian philosopher Cheng Yi, had praised King Wen’s pure mind for never feeling malice toward Zhou Xin, the Shang tyrant, even after Zhou Xin had unjustly exiled King Wen to Youli.34

Zhu Xi’s interpretation, Ansai noted, reversed that of Cheng Yi. Rather than extol King Wen’s long-suffering loyalism, as Cheng Yi seemed to do, Zhu insisted that Wen had been neither naive nor submissive: he fully realized, Zhu claimed, that Zhou Xin was a tyrant in need of pointed remonstration. Zhu thus interpreted the poem as one encouraging subjects to remonstrate respectfully with their rulers when the latter embarked upon political courses that were either unjust or utterly evil.35 In commenting on the different Neo-Confucian readings of Han Yu’s poem, Ansai confessed that at first he had accepted Cheng Yi’s view, but then, after learning of Zhu’s ideas, he came partly to accept but partly to doubt them. Ansai concluded that Zhu, in turning Cheng Yi’s interpretation upside down, had correctly captured the essence of King Wen’s thinking and rightly defined relations between rulers and subjects. Ansai therefore appended both Cheng Yi’s and Zhu Xi’s remarks to the poem so as to affirm them both. Ansai’s personal debate over whether to endorse martyr-like loyalism to even a tyrant (supposedly Cheng Yi’s view) or martyr-like readiness to risk one’s life remonstrating against tyranny (Zhu Xi’s opinion) suggests that he had relatively little sympathy for either course, but the least for the more radical path that Tang and Wu represented and Mencius sanctioned: rebellion to overthrow tyrants.

Ansai’s Kimon disciple Asami Keisai (1652–1711) expanded his teacher’s thinking on the subject by vilifying Tang and Wu for resorting to force rather than remonstration. He stated,

From one violent overthrow myriad others have come. Rebellious ministers and murderous children trying to plunder a country always appeal to Tang and Wu.
Keisai lauded Tai Bo, King Wen’s uncle, who went into voluntary exile when his father made known his wish to be succeeded by Tai Bo’s younger brother, Wen’s father. For Keisai, deferent obedience rather than bold remonstration embodied the superior way. In an effort to make his view appear to be the orthodox one for the Kimon school, Keisai claimed that his teacher Ansai had stated,

In all creation there is no such thing as an evil ruler or an evil father. Thinking that there are such rulers and fathers is the crucible of assassination…. Whatever they might do judgment should neither be passed on one’s ruler or one’s father. Apart from exhausting ourselves in service to them, we have no role to play whatsoever.36

However, another of Ansai’s important Kimon disciples, Satō Naokata (1650–1719), apparently broke with his teacher by defending Tang and Wu as sages who supposedly acted on behalf of humanity in overthrowing Jie and Zhou. Naokata lauded Tang and Wu much as Razan had earlier, recalling that Mencius had first defended them via appeal to expediency. While correct in tracing Confucian defenses of Tang and Wu to Mencius, Naokata anachronistically wove Zhu’s distinction between “expedients” and “moral standards” into Mencian ideas by asserting that Mencius had sanctioned Tang’s and Wu’s deeds via appeal to expediency.37

Maruyama Masao has noted how Kimon scholars, rather than hewing to a single orthodoxy, variously defined themselves vis-à-vis the Tang-Wu problem via a doctrinal polarity that became most manifest in the debates between Keisai’s and Naokata’s divisions of the Kimon school.38 While Maruyama’s interpretation is insightful, the doctrinal polarity evident between Keisai and Naokata can be construed equally as a reflection of a fundamental Confucian disagreement over Tang and Wu. After all, Confucius equivocated over the same issues, allowing muted but real approbation for Tang and Wu, while praising Wen with unequivocal superlatives. Mencius, on the other hand, had announced a far more aggressive view, praising Tang and Wu by comparison. Within the context of Tokugawa intellectual history, the cleavage in Ansai’s school can also be seen as a reflection of the 1612 Razan-Seika split over the propriety of the conquests of Tang and Wu.

Ansai’s Shintō followers, known as the Suika school, resolved the issue with far greater unanimity, favoring the supposedly more anti-Mencian views of their founder, Ansai. One Suika theorist, Matsuoka Yūen (1701–1783), for example, claimed that for Japanese, the ruler-subject relationship was inviolable. Chinese might have admired yielding the throne to others, as with Yao and Shun, or overthrowing tyrants, as with Tang and Wu. In the Japanese mind, however, the latter amounted to subjects killing rulers and children murdering their parents.39 Some-
what similarly, Fujita Yūkoku (1774–1826), a scholar affiliated with the Mito domain and strongly influenced by Kimon doctrines, compared Tang and Wu, who overthrew tyrants, with King Wen, who, though he possessed virtue superior to the tyrant Zhou Xin, remained loyal to him. However, Yūkoku ultimately extolled King Wen for preserving the duties attendant to his station and status (meibun). Without being harsh, Yūkoku implied that Tang and Wu had overstepped their bounds in executing their rulers, even though the latter were debauched. Yūkoku supposedly meant to warn the Tokugawa, as a bakufu supporter, against daring to supplant the emperor even as it served him. Given the views of the Suika scholars, it seems that if any single school of Tokugawa thought was more concerned with inculcating obedience rather than the potential for principled opposition, it was that deriving from Yamazaki Ansai’s teachings, the contrarian views of Naokata and his disciples notwithstanding.

Endorsing Mencius and Opposing the Tokugawa Bakufu

Many critics of bakufu rule voiced their antagonism through the affirmation of Mencian ideas. Itō Jinsai (1627–1705), a Kyoto-based Ancient Learning scholar who sought to revive the original meanings of the Analects and the Mencius, implicitly recognized the semantic legitimacy of the Mencian tianming theory in criticizing Neo-Confucian views of Tang and Wu. Jinsai thus stated,

Neo-Confucians explain Tang and Wu’s conquests ... as expedient deeds but their views are mistaken.... Personal actions exemplify expediency. The Way is a universal ethical course that everybody shares; it is not something based on personal feelings!... Had Tang and Wu not overthrown Jie and Zhou, others would have.... Tang and Wu did not act on a whim: they did what humanity wanted done. Thus they embodied the moral Way.

Jinsai, a townsman who never traveled outside the imperial capital, was hardly interested in legitimizing bakufu rule. After all, within the context of Kyoto municipal politics he seems to have favored political participation by chōnin, or townspeople. Jinsai’s devotion to civilian, that is, non-samurai, rule might have indirectly, and ironically, influenced his belief that Mencius had lauded Tang and Wu as rulers because they had acted on behalf of “the people.” For Jinsai, endorsing Mencius meant not sanctioning a military leader but instead recognizing the popular sentiments legitimizing the deeds of Tang and Wu. Without popular approval, Jinsai emphasized, Tang and Wu would have been nothing more than mere opportunists. Jinsai rejected the Neo-Confucian view that Tang and Wu acted “expeditiously” because that interpretation implicitly de-emphasized the people’s role while at the same time elevating an impersonal, idealistic moral Way that was largely divorced from popular
flesh-and-blood sentiments. Jinsai’s support of Mencius was, then, a veiled and quite civil way of supporting “the people.”

Ôshio Chûsai (1793–1837), an Ô Yômei scholar and Osaka constable, saw no inconsistencies in endorsing Mencian tianming thought and militarily challenging the bakufu. According to Chûsai, Mencius’ views about the contingent nature of political power implied that the populace at large had leverage over their rulers. Chûsai thus suggested that rulers should beware of the consequences of “violating humaneness and betraying righteousness.” The latter were, incidentally, the evils that Mencius had cited in explaining why Jie and Zhou were tyrants and not kings, and why their executions by Tang and Wu amounted to capital punishment and not regicide. Chûsai’s rigorous teachings and his tragic fate—death by suicide as the anti-bakufu uprising that he led, protesting the mistreatment of Osaka indigents, ended in failure—reflected the desperate socioeconomic conditions of his age. They also reflected, significantly enough, the extent to which martyrdom and violent opposition to perceived tyranny occasionally merged in the minds of radical advocates of Mencian ideals.

In the writings of Yoshida Shôin (1830–1859), who first read the Mencius at age six, Mencian notions, especially on martyrdom, regularly surface. His 1851 travel diary, for example, reveals the young Shôin lecturing his companions on Mencius. A poem written during the journey even declare Shôin’s readiness to give up “fish and bear paws,” euphemistically expressing his readiness to martyr himself. Mencius, analyzing the conflict between duty and desire, had noted his fondness for fish and bear paws but admitted that if he could only have one he would want bear paws. Likewise Mencius related that he loved life and righteousness but would want the latter if only one could be had. Rejecting fish and bear paws meant, for Shôin, renunciation of life’s pleasures in favor of an existence dedicated to activism and aimed at saving Japan from foreign predators intent on dominating it. Shôin believed that the bakufu was both irreverent and tyrannical in submitting to the foreigners and in trying to force the emperor to recognize humiliating treaties that he otherwise opposed. Shôin therefore criticized it by advocating reverence for the emperor and expulsion of the foreigners intent on coercing Japan diplomatically.

Shôin thus modified the Mencian tianming position, making it applicable to Japan’s samurai rulers, and then used it to challenge bakufu authority. He accordingly argued that samurai should remonstrate with their masters; if ignored, they might commit suicide to force their masters to repent their misrule. Shôin also allowed that feudal lords should remonstrate the shogun, who, if those counsels were ignored, would be deemed a Jie or Zhou. Implied is that the shogun’s fate, at that point, would be virtually sealed. Shôin rejected, however, Mencian
ideas as they might have been applied by the bakufu to the emperor. Divine Japan, he claimed, belonged to one man: its emperor. Tragic rulers like Tang and Wu were never acknowledged in Japan because of the obedience Japanese owed their emperors, even if they were despots.46

In 1855 Shōin began a series of lectures on Mencius that would inform the martyr-complex so evident during his final years. In 1859, as the day of his execution for his role in a failed assassination plot directed at a bakufu official approached, Shōin’s meditations on life and death often paraphrased Mencius’ thoughts on martyrdom.47 Mencian ideas also appear in Shōin’s calls for sōmō kukki or “grass-roots uprisings.” In letters to his confederates, Shōin argued that only if grass-roots rebels seized the moment could the divine land (Japan) avoid foreign domination.48 The term sōmō (Chin: caomang) comes from the Mencius, where it refers to urban subjects and peasants of the hinterlands.49 In calling for sōmō kukki, Shōin largely understood the term as Mencius had.50 Ideas from Mencius were therefore as important to Tokugawa rebels as they were to the ideologues intent on sanctioning bakufu authority.

Mencian Political Thought in Early Meiji (1868–1912) Japan

In less obvious ways, discussions of Mencius’ tianming theory and his views about martyrdom continued well into the early Meiji period. For example, the leading intellectual of the age, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), assessed three possible reactions to tyranny: submission, revolution, and martyrdom. The first alternative he rejected with disgust; the second he dismissed due to the excessive violence associated with it; the third he endorsed as the only civilized way to challenge misrule. Here it would seem that Fukuzawa was continuing, in essence, a Tokugawa debate over the two Mencian notions of rebellion and martyrdom, endorsing in the process the latter strategy for opposition to tyranny much as Seika, Keisai, and Shōin had done earlier. In this analysis, however, one of Fukuzawa’s points was that citizens must not resort to vigilante justice or assassination as a means of political action.

Fukuzawa specifically condemned theoretical attempts at justifying assassination via reference to tenshū (Chin: tianzhu), or the Confucian notion of a “Heaven-decreed execution.” The latter notion alludes to the Mencius, which states, “The Book of History relates, ‘Heaven’s decree of execution for Jie was prompted by events within Jie’s own palace.’”51 Though Mencius attributed this statement to the Book of History, it no longer appears in that text as such. Nevertheless it does pertain directly to the tianming theory, especially as developed in the Mencius. Interpreted in relation to Mencian ideas, Fukuzawa’s critique of tenshū makes quite evident his unequivocal opposition to the violent tactics that Mencius had sanctioned in lauding Tang and Wu, even while Fukuzawa’s
praise for martyrdom as the only civilized way to check despotism can be construed as an endorsement of another Mencian option.

Essays published in Sômô zasshi (The People’s Journal), a periodical devoted to challenging the harsh 1875 Press Laws promulgated to preempt radical critiques of the Meiji regime, reverberate with Mencian themes. For example, Sawai Naoji’s “Oppressive Regimes Should Be Overthrown,” featured in the third issue, asserted that the people have a right and responsibility to overthrow any regime that violates the natural rights of humanity. Such a regime, Sawai argued, is not legitimate and so should not be obeyed. In another issue, Sato Yoshio’s “On Martyrdom” (“Gishi ron”), argued that while everyone loves life and despises death, even human happiness is a trifle compared to the well-being of a nation. However, Sawai reasons, if one sacrifices one’s life for the sake of realizing humaneness and preserving national liberty, then, though one’s bones bleach in the sun, ultimate happiness will be achieved.52 Not surprisingly, within months of its first issue, Sômô zasshi was shut down by the Minister of Home Affairs and its editor fined and imprisoned. Nevertheless, echoes of Mencian political thoughts on confronting tyranny continued, especially in the mid-Meiji Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (jiyû minken undô). Tracing them, however, is far beyond the scope of this essay. Still it should be evident that Tokugawa Confucianism, as developed in relation to the two Mencian notions discussed in this essay, stressed neither blind submission to tyranny nor feckless harmonization with despot. Instead the individual and social responsibility to challenge, via rebellion or martyrdom, regimes intent on abusing humanity.

NOTES

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Abbreviations are used in the Notes as follows:

LYYD Lunyu yinde (Concordance to the Analects) (see note 3 below)
MZYD Mengzi yinde (Concordance to the Mencius) (see note 3 below)


3 – Hong Ye et al., eds., *Lunyu yinde/Mengzi yinde* (Concordance to the *Analects* and the *Mencius*) (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1988) 5A/5, p. 36. The notes hereafter abbreviate *Lunyu yinde/Mengzi yinde* as *MZYD* (*Mengzi yinde*, Concordance to the *Mencius*) when referring to the *Mencius*, and as *LYYD* (*Lunyu yinde*, Concordance to the *Analects*) when referring to the *Analects*.

4 – *MZYD* 1B/8, p. 7.


6 – MZYD 1B/11, p. 8; 1B/3, p. 6.

7 – MZYD 4A/2, 4A/1, 4A/3, pp. 26–27.


9 – LYYD 7/15, p. 12; MZYD 5B/1, p. 39.

10 – LYYD 15/9, p. 31; 4/8, p. 6; 8/13, p. 14; 14/17, p. 28.

11 – MZYD 6A/10, pp. 44–45.

12 – MZYD 5B/1, p. 38.


19 – Ibid., p. 60.

20 – Hori Isao, Hayashi Razan (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1964), p. 446. Hori’s discussion of this debate, including Seika’s role in it, appears on pp. 159–164.


22 – Hayashi Razan, Shunkanshō, in Fujiwara Seika/Hayashi Razan, ed.


26 – Hori, Hayashi Razan, pp. 159–164.


28 – MZYD 4A/10, p. 27.


43 – Ōshio Chūsai, Senshin dōsakki, in Satō Issai/Ōshio Chūsai, ed. John Allen Tucker


49 – *MZYD* 5B/7, p. 41.

50 – Matsumoto, *Yoshida Shōin*, p. 23. Shōin was not the only late-Tokugawa thinker to use the word *sōmō*: in his *Iwa ni musu koke* (Rock moss), Ikuta Yorozu (1801–1837), a National Learning scholar, did the same. The annotations to Shōin’s writings trace *sōmō* to the *Mencius*, and note that it had referred to people lacking political power (as it did in the *Mencius*) at least since early Tokugawa times. Matsumoto adds that some forms of the nineteenth-century National Learning movement, especially those emerging from the schools of Norinaga and Atsutane, can be called *sōmō no kokugaku*, indicating their roots in the hinterlands. Cf. Ikuta Yorozu, *Iwa ni musu koke*, in *Kokugaku undō no shisō*, NST, vol. 51, p. 22; “Supplementary Notes,” ibid., p. 606; Matsumoto Sannosuke, “Bakumatsu kokugaku no shisōshiteki igi,” ibid. p. 634.


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